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AGAINST MERITOCRACY
Meritocracy today involves the idea that whatever your social position at
birth, society ought to oﬀer enough opportunity and mobility for ‘talent’ to
combine with ‘eﬀort’ in order to ‘rise to the top’. This idea is one of the
most prevalent social and cultural tropes of our time, as palpable in the
speeches of politicians as in popular culture. In this book Jo Littler argues that
meritocracy is the key cultural means of legitimation for contemporary neo-
liberal culture – and that whilst it promises opportunity, it in fact creates
new forms of social division.
Against Meritocracy is split into two parts. Part I explores the genealogies of
meritocracy within social theory, political discourse and working cultures. It
traces the dramatic U-turn in meritocracy’s meaning, from socialist slur to a
contemporary ideal of how a society should be organised. Part II uses a series
of case studies to analyse the cultural pull of popular ‘parables of progress’,
from reality TV to the super-rich and celebrity CEOs, from social media
controversies to the rise of the ‘mumpreneur’. Paying special attention to the
role of gender, ‘race’ and class, this book provides new conceptualisations of
the meaning of meritocracy in contemporary culture and society.
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INTRODUCTION
Ladders and snakes
Meritocracy contradicts the principle of equality, of an equalitarian democracy,
no less than any other oligarchy.
Hannah Arendt1
Meritocracy as plutocracy
Meritocracy today entails the idea that whatever your social position at birth,
society ought to oﬀer enough opportunity and mobility for ‘talent’ to combine
with ‘eﬀort’ in order to ‘rise to the top’. This idea is one of the prevalent social
and cultural tropes of our time, as palpable in the speeches of politicians as in
popular culture. In the UK, Prime Minister Theresa May proclaims that ‘I
want Britain to be the world’s great meritocracy – a country where everyone
has a fair chance to go as far as their talent and their hard work will allow’ (May
2016). The former US president, Barack Obama, pronounced that ‘we are true
to our creed when a little girl born into the bleakest poverty knows that she has
the same chance to succeed as anybody else’; the new US President Donald
Trump argues that ‘we must create a level playing ﬁeld for American compa-
nies and workers’ (Obama 2013, Trump 2017). In South Africa, President
Jacob Zuma is regularly castigated in the press for not being meritocratic
enough (James 2012; Soko 2015). Globally franchised TV talent shows like Idol
and The Apprentice promote the idea of a social landscape in which talent, plus
eﬀort, ‘will out’. As Thomas Piketty recently put it in his economic bestseller
Capital in the Twenty-First Century, ‘our democratic societies rest on a merito-
cratic worldview’ (Piketty 2013: 297).
This book argues that it is not merely a coincidence that a pronounced
lack of social mobility and the continual importance of inherited wealth
(Piketty 2013; Dorling 2011; Marmot 2004; McNamee and Miller 2009;
Wilkinson and Pickett 2010) co-exist with the common idea that we live in
a meritocratic age. On the contrary: the idea of meritocracy has become a
key means through which plutocracy – or government by a wealthy elite –
perpetuates, reproduces and extends itself. Meritocracy has become the key
means of cultural legitimation for contemporary capitalist culture.
In particular, over the past few decades, the language of meritocracy has
become an alibi for plutocracy and a key ideological term in the reproduction of
neoliberal culture. And in the Global North it has done so by seizing the idea,
practice and discourse of greater social equality that gradually emerged in the
ﬁrst half of the twentieth century and the struggles over identity politics and
recognition in the late 1960s and marketising them. Meritocracy has long his-
torical roots, but it also has a new face. It proclaims greater equality of opportu-
nity for more people than ever before. We have been encouraged to believe that
if we try hard enough we can make it: that race or class or gender are not, on a
fundamental level, signiﬁcant barriers to success. To release our inner talent, we
need to work hard and market ourselves in the right way to achieve success.
There are then two signiﬁcantly new features about the culture of mer-
itocracy today. Firstly, it has drawn on the movements for greater equality
that emerged and grew stronger in the Global North over the twentieth
century. Secondly, it is characterised by the sheer extent of its attempts to
atomise people as individuals who must compete with each other to succeed,
by extending entrepreneurial behaviour into the nooks and crannies of
everyday life. The interaction between these characteristics is crucial. The
attempt to absorb the language of equality and identity politics into entrepre-
neurial self-fashioning has created lonely forms of selective empowerment,
ones profoundly ill-equipped to deal with the wider structural causes of
sexism, racism, environmental crisis and economic inequality.
Meritocracy is regularly symbolised in popular and political culture by the
image of the ladder. Making a ‘ladder of opportunity’ available for all to
climb is a motif regularly employed by politicians. At the 2013 Conservative
Party conference, David Cameron pronounced ‘you help people by putting
up ladders that they can climb through their own eﬀorts’ (Cameron 2013).
In the early 2000s, it was a catchphrase of Australian opposition leader Mark
Latham, who used it so much that he became known in some quarters as
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‘Lord of the Rungs’ (Hudson 2004). ‘The ladder of success is best climbed
by standing on the rungs of opportunity’ asserts a widely reproduced motiva-
tional quote, appearing on multiple fridge magnets and digital memes, often
attributed to the twentieth-century right-wing libertarian guru Ayn Rand.2
Meritocracy may seem a very contemporary idea, but, as Raymond
Williams argued in a book review in 1958, the ladder is a perfect symbol of
the bourgeois idea of society, for, while it undoubtedly oﬀers the opportunity
to climb, ‘it is a device that can only be used individually; you go up the
ladder alone’. Such an ‘alternative to solidarity’, pointed out Williams, has
dazzled many working-class leaders and is objectionable in two respects:
ﬁrstly, it weakens community and the task of common betterment; and
secondly, it ‘sweetens the poison of hierarchy’ by oﬀering advancement
through merit rather than money or birth, whilst retaining a commitment
to the very notion of hierarchy itself (Williams 1958: 331). This double move
is a core characteristic of meritocratic discourse: it promises opportunity
whilst producing social division. In the contemporary era, the promises of
meritocracy have become increasingly loud and competitive participation
has come to be presented as a moral obligation at the same time as the
ladders have grown longer.
What’s wrong with meritocracy? Five problems
The drawbacks of meritocracy as an ideal and as an actual social system is
the subject of the entire book. For the purposes of this introduction, I will
sketch ﬁve of its key problems. The ﬁrst problem with the contemporary
meaning of meritocracy is that it endorses a competitive, linear, hierarchical
system in which by deﬁnition certain people must be left behind. The top
cannot exist without the bottom. Not everyone can ‘rise’. Unrealised talent
is therefore both the necessary and structural condition of its existence. The
forms taken by many examples of contemporary celebrity and reality
TV talent shows have exempliﬁed this structure, as I explore in chapter 2,
dramatising these assumptions through widely consumed forms of public
entertainment. Meritocracy oﬀers a ladder system of social mobility, pro-
moting a socially corrosive ethic of competitive self-interest which both
legitimises inequality and damages community ‘by requiring people to be in
a permanent state of competition with each other’ (Hickman 2009). The
‘fair’ neoliberal meritocratic dream rests on the idea of a level playing ﬁeld,
conveniently ignoring systematic inequality, social location and the head
start accrued by the children of those at the top or high up the social ladder.
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Much empirical and critical work emerged in and around social science
since the 2000s on the limitations of and problems with ‘social mobility’ as a
descriptive concept and a normative aim. These limitations have become
more apparent as the marketising eﬀects of neoliberalism have ripped
through the forms of social protection built up in the Global North in the
mid-century and the gap between rich and poor has become increasingly
wide. In The Meritocracy Myth, for example, American sociologists Stephen
McNamee and Robert Miller examine the prevailing belief that ‘people get
out of the system what they put into it based on individual merit’ and
conclude that, while US society has reduced some of its prejudicial
inequalities structuring the opportunities for women and non-whites, ‘the
most important factor for determining where people end up economically is
where they started in the ﬁrst place’ (McNamee and Miller 2009: 16). ‘The
simple fact’, they write, ‘is that there is far more talent, intelligence, hard
work, and ability in the population than there are people lucky enough to
ﬁnd themselves in a position to exploit them’ (McNamee and Miller 2009:
19). The fact that the expansion of inequality militates against social mobility
has become a preoccupation of a number of recent authors (Piketty 2013;
Bloodworth 2016; Wilkinson and Pikett 2010).
The second problem is that the contemporary logic of meritocracy
frequently (though not always) assumes that talent and intelligence are innate:
it depends on an essentialised conception of intellect and aptitude. In other
words, it primarily assumes an ability which is inborn and either given the
chance or not to succeed. This notion of intelligence is overwhelmingly sin-
gular and linear. Its problems are powerfully critiqued in the magniﬁcent
multi-authored book Inequality by Design, which shows how a particularly
narrow notion of intelligence, in the form of psychometric testing of IQs,
structured ‘the bell curve’ debates in the US in the 1990s and became a conduit
for renewed racism towards African Americans (Fischer et al. 1996). Con-
clusively demonstrating that context shapes IQ scores and discussing the history
of the IQ test in military planning, they foreground the sheer complexity of
the thing we call ‘intelligence’ and the vast range of methods which are, have
been or could be used to measure it. Such techniques include Raymond Cat-
tell’s distinction between crystallised and ﬂuid intelligence and Joy Guilford’s
analysis of at least 120 components of intelligence (Fischer et al. 1996: 26–27).
These are conceptions of intelligence as multiple and various: of it as a living
phenomena which can change and grow in numerous directions.
Carried to its logical conclusion, a hermetic conception of intelligence as
a sealed and singular entity shares, as Michael Young intimated in his classic
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1958 work The Rise of the Meritocracy, the logic of eugenics (Young 1994).
This elitist ‘myth of inherent diﬀerence’ accelerated in intensity in aﬄuent
nations during the 1950s. In Britain, as Danny Dorling points out, ‘the state
enthusiastically sponsored the division of children into types, with the
amount spent per head on grammar school children being much higher
than on those at the alternative secondary moderns’ (Dorling 2011: 870).
What Dorling terms ‘apartheid schooling’ was challenged in the 1960s and
1970s, but it was this 1950s’ rising tide of elitist stratiﬁcation in both schools
and society that in part promptedMichael Young’s use of the term ‘meritocracy’
in 1958. All these events were possible because of the ambiguous nature of
‘merit’.
The third problem with the contemporary idea of meritocracy is that it
ignores the fact that climbing the ladder is simply much harder for some
people than others. Gloria Pritschet and Tobias Mixer’s art installation
‘Upward Mobility’, featuring two parts of a ladder with a large gap in the
middle, beautifully illustrates this point (Figure I.1; see Metsker 2012). For
some people the rungs of the ladder are not as available or as tangible in the
same way as for others: the top is placed out of reach. This can be as much
about the social context of the time as, for example, the positon of a parti-
cular family within it. For instance, as I discuss in chapter 2, the chances of
upward social mobility for working-class people in mid-twentieth-century
Britain were far greater than for their parents – or for their children in the
period since 1980 – due to the expansion and then the contraction of the
welfare state and public sector. There was more ‘room at the top’ for that
particular generation at that particular time and in that particular place.
In addition, the availability of material and psychological resources
depends on social location. Whether you have the opportunity to touch a
musical instrument, spend time practising it or becoming accomplished at it
depends on the availability of the instrument and the demands on time as
much as anything else (such as physiological facility, self-identity or available
tuition). What Fischer and his colleagues term ‘the triumvirate of deprivation,
segregation and stigma’ directly aﬀects performance and life chances, and
the realms of housing and education and work opportunities have to be
considered together: ‘what does a good education mean when there is little
surety it will bring a good job? What does a good job mean when choice of
neighbourhoods is restricted?’ (Fischer et al. 1996: 185). As Stuart Hall put
it, some people are positioned at the bottom of a number of diﬀerent ladders
and within a multiple series of disadvantages, in terms of, for example,
ethnicity, single parenthood or technology (The Stuart Hall Project 2013).3
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I explore these permutations and intersections of social position and identity
with meritocratic structures and discourse in chapter 2.
The fourth key problem with the contemporary ideology of meritocracy
is its uncritical valorisation of particular forms of status, in the hierarchical
ranking of professions and status it endorses. Certain professions are posi-
tioned at the top, but why they are there – and whether they should be
there – tends to be less discussed. Why do singer or entrepreneur become
FIGURE I.1 ‘Upward Mobility’ by Gloria Pritschet and Tobias Mixer, exhibited
at Grammar of the Elite, The Gallery Project, Ann Arbor, Michigan,
2012. Photograph by Jennifer Metsker. Reproduced courtesy of the
photographer, the artists and the Gallery Project.
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roles to aspire to above those of vet or nurse? Why, today, as income dis-
parity widens, are celebrity-based professions rising in ascribed status? What
exactly is being ‘made’ when we ‘make it’? And in what, and whose,
interests is it being ‘made’ for? These are not questions that mainstream
commercial or political culture like to ask today. The question of what
exactly is being rewarded by social mobility is rarely posed.
The notion of ‘escape’ introduces an interconnected problem: con-
temporary meritocracy’s frequent validation of upper-middle-class values as
norms to aspire to and its rendering of working-class cultures as abject. The
language of meritocracy is about moving upwards in ﬁnancial and class
terms, but whilst this may entail, for example, being better fed, it does not
mean existing in a ‘better’ or ‘happier’ culture. Middle-class suburbs are not
usually better places for socialising or connecting with a range of people
than housing estates, for instance.4 Contemporary neoliberal discourses of
meritocracy, however, assume that all progressive movement must happen
upwards and, in the process, contribute to the positioning of working-class
cultures as the ‘underclass’, as abject zones and as lives to ﬂee from. This is a
tendency that has exacerbated since the 1970s under neoliberalism (Tyler
2013; Skeggs 2003; McKenzie 2015), which broadly speaking involves the
promotion of corporate power, the marketisation of collective provision
and the idea that competition is the organising principle for all areas of life.
The ﬁfth key problem with the contemporary ideology of meritocracy,
and the one which moves us into the territory of considering why it has
such currency and power, is that it functions as an ideological myth to
obscure and extend economic and social inequalities. Recent social-science
research into meritocracy and social mobility has picked up on this issue.
McNamee and Miller, for instance, have argued that, in America, ‘meritocracy’
is a word that is both inaccurate and harmful and that its use legitimises
inequalities of power and privilege through ‘claims that are demonstrably
false’ (McNamee and Miller 2009: 22). Their book’s title The Meritocracy
Myth has been used (with a slight variation) in a UK context by the political
journalist James Bloodworth, whose short polemic The Myth of Meritocracy
attacked increasing inequality in the UK (Bloodworth 2016). As we will see
later, one of the key components of this ideological myth is how ‘eﬀort’ is
over-valued, and social and economic location is not considered or ignored
(Khan 2010). The emphasis on eﬀort is the element of meritocracy that has
been expanded in recent years. An over-emphasis on merit obscures the
unevenness of the social playing ﬁeld, with its profound dis/advantages of
parental wealth and social location. The neoliberal idea of meritocracy as
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enabling a fair system of social mobility is therefore both profoundly unfair
and an ideological sleight of hand, working to justify a system based on
greed and extensive structural injustice.
The dominant meaning of meritocracy in circulation today might there-
fore be broadly characterised as a potent blend of an essentialised and
exclusionary notion of ‘talent’, competitive individualism and the need for
social mobility. Neoliberal meritocracy promotes the idea of individualistic,
competitive success, symbolised by the ladder of opportunity. This book
analyses this particular cultural cocktail, by considering how the claims of
meritocracy have worked and circulated in terms of political narrative and
public discourse. It argues for abandoning this notion of the individual social
ladder altogether and replacing it with the less divisive priorities of mutual
progress and egalitarianism.
I explore the theoretical implications of the alternatives more fully in
chapter 1 and the practical incarnations of such alternatives more fully in the
conclusion. The rest of the book is taken up with a multifaceted analysis of
meritocracy. This is partly because meritocracy is strangely under-theorised,
and, when it is analysed, it is analysed in a profoundly uni-disciplinary
fashion, having predominantly been the concern of academics in educational
and social policy and political journalists. I suggest that, in order to understand
its strength and potency, we need to draw on other disciplines and tools, on
its cultural and political as well as economic and empirical dimensions.
Meritocracy needs to be unpacked as an ideologically charged discourse
which permeates so many areas from school to work to reality TV.
Meritocracy as social system and as ideological discourse
It is useful to distinguish between two key forms of meritocracy. Meritocracy
ﬁrstly refers to a social system which is based around the idea that individuals
are responsible for working hard to activate their talent and thus one in
which the majority will arrive at social positions for which they are suitable
and appropriately rewarded. It has as its core tenets social mobility and
equality of opportunity and is therefore legitimated by a very diﬀerent
conceptual structure from that of a social system based around economic
and cultural redistribution. However, the uncomfortable fact is that those
who ‘achieve’ pass on more privilege to their children, thus contributing to
unequal social starting blocks. Even a 2010 OECD report, pointing out
the statistically low levels of social mobility in the US and UK in compar-
ison to the Nordic countries and Canada, concluded that its data showed
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how ‘intergenerational social mobility reﬂects equality of opportunities’
(OECD 2010: 2). Whilst social scientists argue over the details, particularly
distinctions between income and occupation, they unequivocally concur
that, for most working- and lower-middle-class people in the UK and the
US the potential for social mobility has in fact declined over the past few
decades (Savage et al. 2015: 187–207; Bukodi et al. 2015; Goldthorpe 2013;
Goldthorpe and Jackson 2007).5 It is therefore in part what is deemed to be
a socially acceptable level of unevenness which either substantiates or
threatens a ‘meritocratic’ order.
The form a meritocratic social system takes is contextually speciﬁc. For
instance, it took a diﬀerent form in the civil service examinations conducted in
imperial China than in Britain in 1945 when SecondWorldWar social provision
was expanded into the welfare state, and it takes a diﬀerent form again in the
contemporary education systems of Singapore (Elman 2013; Todd 2015; Talib
and Fitzgerald 2015). A meritocratic social system cannot be divorced from an
understanding of how it functions in connection with the contextual issues of
economic and cultural redistribution and recognition (in terms of, for example,
the roles assigned and enabled in terms of physical ability, gender or caste) and
with how social success is demarcated and ﬁnancially and culturally rewarded.
In a second, equally important sense, meritocracy needs to be understood
as an ideological discourse, as a system of beliefs which constitute a general
worldview and uphold particular power dynamics. This in turn brings us
back to the classic 1970s debates on ideology and hegemony (Hall 1986;
Grossberg and Hall 1986; Laclau 2002; Lash 2007). As I have discussed
elsewhere (Littler 2017) ‘ideology’ is a charged term: from its original
eighteenth-century designation by Desutt de Tracey to mean ‘the science of
ideas’, through Napoleon’s inﬂuential use of it as a pejorative term, it became
adopted by Marx to understand how social relationships work to legitimise
capitalism (Williams 1983; Marx and Engels 1987). This meaning of ideology
was extended by Althusser and Gramsci to consider its ritual and material
functions, psychological eﬀects and role in cultural power struggles
(Althusser 2014; Gramsci 2005). Analysing ideology could therefore be used
to understand both institutional practice and discursive norms. In their
work, greater attention was paid to the instabilities of ideology: to how
struggles over meaning were contests to secure hegemony or to secure
more dominant forms of social, political and economic power and control.
These elements are very useful for understanding meritocracy.
The term ‘discourse’ in its cultural rather than linguistic sense was used
by social theorists, particularly Michel Foucault, from the 1980s, to bypass
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some of the problems involved in the implication of ‘false consciousness’
that ideology carried, particularly when crudely applied (Foucault 1981;
Hall 1997; Mills 1997). ‘Discourse’ meant a set of shared meanings in a
historically speciﬁc ‘discursive formation’, and it could be conveyed through
institutions, imagery and behaviour as well as language. Particular discourses
lay claims to truth and work through institutions to set the boundaries of
acceptable behaviour. Yet this usage also lost its connection to and stake in
understanding how political power dynamics and vested interests were
reproduced (thus chiming with this apolitical critical era of postmodern
relativism). Here then I tend to use the term ‘ideological discourse’ in the
same spirit that cultural studies, in its CCCS-derived manifestation, impli-
citly tended to: in order to retain the power of both of these critical terms
whilst being alert to the reductive possibilities of each, and using them to
oﬀset each other’s limitations (Hall 1986; Grossberg and Hall 1986;
McRobbie 1978). When I use the phrases ‘meritocratic ideology’ or ‘mer-
itocratic discourse’ in this book it is in the vein of this critical spirit and set
of theoretical writings.
Crucially, the meaning of meritocracy as an ideological discourse is con-
textually speciﬁc. The project of this book is to map some of its diﬀerent
key contemporary manifestations, and so chapter 1 develops a schema of
diﬀerent contextual moments, explaining how ‘social democratic mer-
itocracy’ is a very diﬀerent formation from ‘neoliberal meritocracy’. This
schema is, of course, not conclusive and is geographically restricted by my
own resources and knowledge. But what considering meritocracy as an
ideological discourse also does is to enable us to analyse how ideas come to
gain traction and to hold sway, and how a social system can be built and
endorsed around it: because meritocracy as a social system and meritocracy
as an ideological discourse are intimately connected. For instance, most
contemporary large-scale sociological surveys of public attitudes in the UK
indicate that whilst the majority of the public believes that society is
unequal, they also believe there is enough meritocratic opportunity for
people to get on if they really want to. Factors such as family wealth and
ethnicity in the 2009 British Social Attitudes survey were regarded as
important to getting ahead by only 14% and 8% respectively, a drop
from 21% and 16% in 1987 (BSA 2009). By contrast, 84% of the inter-
viewed public believed that hard work was important, and 71% believed
that ambition was. In later ﬁndings carried out for the Joseph Rowntree
Foundation, 69% of the public agreed with the statement: ‘Opportunities
are not equal in Britain today, but there is enough opportunity for virtually
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everyone to get on in life if they really want to. It comes down to the
individual and how much you are motivated’. Only 14% disagreed
(Bamﬁeld and Horton 2009: 24).
In other words, in both surveys the majority of people interviewed
thought society was unequal but fair, socially mobile and meritocratic
enough for the majority to get ahead if they wanted to. Similarly, a 2008
US-based survey indicated that two-thirds of Americans agreed that people
are rewarded for intelligence and skill, but only one ﬁfth thought that
having a wealthy family was important for getting ahead (McNamee and
Miller 2009: 2–3). All these surveys are historically speciﬁc, however; and,
in the later UK survey, carried out on the cusp of the ﬁnancial crisis, there
were already signs that the degree of acceptable wealth disparity was
becoming breached, with excessively large incomes receiving more con-
demnation. These ﬂuctuating attitudes indicate the imbrication between
meritocracy as an ideological discourse and the wider social structure. They
also indicate an increasing contemporary dissatisfaction with meritocracy as a
persuasive ideological discourse in the Global North since the ﬁnancial
crisis, an issue borne out by a recent rapid increase in reference to, com-
mentary on and questioning of the subject (Hennessey 2015; Hattenstone
2016; Bloodworth 2016; Frank 2016).
This book shows how diﬀerent constituencies have been encouraged to
adopt meritocratic ideas for a range of historical and cultural reasons, and
how they have been persuasive (or not). For instance, chapter 4 shows how
those particularly likely to believe in the worth of meritocracy are those
sections of the super-rich who have experienced upward social mobility,
unlike vast swathes of the population. Chapter 6 discusses how new
mothers are incited to put faith in neoliberal meritocratic solutions due to a
combination of their presentation as feminist, their mediated ubiquity and
the paucity of other viable solutions. What can be termed ‘the cultural pull
of meritocratic hope’ is therefore produced by highly speciﬁc vested interests,
the successful aﬀective resonance of meritocratic narratives, and the limited
range of available options in a given social context.
Considering how the cultural pull of meritocracy is expressed in its various
incarnations across media forms is therefore a key part of this project. But
equally I am not interested in mediated meritocracy as a free-standing entity
sealed oﬀ from politics and geography and society. I want to explore how
meritocracy operates across a number of interconnected realms to get a
better sense of what it is doing and what it means. This for me is the
strength of the approach of cultural studies: to consider how ‘everything
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connects to everything else’ in order to evaluate the power dynamics that
constitute meritocracy. This book therefore uses a multifaceted, transdisci-
plinary cultural studies approach to analyse how the contemporary discourse
of neoliberal meritocracy works and how it has come to achieve dom-
inance. The analysis of this book will nonetheless be partial and speciﬁc – as
all works are – but the aim is to provide a diﬀerent and multifaceted lens to
understand the uses of this concept.
How this book is organised
This book is split into two halves. Part I explores some of the diﬀerent
genealogies of meritocracy in terms of changes in social and cultural theory,
identity politics and political discourse. Part II considers case studies which
present and disrupt meritocratic myths of mobility and popular parables of
progress. These explore gender and work (by analysing the ﬁgure of the
‘mumpreneur’); racialisation in media production (by analysing the
‘Damonsplaining’ incident that blew up in 2015); and diﬀerent media
representations of the ultra-rich. Whilst the chapters can all be read in fairly
self-contained form, the narrative and theorisation also builds throughout.
Part I of the book therefore explores meritocracy’s contemporary genealogies.
Chapter 1 begins this process by discussing the complexity of meritocracy’s
historical and geographical lineages and examining some contemporary
deﬁnitions of the term. The bulk of the chapter is concerned with the
changing uses of the concept since the word was introduced in academic social
theory in the mid-twentieth century. It traces the journey of the word in
English from its ﬁrst use by radical industrial sociologist Alan Fox as a wholly
negative term, through Michael Young’s aﬀably disparaging deployment of the
word to describe a dystopia in his 1958 bestseller The Rise of the Meritocracy,
to Hannah Arendt’s critique of meritocracy in the context of UK education.
It then charts Daniel Bell’s approving adoption of the concept in the 1970s,
its popularity in the new-right think tanks of the 1980s and its signiﬁcant
presence in the work of sociologist Anthony Giddens in the late 1980s and
early 1990s. For whilst the volte-face of the term’s meaning – like Michael
Young’s notorious claim that later politicians who used the term approv-
ingly had not read his book – have been fairly widely cited, surprisingly
scant attention has actually been paid to how and why the connotations of
the term mutated to such a degree (Dench 2006; Young 2001).
The second chapter turns its attention to the idea of ‘rising up’ the social
hierarchy in relation to the structural, yet frequently disavowed, disadvantages
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of gender, race and class. It terms this disavowed disadvantage ‘the egalitarian
deﬁcit’ to indicate how those not at the top of the social pyramid are often
doubly or trebly disadvantaged by neoliberal narratives of meritocracy whilst
being particularly incited to climb it. Taking a broader historical view, it
considers the reasons both for such parables of progress and the intersec-
tional inconsistencies they tend to hide, in the process drawing on a wide
range of examples from Mad Men to the civil service. The chapter argues
that a problematic but quasi-democratic post-war language and practice of
egalitarianism was ﬁlleted and marketised for corporate gain, popularising
the idea of the ‘level playing ﬁeld’ whilst perpetuating many problems of
inbuilt and structural prejudices in terms of race, class, gender and ability. In
other words, discourses of post-racism, post-sexism and what could be
termed ‘post-classism’ – the idea that inequalities of race, gender and class
are a thing of the past – have over the past few decades worked hand in
hand with neoliberal meritocracy to fuel each other and give each other
strength. The chapter also discusses the selective shifts in the characteristics
of this formation in recent years, from disavowing the feminist and civil-
rights movement to attempting to channel it and poach its imagery in the
service of a reinvigorated neoliberal settlement. This formation identiﬁes an
egalitarian deﬁcit as a ‘meritocratic deﬁcit’ and prescribes not equality but
individualising, neoliberal capitalism. The book describes this discourse as
oﬀering what I call ‘neoliberal justice narratives’.
Chapter 3 considers how the idea of meritocracy has come to be mobilised
as a key feature of contemporary neoliberal rhetoric and public discourse. It
illustrates this process by examining the resonance of the term in relatively
recent British political discourse: from a Thatcherite anti-establishment
version, through the explicit Blairite adoption of the concept as a means to
legitimise a competitive and individualistic ethos, to its recent life in the
British coalition government and Conservative discourse as part of David
Cameron’s ‘Aspiration Nation’. It then considers the diﬀerent discourse
around ‘Aspiration for All’ oﬀered by the opposition Labour Party and
the xenophobic demotic populism mobilised by the far (and near) right. The
chapter examines the diﬀerences and continuities in political discourse in
relation to meritocracy. In doing so, it provides an account of how what the
book terms ‘meritocratic feeling’ (drawing on Raymond Williams’ work on
‘structures of feeling’, alongside more recent work on aﬀect) has taken various
forms in diﬀerent political regimes of neoliberal culture.
Part II of the book, ‘Popular Parables’, uses case studies to explore in
detail the contemporary workings of neoliberal meritocracy alongside its
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failures and disruptions. Chapter 4 asks: How do plutocratic elites use dis-
courses of meritocracy to maintain and reproduce their privilege? It considers
this question by identifying particular motifs and themes deployed in the
mediated presentation of the super-rich and characterising them as particular
social types. These are, ﬁrst, the ‘normcore plutocrat’, when elites are pre-
sented as ‘just like us’; second, the ‘kind parent’, when they are positioned
as the benevolent custodians of society; and third, the ‘luxury-ﬂaunter’,
when they show oﬀ their material excess. The chapter traces these motifs
across a range of media, considering examples such as celebrity CEOs, the
rehabilitation of the royal family, Rich Kids of Instagram, Downton Abbey and
The King’s Speech and analysing them in relation to changes in both the
demographics of the international super-rich and to the ﬂuctuating mean-
ings of ‘meritocracy’. It argues that in such populist modes of presentation,
elites are actively mobilising the widely felt injustices of ‘post-democracy’
and rechannelling them for their own beneﬁt and that plutocratic elites
believe in neoliberal meritocracy because they are the ones beneﬁtting from
it most. The chapter concludes by considering how the rich have variously
presented themselves after capitalist crises through an analysis of various
historical versions of the ﬁlm Annie. Whereas plutocratic excesses were
curbed in the post-war period, today they have not been: the super-rich
have been permitted to ﬂourish, which makes it much more pressing for
them to appear ‘just like us’.
Chapter 5 considers neoliberal meritocracy’s racialisations. It uses the
speciﬁc case study of the brief 2015 media furore over an incident on Project
Greenlight, a US reality-TV talent show programme where ﬁlm-makers
compete for the chance to make their ﬁrst feature ﬁlm and thus break
into an industry that is notoriously diﬃcult to access for those without
wealth and connections. During one episode of Project Greenlight the white
ﬁlm actor Matt Damon interrupted the black ﬁlm producer Eﬃe Brown to
explain the meaning of diversity to her. Damon’s comments were widely
ridiculed on Twitter through the hashtag #Damonsplaining. This chapter
has several components: ﬁrst, drawing on David Theo Goldberg’s work on
the post-racial, it discusses the racialisation of merit as an abstract category;
second, it considers these processes in relation to the ascribed merit of cultural
products; third, it relates this incident to the racialised exclusions of cultural
production in the media industries; and ﬁnally, it analyses the viral status of
this event. The chapter reads the Damonsplaining incident as both an arch
example of a discourse of neoliberal post-racial meritocracy and also of its
rupture. In doing so, it explores in detail the question: How is meritocracy
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racialised in contemporary neoliberal culture and what are the meanings of
its disruption?
Chapter 6 uses its analysis of the ‘mumpreneur’ – a mother who becomes
an entrepreneur, starting a business at home while her kids crawl under the
kitchen table – as a springboard into discussing the gendering of neoliberal
meritocracy and its structuring of academic texts as well as working lives,
popular culture and social possibilities. It opens by considering how the
relationship between gender, work and childcare has, for a long time, been
spectacularly inequitable and how, since the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis, these old
inequalities have been situated within a newly challenging economic set-
ting. Being a mumpreneur is presented as a solution for these combined
diﬃculties: oﬀering self-realisation through entrepreneurialism, a solution
for the problems of childcare and the sop for the inadequacies of the labour
market. Yet it often works to heap unmanageable pressure on women
despite and through its narrative of liberation. The chapter argues that the
mumpreneur predominantly operates through a motif of what I call ‘desperate
success’: a motif and a coping strategy which often negates the potential for
more collective forms of co-operation that were raised by second-wave
feminism. Later, it moves to consider what this example reveals about wider
genderings of entrepreneurialism as a category (in academia as well as a lived
gendered reality), discussing recent work on neoliberalism alongside earlier
work on gender and enterprise coming out of cultural studies in the 1980s
and 1990s. Finally, it analyses the speciﬁcity of the contemporary ‘post-post-
Fordist’ conjunction between gender and enterprise by following the
mumpreneur online and examining the now seemingly indispensable
dynamic of the ‘branded self’. The chapter ends by considering what dis-
courses and alternatives might be useful resources to ﬁnd routes out of the
mumpreneur’s pragmatic yet constrained worldview.
Having attempted to track some of meritocracy’s contemporary journeys
and meanings, the conclusion considers what the alternatives are. It dis-
aggregates the concept of meritocracy to see what might be worth salva-
ging. Then it considers the contemporary status of meritocracy in terms of
its ideological ﬂuctuation, discussing which constituencies no longer believe
in neoliberal meritocracy and why.
I have been working on this subject oﬀ and on for the past decade,
because it has seemed to me that while meritocratic ideology is one of the
key drivers of late capitalism, its historical mutations, its cultural forms and
its emotional pull have not been very extensively analysed. It is a curiously
formative and yet under-theorised ideological engine of late capitalism.
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However, as I have indicated, today it is also more noticeably under attack:
whilst writing this book there has also been an increase in the number of
voices critiquing the idea and practice of meritocracy. It is becoming much
more commonplace for media articles and politicians to mention, or even to
foreground, its problems: that meritocracy is not working, or is problematic,
is now more widely acknowledged (The Economist 2013; Hayes 2012;
Bloodworth 2016; Frank 2016). This is because the aftermath of the 2008
crisis has overwhelmingly worked to bolster the position of ﬁnancial elites,
rather than to move toward greater equality, and thus, in many ways, the
neoliberal meritocratic dream has perhaps never looked so tenuous.
At the same time, capitalism is persistent, and, as I outline in chapters 2
and 3, new versions of neoliberal meritocracy are emerging, both in the
shape of right-wing populist nationalisms and through forms of neoliberal
meritocracy that selectively draw on the rhetoric of social justice move-
ments or ‘neoliberal justice narratives’. From the billionaire Donald Trump’s
claims to speak for the hardworking oppressed masses in the US, to Prime
Minister Theresa May’s vision of making Britain ‘the great meritocracy of
the world’ whilst re-introducing educational segregation through grammar
schools, the centrality of narratives of meritocracy is being aggressively
re-established in new guises. The active refashioning of these stories make
this a crucial moment to examine the meritocratic dream in all its variations:
to expand our critical understanding of what it means, and the abuses to
which this term is put, in order to contribute to reshaping popular narratives
around it and working toward more egalitarian societies.
Notes
1 Arendt 2006: 176–177.
2 The quote has been extensively reproduced, but I have not yet been able to ﬁnd
the original source.
3 The Stuart Hall Project shows a clip of Stuart Hall on a TV discussion programme.
He says: ‘We can now begin to identify a range of diﬀerent processes which do tend
in particular kinds of societies to deliver a certain number of people at the bottom of
a number of diﬀerent ladders. Some of them are technological, some of them have to
do with race and ethnicity, some of them have to do with single parenthood.
Although the causes are multiple, what seems to be important is that they deliver a
certain number of people to a multiple series of disadvantages. And then, the ques-
tion of permanence comes in: how on earth do people like that get themselves out?
Well, they don’t get themselves out of being stuck in that way by being thrifty or
getting on their bikes or any of those things’ (The Stuart Hall Project 2013).
4 As author Zadie Smith pointed out on Start the Week (BBC 2013). Thanks to Doreen
Massey for alerting me to this programme and discussing these issues with me.
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5 While social-mobility statistics are continually contested and in process, the
majority of quantitative analysis has pointed to a decline in the possibility for
upward social mobility for working and lower-middle classes (particularly men) in
the more unequal countries in the Global North. Research by Jo Blanden and
her colleagues in the UK, for instance, examining incomes of people in com-
parison to that of their parents found a clear decline in income mobility between
cohorts born in 1958 and 1970 (Blanden et al. 2004). Other work, particularly in
teams including John Goldthorpe, has complicated what they see as an overall
‘decline narrative’, but their arguments still end up concluding that opportunities
for the working class are declining. For particular attention to gender analysis, see
Bukodi et al. 2015; I discuss the signiﬁcance of this in relation to meritocracy in
chapters 2 and 6.
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PART I
Genealogies
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1
MERITOCRACY’S GENEALOGIES IN
SOCIAL THEORY
The idea of meritocracy may have many virtues, but clarity is not one of
them.
Amartya Sen1
Never start with the dictionary
Government by persons selected on the basis of merit in a competitive edu-
cational system; a society so governed; a ruling or inﬂuential class of educated
people. Hence meritocrat sb and a.; meritocratic a.
(Oxford English Dictionary 2001: vol. IX, p. 635)
Lecturers often tell students never to start with a dictionary deﬁnition. They
do this for a reason: the temptation to treat dictionary deﬁnitions as
immutable empirical truths ﬂung from a faceless, ahistorical summit of sci-
entiﬁc rationality. But these deﬁnitions are also gravitated towards because
they are attempts to condense shared understandings of what a word means
at the time the dictionary was put together. When Raymond Williams
produced his book Keywords, he solved this problem by taking signiﬁcant
words in everyday use, situating them in broader contexts and tracing the
longer evolutions of their meaning across time and space (Williams 1983).
‘Meritocracy’, unfortunately, is not one of the words examined by Williams
in Keywords (although, as I discuss below, he did have some very powerful
and important points to make about meritocracy in a book review). We
will therefore have to do some of this genealogical work ourselves.
It is only too easy to see from the dictionary entry above why meritocracy
is such a charged, ‘of the zeitgeist’ subject. Just look at the issues it connects
to: the question of who governs society, the issue of a small group having
inﬂuence over the many, competitiveness in general and within education in
particular, the thorny problem of what it means to have ‘merit’ and the
promise (and, less conspicuously, the pitfalls) of social mobility. These are core
themes and problems of our time. Noticeably, however, other dictionary
deﬁnitions have slightly diﬀerent emphases. Some foreground meritocracy’s
emphasis on individual advancement through wider social structures. To take
the widely used online Free Dictionary’s current version:
Meritocracy:
1. A system in which advancement is based on individual ability or
achievement.
2.
a. A group of leaders or oﬃceholders selected on the basis of individual
ability or achievement.
b. Leadership by such a group.
(Free Dictionary 2016)
Here meritocracy is a system structured around advancement of people who
are selected on the basis of individual achievement; and, as I show
throughout this book, its emphasis on the individual is important. The
‘-ocracy’ of ‘meritocracy’ derives from the Greek word for government,
and, as this deﬁnition illustrates, the word can with modiﬁcations (‘mer-
itocrat’) refer to an elite group of people who govern and who have been
able to arrive at such a position ‘on the basis of individual ability or
achievement’. Whereas ‘a meritocracy’ refers to a social system where
people are selected by some undeﬁned source according to their merit, ‘the
meritocrats’ can also mean an elite group of rulers who have risen up
through this system. There is an immediate palpable contrast and chasm
between the elite cadre of rulers and the ‘open’ system of access to that
elite, a gap that is bridged by the image of travelling up the ladder.
As we have seen already, ‘meritocracy’ has been a word used to describe
both a social system and a set of discourses, cultural meanings, associations,
ideas, judgements, presumptions and emotions about it. These deﬁnitions
and distinctions (much like terms like ‘government’ or ‘economy’) can be
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diﬃcult to separate given the extent to which they have shaped each other.
Furthermore, as this chapter discusses, contemporary deﬁnitions of meritocracy
often rest on some problematic foundations in terms of what they cite as the
ﬁrst use of the word. As Amartya Sen wrote, ‘the idea of meritocracy may
have many virtues, but clarity is not one of them’ (Sen 2000: 7).
In the introduction I suggested that it is useful to separate the meaning of
the social system from meritocracy as an ideological discourse and to rigorously
contextualise both of them. This chapter discusses the slippage between
meritocracy-as-a-social system and meritocracy-as-a-discourse in a number
of ways. It considers how meritocracy has changed in meaning, tracing
its etymology, mapping the stunning U-turns the word has undertaken in
its journey from negative slur to positive axiom of modern life. It suggests
that particular conceptual categories might be created to help understand
the mutations of the word. To these ends this chapter traces a journey
from what it terms the ‘socialist critique of meritocracy’ through ‘social
democratic meritocracy’ and then ﬁnally to ‘neoliberal meritocracy’. It traces
these historical formations through the usage of the word in social theory,
from Alan Fox, Hannah Arendt, Michael Young, Daniel Bell and Anthony
Giddens. Social theory does not exist in a vacuum, and so the discussion
gestures to the lines of traﬃc between these writers and the wider cultural
and political climate that they helped form and which formed them, con-
texts which are explored in more detail in later chapters. But to begin with
it is useful to consider what happened to meritocracy before it was coined as
a word.
Early genealogies, histories and geographies
The meanings of ‘meritocracy’ were, of course, not just born with the
invention of this word in English in the 1950s. As a complex concept it can
be connected to much longer historical and geographical genealogies, an
extensive discussion of which is beyond the scope of this book. The dis-
course and social systems this book discusses are primarily those which have
been mobilised in the West or the Global North and particularly as manifest
in relatively recent Anglo-European culture, with a pronounced bias
towards my own standpoint as a British citizen. However, as we have
already begun to see, this discourse has a wider resonance beyond this zone.
What this book terms a recognisable discourse of neoliberal meritocracy has
been noted in South Africa, Singapore and South Korea, with pronounced
speciﬁc geocultural variations (James 2012; Soko 2015). For instance, the
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language of diversity, meritocracy and opportunity have been used to help
entrench economic inequality in Singapore’s educational system and its
wider society between the 1970s and the present, despite and alongside its
novel attempts to tackle racialised forms of discrimination (Quinn Moore
2000; Talib and Fitzgerald 2015). In terms of wider histories of the concept,
we might cite a number of diﬀerent international examples, such as the
early example of the exams introduced in the civil service in imperial China
providing ‘access for all’ to the profession (Elman 2013). And at the same
time the meaning of meritocracy, as I discuss it here, has been shaped by
Western histories and values which themselves were shaped through past
and present transnational imperialisms.
In the West the expansion of the potential for ‘social mobility’ has been a
key feature of ideological narratives, if not of widespread social reality, in
diﬀerent ways and forms ever since the establishment of industrial capitalism
and the Enlightenment, which emphasised the supposedly equal potential of
those it qualiﬁed as ‘human’. For instance, after the Paris Commune of
1871 – which overthrew the French monarchy – was crushed, the
re-established republic announced that it was now a regime in which
‘careers were open to talents’ (Ross 2002).2 These developments were
echoed in the British Victorian self-help tradition, most famously repre-
sented in the bestselling books by Samuel Smiles (e.g. Self-Help, 1859).
Smiles had been a Chartist but later jettisoned his commitment to socialism
in favour of an enthusiastic embrace of capitalism and the Protestant work
ethic and the perceived potential of the individual to pull themselves up by
their bootstraps (Lindemann 2013: 121–122; Hobsbawm 1988: 255). The
gradual expansion of the democratic franchise and educational provision in
the UK in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was also justiﬁed
and rendered acceptable to conservatives and capitalists on the basis that it
would facilitate the movement of a small pool of talented people into the
Establishment, and into the capitalist class, rather than on the basis of
increasing equality (Todd 2015).
In the US, where ‘[p]eople understand the idea of the American Dream as
the fulﬁlment of the promise of meritocracy’ (McNamee and Miller 2009: 2)
a similar set of tenets was mobilised. The basis of the American Dream was
that, as Thomas Jeﬀerson famously put it, an ‘aristocracy of talent and virtue’
was replacing the aristocracy of birth that characterised a degenerate European
social order. From this perspective, rejecting aristocratic hereditary privilege
and striving through the Protestant work ethic meant ‘freedom’, and it was
exactly this shake-up of the European social order and the break with
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feudalism that so struck the French diplomat, historian and political scientist
Alexis de Tocqueville who wrote about it in his book Democracy in America
(De Tocqueville 1994).
A narrative of social mobility enabling a talented few to rise to the top
has then been a discourse which is extremely compatible with capitalism for a
couple of centuries. Indeed a dominant strand of the Western liberal capitalist
tradition is that we are ‘taught to scorn equality of property whilst aspiring
to equality of condition’, as Steve Cross put it (Cross and Littler 2010). This
division is reﬂected in how the phrases ‘equality of opportunity’ and ‘equality
of outcome’ became political terms. ‘Equality of opportunity’ became synon-
ymous with liberal capitalism, and ‘equality of outcome’ became associated
with socialism (Schaar 1997). To some extent these terms echo classic
sociological theory. ‘Equality of opportunity’ echoes Emile Durkheim’s idea
of a society providing ‘free space for all merits’: that the most social harmony
will be achieved if people can ﬁnd work according to their natural ability
(Durkheim 2013). ‘Equality of outcome’ echoes Marx’s emphasis on dis-
secting capitalism’s exploitations to argue for equality in distribution of
wealth, a theory taken up across the wide political spectrum on the left,
from vicious authoritarian communists through social democrats to libertarian
anarchists (Marx and Engels 2004).
In general, ‘equality of opportunity’ has been used by right-wing and
liberal or neoliberal governments. ‘Equality of outcome’ is a left-wing
idea, although it is not a term which has been used rhetorically in the same
way as ‘equality of opportunity’ and it has little if any popular resonance.
Indeed, politicians who are actually arguing for ‘equality of outcome’ have
mainly tended simply to use the language of ‘equality’, which has also
blurred the debate. In the neoliberal era formerly left-wing parties have
switched sides: an important strand of the New Labour government in the
UK of the 1990s (which Margaret Thatcher described as her greatest success)
was jettisoning the idea of equality of outcome in favour of equality of
opportunity, as we will see in the next chapter. ‘Opportunity’ can sound
excitingly open and undetermined; ‘outcome’ can sound fairly deﬁned
and ﬁnal. In part what this book does is to examine how this language of
equality of opportunity has been used to justify rampant and increasing
social inequality; and, whilst arguing for equality of outcome in terms of
greater parity of material resources and expenditure of eﬀort, it also argues
that it is crucial to both factor in, and to mobilise, the diversity, malle-
ability and variability of ﬂourishing that ‘opportunity’ has historically been
associated with.
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Ladders and level playing ﬁelds
As we saw earlier, the ‘ladder of opportunity’ is a key metaphor for
meritocracy. At times the ladder is also used metonymically to stand for the
whole of society. In the collaborative sociological study Inequality by Design,
the authors discuss how, whereas some societies or nations can be under-
stood as being short, broad ladders, with lots of room for many people all
the way to the top, other societies (particularly the US and South Africa)
have tall, narrowing ladders: ladders with vast distances between top and
bottom rungs (Fischer et al. 1996: 7, 12). A connected problem of the long
social ladder is that once people get to the top they tend to pass on their
privilege to their children, as I discuss in the conclusion. This ‘social ladder’
imagery also has a resonance in imperialistic accounts of development,
whereby ‘developed’ countries are placed at the top of the global social
ladder and ‘other’ or ‘undeveloped’ countries below them (Kothari 2005).
It is therefore important to remind ourselves that this key emblem or motif
of individual people going up single ladders is historically and contextually
speciﬁc. There is an interesting resonance here in the evolution of the board
game Snakes and Ladders. The earliest examples known are Hindu, Jain and
Islamic versions from India, Nepal and Tibet, where they were developed as
religious instruction games (Parlett 1999; Topsﬁeld 2006a, 2006b). Figure 1.1
is a Jain version, ‘Gyanbazi’, from either Gujarat or Rajasthan in the late
nineteenth century.3 The pavilion at the top represents the heavens, where
the liberated beings live together. There is no supreme creator god: Jains, like
Buddhists and Hindus, believe in a cycle of birth and rebirth inﬂuenced by
the eﬀects of good and bad deeds and attitudes. The goal is for people to
move past the many snakes (symbolising bad behaviour) and to arrive,
through good behaviour, at the pavilion at the top.
In later nineteenth-century versions, British imperialism in India resulted
in the game being translated into a game of Christian-capitalist moral
instruction.4 In, for example, a British design produced around 1900 and
manufactured in Germany, ‘Robbery’ leads down a snake to a beating,
‘Strike while the iron is hot’ results in ‘Forging ahead’, and ‘Punctuality’
leads up a ladder to ‘Opulence’ (Figure 1.2). By this stage, ‘Opulence’ is
good.5 The goal of the game is to reach the ‘Scroll of Fame’, a zone featuring
a list of people well known for their wealth, hard work, genius and virtue,
including nurse Florence Nightingale, scientist Isaac Newton and banker-
philanthropist George Peabody. This nineteenth-century version is clearly
shaped through British imperialism and what C.B. Macpherson termed the
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rise of possessive individualism, of the idea of the self as bounded individual
subject which arose during capitalist modernity (Macpherson 2010). The
Protestant work ethic is here hard at work in fuelling and helping generate
individualised forms of capital. Its goal is no longer spiritual enlightenment,
but a diﬀerent mixture of celebrity, virtue and wealth.
Many versions of the game were produced throughout the twentieth
century, including the American versions of Chutes and Ladders introduced
FIGURE 1.1 Gyanbazi game from Gujarat/Rajasthan, India, late 19th or 20th
century. Watercolour on cloth. Reproduced courtesy of the Victoria
& Albert Museum, London.
Meritocracy’s genealogies 29
in 1943 by board-game manufacturer Milton Bradley. Bradley took the
health and safety option of removing the snakes to make the board game
appear less dangerous and to popularise it as a game for children (Augustyn
1974: 27; Slesin 1993). The characters on the board were exclusively white
until 1974, when black children were ﬁnally represented as having a chance to
‘climb the ladder’ (Slesin 1993). Boards increasingly foregrounded a singular
goal of winning. Today, in a recent version for smartphones, the game is
streamlined even further – with a single snake being split into squares and the
singular aim of attaining wealth symbolised by a treasure chest full of gold.6
If this example indicates how meritocracy’s symbolism is historically and
socially constructed, it also indicates how the symbolism around meritocracy
itself is revealing and important. The ladder is not the only image that
meritocracy has been associated with; another key example is the ‘level
playing ﬁeld’. The sporting imagery of this phrase ﬁgures life as a game, its
players all starting from an equal footing, not slanted and favouring some
over others. It is a handy aphorism, and, whilst it is, of course, a metaphor,
metaphors are ‘ideas we live by’, as Lakoﬀ and Johnson famously put it
(Lakoﬀ and Johnson 1980). The phrase ‘level playing ﬁeld’ has a particularly
obscure history, with agreement only being that it became popularised in
the US in the 1980s in business discourse and adopted by Ronald Reagan as
a means to argue for deregulation and ‘free’ trade (Saﬁre 2008: 387–388).
FIGURE 1.2 Snakes and ladders board game. Designed in England and manu-
factured in Germany, c.1900. Chromolithographed paper on card.
Reproduced courtesy of the Victoria & Albert Museum, London.
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The popular charge of the phrase is dependent on the popularity of sport
(and sporting metaphors have a far longer history, as does the notion of
‘levelling’). The usage of the term ‘level playing ﬁeld’ was further popu-
larised by such management texts as American journalist Thomas Friedman’s
2005 business bestseller The World is Flat. This book extended the vision of
a level playing ﬁeld to the whole world, arguing that shifts in geopolitics
and technology now enabled a dynamic transnational meritocracy to surface
from its brave new world of commercial competitiveness (Friedman 2005).
Such visions of a level playing ﬁeld for a mobile cosmopolitan workforce
have been enthusiastically embraced by contemporary management litera-
ture and neoliberal governmental rhetoric (as I discuss in the following
chapter), but just as emphatically criticised by geographers and cultural,
educational and political theorists. Educational scholars Brown and Tan-
nock, for instance, critique the idea of a transnational level playing ﬁeld in
education, arguing that it contradicts the fact that ‘in reality, economic,
social and education inequalities both within and between nations are vast
and increasing’ (Brown and Tannock 2009: 386). They argue that the
construction of a competitive ‘global war for talent’, as manifested in uni-
versities, which is characterised by an increasingly stratiﬁed vision of ‘hyper-
meritocracy’ and skewed towards a ‘winner takes all’ market, greatly
exacerbates such inequalities (Brown and Tannock 2009; Frank and Cook
1995; see also Piketty 2013; chapter 4 below).
In both Thomas Friedman’s and Ronald Reagan’s use of the term, the
idea of the level playing ﬁeld is signiﬁcant in that it ﬁgures ‘the ground’ as
equal, but it is also signiﬁcant in that it does not take other key forms of
diﬀerentiation into account. We do not learn, for instance, how the
players are selected, how long they have been training and practising
beforehand or who is allowed to play against whom. The assumption
implies a team victory, thus suggesting more collective forms of egalitarianism,
but, as a phrase, it is often applied to an individual’s chances in a particular
context. The examples here indicate how the application of tropes from
the realm of sport, leisure and fun have been used to validate a particular
way of organising society and the economy with savagely unequal results.
As we will see in the rest of the book, tropes and stories like the ladder
and the level playing ﬁeld have been insistently drawn upon in recent
times to popularise neoliberal meritocracy, to promote particularly strati-
ﬁed, individualistic and competitive ways of organising the world in the
interests of the few. However, to understand how the meanings of
meritocracy were able to move in this direction, we also need to consider
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its evolution and its stunning U-turn as a term since it was coined in
English in the mid-twentieth century.
Socialist roots and critique
Michael Young is widely regarded as having coined the term ‘meritocracy’
in his 1958 book The Rise of the Meritocracy. However, the term was in fact
used two years earlier by Alan Fox in ‘Class and Equality’ for the journal
Socialist Commentary, as the British historian David Kynaston recently noted
in Modernity Britain: Opening the Box, 1957–59 (Kynaston 2013: loc. 3666;
Fox 1956). As Kynaston is not especially interested in meritocracy, he
devotes only a couple of sentences in Modernity Britain to the discovery, but
in terms of the etymology of the word and its cultural currency, this is a
signiﬁcant and quite remarkable ﬁnding.7
What is striking about Fox’s article is that it makes more extensive critical
and politically radical use of the term than Michael Young (whose use of it
I discuss below). Alan Fox was to become an inﬂuential industrial sociologist
whose radical perspective on industrial relations challenged the liberal
orthodoxy of the discipline. In 1956 he was a researcher at Nuﬃeld College
Oxford, working on a history of British trade unions and a history of the
National Union of Boot and Shoe Operatives (Oxford Dictionary of National
Biography 2013; Fox 2004: 230). The journal the article appeared in, Socialist
Commentary, was the weekly publication of the Socialist Vanguard Group, a
political group to the left of the Labour Party. Indeed, in 1955 the Labour
leader and former prime minister, Clement Atlee described Socialist Com-
mentary as ‘a useful corrective to the New Statesman [a more mainstream UK
left weekly magazine]’ (Douglas 2002: 80).
Fox’s article is a careful sociological summary of the policies, social
apparatuses and ideologies that cause stratiﬁcation. It considers the role of
‘the four scales’ – income, property, education and occupation – in solidifying
inequality of position. It discusses how these factors are interconnected,
with, for example, low incomes having made it impossible for workers ‘to
break out of the vicious circle which cramped their lives’ (Fox 1956: 12).
Because of the era and his speciﬁc research interests, Fox tended to focus on
industrial work. He suggests that we might understand social inequality by
looking at extremes of occupational status and ways of categorising their
social standing (‘Is it dirty and laborious or the reverse of those things? Is it
carried out under discipline and supervision, or under conditions permitting
personal independence, initiative and discretion?’ [Fox 1956: 11]). Whilst he
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raises the hope that mechanisation and workers’ demands on the shop ﬂoor
would make blue-collar lives better, he suggests that this is only part of the
story. For even if mechanisation improves and unionisation succeeds, social
stratiﬁcation will remain. For Fox, inequality
will remain as long as we assume it to be a law of nature that those of
higher occupational status must not only enjoy markedly superior
education as well but also, by right and of necessity, have a higher
income into the bargain. As long as that assumption remains – as long
as violations of it are regarded as grotesque paradoxes – then so long
will our society be divisible into the blessed and the unblessed – those
who get the best and most of everything, and those who get the
poorest and the least. This way lies the ‘meritocracy’; the society in
which the gifted, the smart, the energetic, the ambitious and the ruthless
are carefully sifted out and helped towards their destined positions of
dominance, where they proceed not only to enjoy the fulﬁlment of
exercising their natural endowments but also to receive a fat bonus
thrown in for good measure.
This is not enough. Merely to devise bigger and better ‘sieves’
(‘equality of opportunity’) to help the clever boys get to the top and
then pile rewards on them when they get there is the vision of a certain
brand of New Conservatism; it has never been the vision of socialism.
(Fox 1956: 13)
I quote this at length because it is both a remarkable and remarkably unquoted
passage. It indicates the radical origins of critiques of meritocracy – roots that
have been obscured – alongside the extent to which it has travelled as a
term. For Fox, ‘meritocracy’ is a term of abuse. It denotes a society in
which ‘the gifted, the smart, the energetic, the ambitious and ruthless’ not
only reap the rewards for their (dubious or admirable) skills but receive too
much: these ‘fat bonus[es]’, the rewards piled on them are excessive and
mean that others suﬀer.
As a result of this analysis, Fox suggests ‘cross-grading’ as a route towards
greater equality. ‘Cross-grading’ is conceptualised not only in ﬁnancial
terms, but also in terms of time, education and leisure. He makes pointers
towards policies of redistribution; these
might mean, perhaps, refusing to accept the idea that to prolong the
education of secondary modern pupils beyond the age of ﬁfteen is ‘a
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waste of time’. It might mean that those who perform the dull and
repetitive jobs in which our economy abounds receive substantially
more leisure than the rest.
(Fox 1956: 13)
Fox’s remarkable article in which the earliest use of ‘meritocracy’ to be
recorded to date appears is therefore an explicitly socialist argument against
the very logic of meritocracy. These origins were forgotten, however, until
2013, in favour of Michael Young’s playful, dystopian social satire, The Rise
of the Meritocracy.
Social democratic meritocracy
The Rise of the Meritocracy was published in 1958 and set in 2034. It is voiced
by a pompous narrator who draws on the PhD thesis of the now-deceased
social scientist ‘Michael Young’ – who (we learn at the end) died in a ferocious
battle caused by the problems with the new social system of meritocracy.
‘Meritocracy’ here is understood as produced through the formula I + E =
M, or ‘Intelligence combined with Eﬀort equals Merit’. The ﬁrst half of the
book depicts early twentieth-century Britain from the vantage point of a
science-ﬁction future. It charts the demise of the old class-bound nepotistic
order, in which kinship triumphs over skill and the rich bequeath their
social worlds to their children, as a world overthrown by movements for
greater social equality. The second half relates the ascendancy of the new
system of merit, which turns out to lead not to an equal society but rather
to a new caste system in which IQ determines social station. In this world,
the lower rungs are occupied by both ex-rich and ex-poor who are dim-
witted and, to borrow contemporary terminology, ‘socially excluded’;
careers tend to dip after people reach 40 or 50; and there is a roaring black-
market trade in brainy babies. The book concludes by gesturing towards the
2034 ‘Battle of Peterloo’ when an alliance of housewives and ‘populists’
ﬁght back on May Day against meritocracy. We learn that it was in this
battle that ‘Michael Young’ died.
Rejected by a number of publishers, including one who wanted it
refashioned into a novel in the style of Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World –
which Young did, although that particular version, intriguingly, never got
published – The Rise of the Meritocracy eventually became a UK bestseller.
This was in itself indicative of what Mike Savage has described as the
unprecedented power of sociology in mid-twentieth-century Britain
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(Savage 2010).8 The book portrays a hidebound, class-bound British society
as grossly unfair and registers the seismic post-war moves towards a more
egalitarian society and the redistribution of resources by the welfare state.
But it is also, clearly, a book in which meritocracy is not depicted as a
problem-free goal that such class-bound societies should strive for. On the
contrary, it is presented as an ideology or organising principle that will
become a problem, by leading to new inequalities of power and forms of
social stratiﬁcation.
Through its satire, The Rise of the Meritocracy was both questioning the
way the social order was being re-made and connecting to older political–
philosophical debates around merit. These debates included, for example,
Emile Durkheim’s vision of society providing ‘free space to all merits’; those
of the US structuralist–functionalists of the 1940s and 1950s, who sought to
update his ideas; and the scepticism of British social democratic radicals of
the interwar period like Tawney, Cole and Hobson, who argued that the
production of ‘merit’ needed to be understood instead as a more egalitarian,
co-operative process (Beck 2008). Young’s political–philosophical position
was closer to the latter. As a key writer of the 1945 Labour Party manifesto
Let Us Face the Future and Labour’s director of research, Young wrote The Rise
of the Meritocracy in part as a warning shot to his party against newly emergent
forms of social division (Briggs 2006). The book is critical of tendencies
toward over-valorising innate ability and the emergence of new hierarchies.
As Raymond Williams argued in a review of Young’s book, ‘we think of
intelligence as absolute and limited because we have been told to think so,
by this kind of society. It seems increasingly obvious, in practice, that our
concepts of intelligence are peculiarly unintelligent’ (Williams 1958).
‘Meritocracy’ came to move away from this overtly satirical meaning to
such an extent that, notoriously, by the 1990s UK’s New Labour under
Tony Blair had adopted a non-satirical idea of a meritocratic society with
gusto. Shortly before his death, Young wrote of how the term had been
adopted by Blair and widely disseminated in the US but not in the way he
intended. It had been misunderstood, and so New Labour should stop using
the term, he argued in an oft-quoted article for The Guardian. For Young,
the unironic way ‘meritocracy’ was now deployed, which worked by
‘sieving people according to education’s narrow band of values [using] an
amazing battery of certiﬁcates and degrees’ meant that social stratiﬁcations
had hardened, those demoted to the bottom of the social pile were deemed
unworthy and demoralised. ‘No underclass’, he wrote, ‘has ever been left as
morally naked [as this one]’ (Young 2001).
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I will come to the issue of how ‘meritocracy’ changed in value from
the 1960s onward below, but it is worth considering how Young’s book
itself – or rather, the text and its author’s paratextual framings of it – may
have contributed, despite themselves, to such misreadings.9 For, whilst The
Rise of the Meritocracy is a text which is known for being disparaging of
meritocracy, there is also a fair amount of ambiguity on this issue within
both the text itself and in Michael Young’s comments on it. Its author
claimed that The Rise of the Meritocracy was ‘intended to present two sides of
the case – the case against as well as the case for a meritocracy’ (Young
1994: xvii). In the book, whilst ‘meritocracy’ is valued for its ability to dis-
mantle inherited privilege, it is also damned for its power to create new,
unfair social divisions. The ﬁctional ‘Chelsea Manifesto’ is the clearest
expression of an alternative to both, with its often powerful arguments for
equality, for valuing ‘kindliness and courage, sympathy and generosity’ over
narrow conceptions of intelligence; and yet this alternative vision is truncated
and cut oﬀ. Neither was the author’s paratextual activity always consistent.
For instance, Young stated that he supported the ideal of a classless society;
yet when asked in the 2000s whether the book was arguing to promote ‘the
comprehensive idea’ in education, he replied with an unexpansive but
unequivocal ‘no’ (Dench 2006: 74).
Young, who was director of the Institute of Community Studies at the
time of writing the book, later became a founder and co-founder of a
variety of institutions key to post-war British life and progressive social
education, including the Open University, the Consumer’s Association and
the University of the Third Age. He was deeply committed to formations
which enabled innovative forms of participation and engagement with
political and social structures. It is for this reason that his legacy is held in
such high regard in the UK today. This is a political–conceptual lineage
which connects Young’s work with that of contemporary advocates of
participatory democracy; the tentative conclusion of the book’s story, in
which the housewives and other populists rise up together, is symptomatic
of this tendency.
Yet, whilst arguing against ‘the big organisation’, Young’s primary model
or template for participation was the nuclear family. As Hilary Land makes
clear in her essay about The Rise of the Meritocracy, the book, whilst anticipating
a feminist critique of merit, does not particularly challenge conventionally
gendered divisions of labour (Land 2006: 59); nor, we can add, its hetero-
normativity, nor its singular means of conceptualising ‘social closeness’. We
can also note that Young’s antipathy towards large organisations involved
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being decidedly ambivalent / hostile towards nationalised industries. At its
most left wing, this involved promoting mutual aid and ‘neighbourly
socialism’. At its least, it involved joining the liberal Social Democratic Party
(SDP) and not making any explicit critique of capitalism. The emphasis on
economic and cultural redistribution, which is foregrounded in Fox’s
account, is very much downplayed in Young’s.
What this means is that, whilst The Rise of the Meritocracy clearly critiques
an essentialised and individualised notion of merit and implicitly eugenicist
approaches to intelligence, its relationship to comprehensive provision, and
indeed to capitalism, is somewhat less clear. There is a slide away from a
more explicitly socialist critique into a more ambiguous, social democratic
version. In this particular articulation, its gendered nature begins to be ques-
tioned, although this line of questioning is not pursued but rather foreclosed
and returned to the bosom of the heteronormative nuclear family. And
whilst responsibility for what happens to any concept, book or term cannot
obviously be laid at the feet, the brain or the typewriting ﬁngers of the
author, the persistence of such textual lacunae is a key factor in how the
term later became deployed. The paradoxical nature of Young’s historical
position is also apparent in the tendency of commentators to describe him as
the original ‘social entrepreneur’ (Briggs 2006), a phrase which has now
become decidedly ambivalent, reﬂecting not only innovative brilliance at
creating socially beneﬁcial initiatives (at which Young excelled), but also
what was to become a wider saturation of the ﬁeld of social policy by
neoliberal entrepreneurialism.
The critique of educational essentialism
On the other side of the Atlantic in 1958, the same year that The Rise of the
Meritocracy was published, Hannah Arendt published a scathing essay ‘The
Crisis in Education’ (Arendt 1958). Designed to have wider applicability
than a US audience, it was based on a lecture she had recently given in
Germany and had had translated (Wild and Posten 2010; Nordquist 1997).
The essay took as its starting point the media anxiety and commentary in
the US over falling educational standards, which Arendt expressed as ‘the
puzzling question of why Johnny can’t read’ (Arendt 2006: 171). Contending
that both progressive and traditional education were failing to address the
key issues, Arendt’s critical perspective broadens out to consider the social
context of American education in relation to that oﬀered in Europe, and
philosophises about what eﬀective pedagogy would involve (Arendt 2006:
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171). On the one hand, she suggests that schools need to hold back on
didactic moralising (‘the function of the school is to teach children what the
world is like and not to instruct them in the art of living’ [Arendt 2006:
192]). On the other, she revisits the issue of authority, making the con-
nection between a lack of parental authority and the problem of a lack of
democratic involvement or adults who ‘refuse to assume responsibility for
the world into which they have brought children’ (Arendt 2006: 187) thus
failing to ‘prepare them in advance for the task of renewing a common
world’ (Arendt 2006: 193).
Arendt therefore argues that most American secondary schools do not
educate well enough for college but rejects the idea that this is an automatic
result of mass education. Indeed, in the process, she is scathing of the new
‘English example’ of selecting a small proportion of those considered to
have enough ability to attend grammar schools. For
there at the end of primary school, with students at the age of eleven,
has been instituted the dreaded examination that weeds out all but
some ten per cent of the scholars suited for higher education. The rigor
of this selection was not accepted even in England without protest; in
America it would have been simply impossible. What is aimed at in
England is ‘meritocracy’, which is clearly once more the establishment
of an oligarchy, this time not of wealth or of birth but of talent. But
this means, even though people in England may not be altogether
clear about it, that the country even under a socialist government will
continue to be governed as it has been from time out of mind, that is,
neither as a monarchy nor as a democracy but as an oligarchy
or aristocracy – the latter in case one takes the view that the most
gifted are also the best, which is by no means a certainty. In America
such an almost physical division of the children into gifted and
ungifted would be considered intolerable. Meritocracy contradicts the
principle of equality, of an equalitarian democracy, no less than any
other oligarchy.
(Arendt 2006: 176–177)
It is striking to read that Arendt at this time states that a division
between ‘gifted and ungifted would be considered intolerable’ in
America, given the ubiquity of ‘gifted and talented’ programmes in the
US today and, indeed, the extent to which it has become synonymous
with US education.
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A ‘just meritocracy’? the beginnings of neoliberal meritocracy
In 1973, in his classic text The Coming of Post-Industrial Society, Daniel Bell –
an American sociologist and friend of Michael Young – pronounced that
‘the post-industrial society, in its logic, is a meritocracy’ (Bell 1973: 409).
The impact of the 1960s movements and struggles by those disenfranchised
by the hierarchies of the Fordist settlement – women, non-whites, gay
people – challenged and partially ruptured the existing patterns of social
stratiﬁcation. For example, after the 1963 Equal Pay Act in the US and the
1970 Equal Pay Act in the UK, it was no longer legal to pay men and
women diﬀerently for doing the same job, even if the struggle over equal
pay for work of equal value – and against cultural prejudices against what it
is possible for a woman or a man to do – remained necessary.
These challenges to social mobility were engendered through and
alongside the shift to a ‘post-industrial’, post-Fordist society and culture.
Post-Fordist culture and society has involved a range of notable cultural,
social, economic and political developments. These developments have
included the rapid growth in consumer-oriented production, branding and
the service sector; the mobilisation of just-in-time production and ICTs in the
service of ‘the creative industries’; industrial downsizing and the contract-
ing-out of manufacturing overseas; and the neoliberal erosion of workers’
rights, and the social provisions of the welfare state, in favour of privatised
solutions and social risk borne by ‘the individual’ (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim
2001; Lash and Urry 1993; Bauman 2000; Boltanski and Chiapello 2007;
Crouch 2004).
In The Coming of Post-Industrial Society, Bell uses ‘meritocracy’ to refer
primarily to the new forms of social mobility which are engendered within
allegedly ‘post-industrial’ society. This is important, as use of the term
‘meritocracy’ in Bell’s text works to neutralise and erase those more pro-
blematic (or ‘dystopian’) aspects of the term present in Young’s work and
powerfully criticised in Fox’s essay. Bell elaborates upon his ideas about
meritocracy in a now more obscure text: a 1972 article, ‘On Meritocracy
and Equality’, in the journal Public Interest. This article is fascinating as it
forms a mid-point in the journey of meritocratic ideology from object of
satirical scorn (in The Rise of the Meritocracy) to central and explicit tenet of
neoliberalism (as in the pamphlet which I consider in the following section).
Public Interest was a quarterly American public policy journal aimed at
journalists, academics and policy makers founded by Daniel Bell and Irving
Kristol in 1965. Irving Kristol, writer, journalist and publisher, was dubbed
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‘the godfather of neoconservatism’ when he featured on the cover of Esquire
magazine in 1979, a moniker he later adopted and adapted in his books
including Reﬂections of a Neoconservative, The Neoconservative Persuasion and
Two Cheers for Capitalism. Bell dropped his involvement with the journal
from the late 1970s, as it lurched further to the right (Buhle 2011).
Bell’s interpretation of meritocracy was therefore a meeting point
between Young’s social-democratic version – Young explicitly refers to Bell
as ‘a friend’ in the 1994 Introduction to Rise of the Meritocracy – and neo-
conservatism (Young 1994: xv). This is palpable in the article. It is a thorough,
carefully written piece, in which Bell argues for a distinction between
‘equality of opportunity’ and ‘equality of result’. There has been a conceptual
confusion between these positions, the article argues, drawing on the work
of John Rawls. Which do we want? Bell claims that ‘equality of result’ is a
socialist ethic, whereas ‘equality of opportunity’ is a liberal one (Bell 1972:
48). In the process, he questions the value of aﬃrmative action programmes
and comes, eventually, to argue for a ‘just meritocracy’ which is ‘made up
of those who have earned their authority’, as opposed to an ‘unjust’ one
which ‘makes those distinctions invidious and demeans those below’ (Bell
1972: 66).
In this text the usage of ‘meritocracy’ comes to take the lineaments of the
form we are familiar with today. It is an unambiguously positive and
valorised term. It is also one which argues in favour of ‘opportunity’. This is
familiar territory to a contemporary readership. However, what distin-
guishes it from current usage are two important contextual points. First, the
terrain on which meritocracy operates is one of high conﬁdence in eco-
nomic growth, as evidenced by virtue of Bell being able to debate whether
or not ‘we have reached the post-scarcity state of full abundance’. This is
clearly a moment before either the 1970s recession (and before extensive
anxiety about the ﬁnite nature of natural resources). Second, and relatedly,
the position from which Bell speaks is deﬁned by a political context in
which widespread support for the Keynesian consensus has not yet col-
lapsed, a context that has resulted in ‘a steady decrease in income disparity
between persons’ (Bell 1972: 64).10 To put it bluntly: putting a competitive
vision of meritocracy into play is not hugely conspicuous or controversial at
a time when there is a strong social safety net.
Bell was writing at a time in the Global North when the Fordist welfare
settlement was oﬀsetting the worst extremes of capitalist inequality and its
attendant social squalor and from a time when there was high conﬁdence in
expanding economic growth. From this position meritocracy is, for Bell, to
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be conceived as a social system in which ‘just’ rewards and small gradations
of privilege and position can be given to diﬀerential talent. From here, it
might even be used as a motor for greater growth:
And there is no reason why the principle of meritocracy should not
obtain in business and government as well. One wants entrepreneurs
and innovators who can expand the amount of productive wealth for
society.
(Bell 1972: 66)
And so the ambiguities of The Rise of the Meritocracy are resolved in favour of
a speciﬁc usage which is quite diﬀerent from Young’s. For Bell, IQ is far less
problematic than for Young. He is not so interested in the potential of local
or participatory power or the extent of social levelling proposed by Fox. He
is interested in achieving a social order in which the excesses of capitalism
are curbed by the state, and hopes that meritocracy can be recalibrated in
such a way as to avoid it solidifying into the new caste system imagined by
Young, instead providing an incitement-engine for a dynamic yet just
society. Here meritocracy starts to become posited as an engine of
‘productive wealth’.
Meritocracy in the neoliberal laboratory
Bell’s vision of meritocracy emerged from a historical situation characterised
by the presence of a strong welfare state which could oﬀset the most
extreme eﬀects of market-produced social inequality. In this context,
meritocracy could be imagined as a dynamic engine both of ‘opportunity’
for social mobility, shaking up an ossiﬁed class system, and for ambiguously
imagined ‘productive wealth’ – a term vague enough to be used by actors
across the political spectrum. By the 1990s, however, this ambiguity was
being aggressively exploited by the right, as the concept of ‘meritocracy’
became mobilised in explicit opposition to social democracy.
In Britain, a 1995 pamphlet by Adrian Wooldridge from the Social
Market Foundation, Meritocracy and the ‘Classless Society’, argued for a vision
of meritocracy which was explicitly pitted against comprehensive education,
student grants, housing beneﬁt and any other kind of collective provision.
Meritocracy is here opposed to what Wooldridge calls the ‘niceness revo-
lution’ of the 1960s and 1970s. As part of this, it is explicitly opposed to
‘community’ (Wooldridge 1995: 45) and to the welfare state, which is
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ﬁgured as ‘an obstacle’ to spreading meritocratic values (Wooldridge 1995: 43).
Meritocracy in Woolridge’s version then is explicitly bound up with the
logic of a capitalist market and with entrepreneurialism and very much
against the collective provision of social democracy and the welfare state.
Here meritocracy fully embraces the liberal idea of equality of opportunity
and renders it synonymous with economic growth, capitalist competition
and marketisation. Meritocracy is marketised, and marketisation is good.
We can understand the development of this framework more capaciously
by drawing on Michel Foucault’s series of distinctions between liberalism
and neoliberalism in his prescient 1978–1979 Collège de France lecture series
(which forms the backdrop to his account of the emergence of biopolitics,
published in French in 2004 and English in 2008). Foucault is insistent on
the need to grasp the distinctions between liberalism and neoliberalism, to
grasp their singularity, to ‘show you precisely that neoliberalism is really
something else’ (Foucault 2008: 130). For Foucault, the ‘something else’
neoliberalism became was a situation in which ‘the overall exercise of political
power can be modelled on the principles of a market economy’ (Foucault
2008: 131). In other words, it was not just that the market became domi-
nant but that, since the 1970s, it had begun to structure the way political
power itself works.
Foucault describes how, to create this regime, classical liberalism had to
be subjected to a number of transformations. A key transformation is that
whilst classical liberalism accepts monopolies, neoliberalism does not: compe-
tition under neoliberalism is not considered natural, but structured (Foucault
2008: 134–137). Moreover, the only ‘true’ aim of social policy for neoli-
beralism can be economic growth and privatisation; thus, the multiplication
of the ‘enterprise’ form within the social body, Foucault states, is what is at
stake in neoliberalism, and it is what comes to constitute the ‘formative
power of society’ (Foucault 2008: 148).
In Wooldridge’s formulation, meritocracy becomes a means of actively
intervening to multiply the enterprise form within the social body. For
example, he saw danger both in the hereditary interests of the House of
Lords and in Thatcher’s inability to ‘undermine the comprehensive principle
in state schools’ (Wooldridge 1995: 9). The vision, in other words, is of a
starkly stratiﬁed society, one in which people can travel according to their
inborn ‘merit’. It considers vast inequalities of wealth and poverty to be
legitimate as long as the potential to travel through them for those savvy
enough is maintained. The distaste for the masses, towards the ‘all and
sundry’ model of comprehensive education, combines revulsion toward
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‘standardisation’ and toward the masses who fall out of view when the
socially mobile are focused upon. These terms are elided.
Interestingly, Woolridge’s pamphlet was produced by the Social Market
Foundation, an ostensibly cross-party think tank. The very name ‘Social
Market Foundation’ bears out Foucault’s claim that neoliberal rhetoric
works to incite marketisation throughout the social body, while strongly
echoing Michael Young’s language of social entrepreneurialism: neoliberalism
as analysed by Foucault and Young’s own political discourse here become
almost wholly intertwined. In this inﬂuential pamphlet, a product of several
decades of new right thinking, ‘meritocracy’ is unambiguously posited as an
engine of competition against supposedly debilitating forms of social colla-
boration. Neoliberalism has competition as a central organising principle, as
William Davies amongst others has analysed (Davies 2014). Meritocracy as
an ideology is a key contributor to the success and tenacity of neoliberalism,
as a seemingly ‘fair’ means through which competition is expressed and
extended.
It was not only narratives associated with the political right which were
to embrace this new, neoliberal meaning of meritocracy. The theoretical
work of British sociologist Anthony Giddens was also used by the British
New Labour government in the development of its ‘Third Way’ politics, in
which ‘meritocracy’ became a key term and was used for simultaneously
socially liberal and neoliberal ends. The story of this political adoption and
its similar politics to the Clinton government in the US are taken up in
chapter 3; how social liberalism became so malleable is discussed in the next
chapter.
‘Meritocracy’, therefore, is a word with a short etymological history – under
60 years – but during this time it has gradually and dramatically shifted in its
meaning and value. It has moved from a negative, disparaging criticism of an
embryonic system of state organisation which was creating problematic new
hierarchies by using a controversial notion of ‘merit’ in education, to a positive,
celebratory term, one connecting competitive individualism and ‘talent’ with a
belief in the desirability and possibility of social mobility in an increasingly
unequal society. Initially mobilised as a critical term through a radical
socialist discourse, it mutated through left-liberal social democracy, and then,
by the 1980s, ‘meritocracy’ became a wholly positive term. It was mobilised
gradually into having a positive charge through and by neoliberalism, although
this has happened in diverse, sometimes erratic ways. It has been and
continues to be shaped as a discourse by diverse constituencies, agents
and sites including popular culture, social theory and political rhetoric. The
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next chapter considers the relationship between ‘rising up’ the social hier-
archy in relation to work and to the structural, yet frequently disavowed,
disadvantages of gender, ethnicity and class.
Notes
1 Sen 2000: 7.
2 It also enshrined equality before the law whilst only allowing property-owners
to vote.
3 Hindi versions were known by other names including Moksha-Patamu.
4 They appeared in Britain at the end of the nineteenth century, and ‘the end
of Victoria’s reign saw the gradual loss of moral exhortations’ (Parlett 1999:
92–93).
5 Notably, ‘Self-esteem’ (or pride) leads to a fall in this board game: a trope which
was not to be a feature of twenty-ﬁrst-century meritocracy, where self-esteem is
a precondition for action.
6 Published by Agatco. You can see the image on iTunes, but I was unable to
secure copyright permission to publish it (https://itunes.apple.com/gb/app/sna
kes-and-ladders/id300205243?mt=8. Accessed 16 December 2016).
7 The Oxford English Dictionary’s entry on meritocracy and its earliest use has been
updated during the time I have been writing this book (Oxford English Dictionary
2016).
8 In this book, Young is simultaneously noted as being inﬂuential whilst Rise of the
Meritocracy is absent from the discussion.
9 Young stated in the introduction to the 1994 edition that ‘the most inﬂuential
books are always those which are not read’ (Young 1994: xv) and later wrote
that he did not think that Blair had actually read his book (Young 2001). Clare
Donovan has argued, somewhat tenuously, that many academics who have cited
it have not read it either (Donovan 2006). Various reviewers have also argued
that its style is problematic (e.g. Hoggart 1958; Barker 2006: 3).
10 ‘Traditionally, the market was the arbiter of diﬀerential reward, based on scarcity
or on demand. But as economic decisions become politicized, and the market is
replaced by social decisions, what is the principle of fair reward and fair diﬀerence?’
(Bell 1972: 63).
References
Arendt, Hannah (1958) ‘The Crisis in Education’, Partisan Review 25(4) pp. 493–513.
Arendt, Hannah (2006) Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought.
London: Penguin Books.
Augustyn, Frederik J., Jnr (1974) Dictionary of Toys and Games in American Popular
Culture. Philadelphia: Haworth Press.
Barker, Paul (2006) ‘A Tract for the Times’, in Geoﬀ Dench (ed.), The Rise and Rise
of Meritocracy. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 36–44.
Bauman, Zygmun (2000) Individualisation. Oxford: Polity Press.
44 Genealogies
Beck, John (2008) Meritocracy, Citizenship and Education: New Labour’s Legacy.
London: Continuum.
Beck, Ulrich, and Elizabeth Beck-Gernsheim (2001) Individualization: Institutionalised
Individualism and its Political Consequences. London: Sage.
Bell, Daniel (1972) ‘On Meritocracy and Equality’, Public Interest 29 (Fall) pp. 29–68.
Bell, Daniel (1973) The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting.
New York: Basic Books.
Boltanski, Luc, and Eve Chiapello (2007) The New Spirit of Capitalism. London:
Verso.
Briggs, Asa (2006) ‘The Labour Party as Crucible’, in Geoﬀ Dench (ed.), The Rise
and Rise of Meritocracy. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 17–26.
Brown, Phillip, and Stuart Tannock (2009) ‘Education, Meritocracy and the Global
War for Talent’, Journal of Education Policy 24(4), pp. 377–392.
Buhle, Paul (2011) ‘Daniel Bell: Obituary’, The Guardian, 26 January, www.guardian.
co.uk/education/2011/jan/26/daniel-bell-obituary. Accessed 1 November 2016.
Cross, Steve, and Jo Littler (2010) ‘Celebrity and Schadenfreude: The Cultural
Economy of Fame in Freefall’, Cultural Studies 24(3) pp. 395–417.
Crouch, Colin (2004) Post-Democracy. Oxford: Polity Press.
Davies, William (2014) The Limits of Neoliberalism. London: Sage.
De Tocqueville, A. (1994) Democracy in America. London: Fontana Press.
Dench, Geoﬀ (ed.) (2006) The Rise and Rise of Meritocracy. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
Donovan, Paul (2006) ‘The Chequered Career of a Cryptic Concept’, in Geoﬀ
Dench (ed.), The Rise and Rise of Meritocracy. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 61–72.
Douglas, R.M. (2002) ‘No Friend of Democracy: The Socialist Vanguard Group
1941–1950’, Contemporary British History 16(4), pp. 51–86.
Durkheim, Emile (2013) The Division of Labour in Society, 2nd edn, ed. Stephen
Lukes, trans. W.D. Halls. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Elman, Benjamin A. (2013) Civil Examinations and Meritocracy in Late Imperial China.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Fischer, Claude S., Michael Hout, Martín Sánchez Jankowski, Samuel R. Lucas,
Ann Swidler and Kim Voss (1996) Inequality by Design: Cracking the Bell Curve
Myth. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Foucault, Michel (2008) The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978–
1979, trans. Graham Burchell. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Fox, Alan (1956) ‘Class and Equality’, Socialist Commentary, May, pp. 11–13.
Fox, Alan (2004) A Very Late Development. 2nd revd edn. Coventry: BUIRA.
Frank, Thomas H., and Philip J. Cook (1995) The Winner-Take-All-Society: Why the
Few at the Top Get So Much More than the Rest of Us. New York: Simon &
Schuster.
Free Dictionary (2016) ‘Meritocracy’, www.thefreedictionary.com/meritocrat. Accessed
1 November 2016.
Friedman, Thomas (2005) The World is Flat. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Hobsbawm, Eric (1988) The Age of Capital: 1848–1875. London: Abacus.
Hoggart, Richard (1958) ‘IQ plus Eﬀort = Merit’, The Observer, 2 November.
Meritocracy’s genealogies 45
James, Wilmot (2012) ‘The Language of Meritocracy’, Inside Politics, 5 March, https://
inside-politics.org/2012/03/05/the-language-of-meritocracy. Accessed 1 November
2016.
Kothari, Uma (ed.) (2005) A Radical History of Development Studies. London: Zed Books.
Kynaston, David (2013) Modernity Britain: Opening the Box, 1957–1959, Kindle edn.
London: Bloomsbury.
Lakoﬀ, George, and Mark Johnson (1980) Metaphors We Live By. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press.
Land, Hilary (2006) ‘We Sat Down at the Table of Privilege and Complained about
the Food’, in Geoﬀ Dench (ed.), The Rise and Rise of Meritocracy. Oxford: Wiley-
Blackwell, pp. 45–60.
Lash, Scott, and John Urry (1993) Economies of Signs and Space. London: Sage.
Lindemann, Albert (2013) A History of Modern Europe From 1815 to the Present.
Oxford: Wiley.
McNamee, Stephen J., and Robert K. Miller (2009) The Meritocracy Myth. Lanham:
Rowman & Littleﬁeld.
Macpherson, Crawford B. (2010) The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism from
Hobbes to Locke. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels (2004) Marx and Engels Collected Works. London:
Lawrence & Wishart.
Nordquist, Joan (1997)Hannah Arendt (II): A Bibliography, Social Theory: A Bibliographic
Series, 46. Santa Cruz: Reference and Research Services.
Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (2013) http://oxforddnb.com/. Accessed 1
November 2016.
Oxford English Dictionary (2001) Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Oxford English Dictionary (2016) www.oed.com. Accessed 28 February 2017.
Parlett, David (1999)The Oxford History of Board Games. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Piketty, Thomas (2013) Capital in the Twenty-First Century. Cambridge, MA: Belknap
Press.
Quinn Moore, R. (2000) ‘Multiracialism and Meritocracy: Singapore’s Approach to
Race and Inequality’, Review of Social Economy 58(3) pp. 339–360.
Ross, Kristin (2002) May ’68 and its Afterlives. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
Saﬁre, William (2008) Saﬁre’s Political Dictionary. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Savage, Mike (2010) Identities and Social Change in Britain since 1940: The Politics of
Method. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Schaar, J. (1997) ‘Equality of Opportunity, and Beyond’, in L. Pojman and R.
Westmoreland (eds), Equality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 137–147.
Sen, Amartya (2000) ‘Merit and Justice’, in Kenneth Arrow, Samuel Bowles and
Steven Durlauf (eds), Meritocracy and Economic Inequality. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, pp. 5–16.
Slesin, Suzanne (1993) ‘At 50: Still Climbing, Still Sliding’, New York Times, 15 July,
www.nytimes.com/1993/07/15/garden/currents-at-50-still-climbing-still-sliding.
html. Accessed 1 November 2016.
46 Genealogies
Soko, Mills (2015) ‘South Africa Needs a Meritocratic Civil Service, not a Political
One’, Rand Daily Mail, 14 May, www.rdm.co.za/politics/2015/05/14/sa-needs-a-
meritocratic-civil-service-not-a-political-one. Accessed 1 November 2016.
Talib, Nadira, and Richard Fitzgerald (2015) ‘Inequality as Meritocracy: The Use of the
Metaphor of Diversity and the Value of Inequality within Singapore’s Meritocratic
Education System’, Critical Discourse Studies 12(4) pp. 445–462.
Todd, Selina (2015) The People: The Rise and Fall of the Working Class, 1910–2010.
London: John Murray.
Topsﬁeld, Andrew (2006a) The Art of Play: Board and Card Games of India. Bombay:
Marg Publications.
Topsﬁeld, Andrew (2006b) ‘Snakes and Ladders in India: Some Further Discoveries’,
Artibus Asiae (66)1 pp. 143–179.
Wild, Thomas, and Anne Posten (2010) ‘For the Sake of What is New’, Hannah
Arendt Center, Bard College, www.hannaharendtcenter.org/?tag=denver-lindley.
Accessed 18 March 2016.
Williams, Raymond (1958) ‘Democracy or Meritocracy?’, Manchester Guardian, 30
October, p. 10.
Williams, Raymond (1983) Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Wooldridge, Adrian (1995) Meritocracy and the ‘Classless Society’. London: Social
Market Foundation
Young, Michael (1994) The Rise of the Meritocracy [1958], 2nd revd edn. London:
Transaction Publishers.
Young, Michael (2001) ‘Down with Meritocracy’, The Guardian, 29 June, www.gua
rdian.co.uk/politics/2001/jun/29/comment. Accessed 1 November 2016.
Meritocracy’s genealogies 47
2
RISING UP
Gender, ethnicity, class and the
meritocratic deﬁcit
The enemies of ’68 have never forgotten how much was unhinged in that
period.
Stuart Hall1
See where your talent takes you
We strongly believe that work is the way each of us can put our passion and
energy into creating value. And we’re convinced that choosing a career
requires careful consideration, as it will inevitably lead to challenges as we
embark upon a journey of personal and professional transformation.
Our goal is to release those energies. We know it’s not easy, and can often
be stressful: that’s why, at Meritocracy, we make job-seeking a rich,
rewarding experience. We give candidates the power to grasp the vision of a
London-based charity, explore the spaces of Swedish market leader in the
packaging industry, or discover the values of a Korean multinational con-
necting millions of people worldwide daily, before making their next move.
Be curious, see where your talent takes you.
(Meritocracy n.d.)
There is an online job agency called Meritocracy. It aims to help companies
recruit ‘millennials’ – young people born between 1980 and 2000 – and to
help these millennials ﬁnd jobs.2 Meritocracy, whose clients include Tetra-Pak,
Samsung, Coca-Cola, Moleskine and JustGiving, encourages companies to
upload photos and details of their working environments alongside job specs
to the site. Meanwhile, applicants can see at-a-glance statistics about the
number of company employees and its gender ratio alongside photos of
beaming members of staﬀ in funky environments, embedded ﬁlms featuring
workers discussing why they love working there, and icons indicating
‘beneﬁts’, such as games rooms, pensions or laptops. In the talent economy
Meritocracy promises to transform the stressful business of job-seeking into
a bold, adventurous experience, helping release passions to ‘create value’. Its
weightless, generalising adjectives conjure up a young, aﬄuent, passion-
driven cosmopolitan imaginary. The agency workers are based in London
and Italy but, like their clientele, they do not like to be pinned down by
geography. ‘It might sound odd, annoying even, but on Meritocracy you
can’t select locations, only ambitions. Above all, we want to oﬀer the best
opportunities for each of you. Wherever they may be’ (Meritocracy n.d.).
It is the aﬀective work experience here which is paramount, in terms of
surroundings, colleagues, beneﬁts and feeling like you are ‘creating value’
(rather than having values and creating things out of them). These experiences
are most important, presenting an exciting alternative to, and/or extension
of, current surroundings and networks. The envisaged cosmopolitan corporate
work-subjects are young, and are not imagined as parents: family-related
provision notably doesn’t ﬁgure in the ‘associated beneﬁts’ section. Meri-
tocracy here connotes the freedom to work – not so much hard as ‘boldly’
and ‘passionately’ – in order to unlock inner talent and rise up the global
ladder of opportunity to corporate cosmopolitan nirvana.
The ideology of meritocracy has, as we saw in chapter 1, long been
yoked to the idea of career advancement from egalitarian beginnings. But
here it takes a speciﬁc form as an ideologically loaded brand name for a
commercial agency, one seeking itself to create proﬁt by drawing on an
image of egalitarian opportunity and talent-activation as the route to climb
the global ladder. In the process, it harnesses rhetoric about the transnational
meritocratic winners of a ‘global war for talent’ (Brown and Tannock 2009)
that has been popularised by recent management literature, as we saw in
chapter 1 and, as the next chapter shows, has also been sanctioned by neoliberal
governments. It is also indicative of how meritocracy has been more widely
positioned as a discourse with a ‘cool’ value, a social system suggesting
boundless and limitless opportunity for the transnationally gifted. It represents
what we might call ‘neoliberal meritocracy as corporate liberation’.
The images being mobilised here gain traction by having some vestiges of
truth. It is possible for some young people to have working lives involving a
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sizeable amount of travel and a variety of forms of self-realisation. But on
the Meritocracy website these messages are massaged into relentlessly gla-
morous forms and the substantial negative aspects of such work are elided.
In a wider context such messages accrue along with others like them to gain
a mythic status and become a widely disseminated truth-claim about con-
temporary ‘no-collar’ work. The term ‘no-collar work’ refers to formerly
‘white-collar’ professions repackaged under post-Fordism as attractive and
casual, combined with new professions, particularly in the tech sector and
the creative industries (Ross 2004; Sennett 2006; Friedman 2005). Jobs
advertised on the Meritocracy website span a wide range of roles and sec-
tors – including administration, creative, technological, branding, sales,
production, retail and management work – and all are promoted through
exactly this creative, cool, no-collar, youth-oriented aesthetic. The clue that
there just might be a problem with the image is to be found when you click
on an image of their core staﬀ, who are overwhelmingly white and male.3
The pervasive branding of no-collar labour as cool, informal, fun and
open access has been facilitated by the cultural and creative industries which
preﬁgured and set a template for an image of the future of work and for
conditions across other sectors (Gill 2002; Gregg 2011; McGuigan 2009;
McRobbie 2016; Ross 2010). Yet a sizeable quantity of research has now
shown that, alongside the image of carefree enjoyability that anyone talen-
ted and purposeful enough can access, there has in all of these sectors
simultaneously been an erosion of working conditions both in terms of job
security (the cutting of sick pay and pensions, a rise in ﬁxed-term, perma-
temp and zero-hours contracts) and of the ability to access and progress
through the sector by those who are not rich, white, male or well-con-
nected enough. To use two ugly, but extremely useful neologisms, con-
temporary work in the private and increasingly in the public sector has
overwhelmingly moved in the direction of oﬀering ‘ﬂexploitation’ (ﬂex-
ibility + exploitation) rather than ‘ﬂexicurity’ (ﬂexibility + security) (Ross
2010).
As we have seen, meritocracy today, in its neoliberal form, tends to
endorse a competitive, linear system of social mobility and to function as an
ideological myth to obscure inequalities, including the role this discourse of
meritocracy itself plays in actually curtailing social mobility. Its myth of
mobility is used to create the idea of a level playing ﬁeld that does not exist.
As chapter 1 tracked, meritocracy has travelled a long way from a term of
abuse to a normalised principle. By taking a broader historical view, focusing
on worlds of work and using a series of cultural snapshots, this chapter
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considers the historical reasons for both such parables of progress and the
intersectional inconsistencies they hide. It shows how a quasi-democratic,
but problematic, post-war language and practice of egalitarianism was ﬁlleted
and marketised for corporate gain: popularising the ideas of a level playing
ﬁeld and that we can all ‘rise up’ at work, whilst perpetuating particular
inbuilt and structural prejudices in terms of race, class, gender and ability. It
terms these structural, yet frequently disavowed, disadvantages of gender,
race and class the ‘egalitarian deﬁcit’.
The second half of the chapter considers how this egalitarian deﬁcit has
been dealt with. It argues that over the past few decades, the idea that we
are ‘over’ disparities of race, gender and class – or post-racism, post-sexism
and what could be termed ‘post-classism’ – have worked hand in hand with
neoliberal meritocracy to fuel each other and give each other strength.
Those experiencing the egalitarian deﬁcit, who do not start out at the top
of the social pyramid, are often doubly or trebly disadvantaged by neoliberal
narratives of meritocracy whilst being particularly incited to climb it. They
have been encouraged to feel the pressures of inequality as, overwhelmingly,
a personal failing. But the chapter also identiﬁes selective shifts in the char-
acteristics of this formation in recent years: from ignoring inequality to
selectively noticing injustice, an injustice positioned as a ‘meritocratic deﬁcit’;
and from disavowing the feminist and civil-rights movements to attempting
to re-articulate their imagery in the service of a reinvigorated neoliberal
settlement. These ‘neoliberal justice narratives’, as I term them, attempt to
redress some forms of inequality whilst perpetuating others.
Partial progression and painful ladders: mid-century welfare
A key reason why neoliberal meritocracy has been able to gain ideological
traction is because of its use of the powerful residual eﬀects and aﬀects of
changes in the high point of social democracy during the mid-twentieth
century, particularly in terms of opening up access to occupations. Lauren
Berlant’s book Cruel Optimism suggests that an aﬀective relationship to the
promise of the post-war social democratic moment is both a constitutive
feeling of the present and an impasse to our future, given that its social
solidarities are being eroded away and sold by neoliberalism. The very
optimism of the post-war moment is abused and channelled into becoming
‘an obstacle to our ﬂourishing’ (Berlant 2011).
It is important to consider the nature of the meritocracy which was on
oﬀer at this mid-century moment. Social democratic welfare states were
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neither globally ubiquitous nor a uniform phenomenon. In many countries,
this formation did not appear at all, and its manifestations across countries
that were aﬀected was variable. Nonetheless the term ‘welfare states’ indicates a
range of systems of social provision and protection – including universal
healthcare, education and pensions – that developed most markedly in
Western Europe and the Nordic countries, and signiﬁcantly in the US in
the shape of the New Deal, from the end of the Second World War up
into the 1970s. (Certain aspects can be dated earlier: in the UK, for example,
the arrival of social democracy is often dated from the reforms of the Liberal
government in the 1900s [see Wahl 2011: 4].)
The swathe of entitlements generated by the introduction of welfare
states oﬀered multiple routes to rising up or increased forms of social
mobility for many, including sick pay, maternity pay, holiday pay, universal
education, healthcare, pensions and legislation against discrimination. As the
inclusion of the word ‘healthcare’ in this list makes clear, these forms of
protection were extremely variegated between countries: there were stark
diﬀerences between universal public healthcare in Denmark and its non-
existent or bony skeletal structure in the US. Esping-Anderson described
these diﬀerences as being part of the ‘three worlds’ of welfare capitalism. In
this typology universal provision was most pronounced in the social-
democratic Nordic countries, ‘middling’ in Christian-democratic areas like
France and Germany and much weaker in liberal regimes such as the USA
and Japan (Esping-Anderson 1990).
The phrase ‘welfare capitalism’ itself indicates how this system was a
compromise – a fraught and heated compromise – between states and
capital. Such tensions are captured in the term Yiannis Gabriel and Tim
Lang provide for this settlement, ‘the Fordist Deal’: a phrase evoking car
manufacturer Henry Ford’s argument that his workers needed to be able to
aﬀord to buy the goods they were making. The Fordist Deal promised
‘ever-increasing standards of living in exchange for a quiescent labour force’
(Gabriel and Lang 2015: 10) and for those within its national borders,
oﬀered substantial levels of social protection within a profoundly hierarchical
and patriarchal structure.
At this time, a very signiﬁcant opportunity for rising up the social ladder
of employment was provided by the expanded numbers of people
employed in the public sector, such as the civil service, hospitals, schools
and libraries. As the Nuﬃeld Mobility Study 1968–1971 demonstrated, the
public sector had grown alongside the service sector, there was much more
white-collar work on oﬀer: more ‘room at the top’ (Bukodi et al. 2015;
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Savage et al. 2015: 190). We can translate this phenomenon into terms
compatible with academic research on social mobility, which usually diﬀer-
entiates between ‘absolute’ and ‘relative’ social mobility (Hickman 2009: 11;
Goldthorpe, Llewellyn and Payne 1980). Absolute social mobility refers to
the movement in occupational classes from one generation to the next. In
the UK there was a high level of movement in absolute terms between
1945 and the mid-1980s due to the growth in professional employment
in the public sector (especially in education and health) and in service sector
employment.
The phenomenon of partial and expanding mid-century upward mobility
has since reduced with the combined eﬀects of public sector spending cuts
since the 1980s and shrinkage in the service economy. Measuring relative
social mobility involves comparing rates at which those from ‘lower down’
move up, compared to how many ‘higher up’ fall down. As Vikki Boliver
and David Byrne have argued, not only has there been ‘little if any sign of
[people] becoming any more equal over time’ but now with a crumbling
middle class, ‘upward mobility increasingly necessitates downward mobility’
(Boliver and Byrne 2013; see also Dorling 2011). In other words, the ‘room
at the top’ generated by an expanding public sector has shrunk.
Such patterns help explain both the mid-century cultural validation of
professional occupations and the expanding late-twentieth-century focus on
entrepreneurialism and celebrity. Since the late 1970s, these public welfare
systems have been under sustained and incremental attacks and erosion from
national and international policies and marketisation (Foucault 2008; Harvey
2005; Wahl 2011). The forms of social protection oﬀered by welfare states
have been subject to repeated assaults by various permutations of neoliberal
practice as part of a longer unravelling since the late 1970s, now well
documented in a range of texts on the eﬀects of neoliberalism (Brown 2015;
Foucault 2008; Harvey 2005). Neoliberalism has had ‘uneven geographical
developments’, as David Harvey discusses in A Brief History of Neoliberalism.
Naomi Klein and her team also provide a usefully detailed account of global
diﬀerentiation in The Shock Doctrine, tracing connections between the
compromises twisted into the legislation in post-apartheid South Africa,
Chile and the UK (Klein 2008). In recent years, amidst neoliberal auster-
ity, jobs and provision oﬀered by the public sector have been one of the
ﬁrst targets for extensive cuts. Cutting back the protections oﬀered by
social democracy has disproportionately aﬀected women, non-whites and
the working class (Stephenson 2011; Pearson and Elson 2015; Wilkinson
and Pickett 2010).
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Pulling rank: problems with welfarist rising up
However, there were also problems with both the extent, and the character,
of these forms of rising up, of social mobility at the high point of the social
democratic welfare state. Whilst it reduced poverty and squalor for all, the
Anglo-American model of social democracy was disproportionately helpful
at opening up progress and access to work for men, and especially white
men. Whilst it provided more forms of social protection for all, the welfarist
model in many countries was not particularly attuned to wider equalities in
terms of social reproduction (as I explore in chapter 5). In the Anglo-American
model of welfare capitalism the emphasis in paid work in the public sector
like many private companies was still very much on the male worker as
breadwinner. The question of reducing work hours for men and women so
that they could share equal parenting, for example, was never on the agenda
of the UK or US welfare state, unlike the Nordic model of welfare capitalism,
a settlement which was more oriented towards this model (Fraser 2013). For
example, in Sweden, equal pay was introduced in 1947 and paid maternity
leave in 1948, whereas in the UK similar acts were only introduced in 1975
(by which time Sweden had made its parental leave unisex).
Neither did it integrate women, ethnic minorities or the working class
with proportional egalitarianism into its employment structures. Covert
discrimination continued to ﬂourish. One good example of this is the British
civil service. In the 1960s, the UK civil service employed nearly a million
workers and, much like the administrative wing of imperial China mentioned
in chapter 1, ‘required examinations for promotions in order to privilege
talent over connections’, thus being known as a ‘fair ﬁeld with no favour’
(Hicks 2016: 29). Whilst it was a more open system, the entrance exam still
favoured some forms of experience over others, a fact recognised by the
1968 Fulton report which argued that the civil service entry exam was
‘rooted ﬁrmly in the educational standards of Oxbridge and the curricular
preferences of middle-class public schools’ (Pilkington 1999: 20).
Moreover, as Marie Hicks’ historical archive work on women and tech-
nology shows, there was a marked misogyny to how such employment
positions and ranks were classiﬁed (Hicks 2010, 2016). Hicks writes of how,
in the UK civil service, thousands of women working with early computers
were given the employment classiﬁcation of ‘operators’: jobs coded as
menial and given low pay rates. As computing grew in importance and
prestige, these tasks were recoded as skilled work, but instead of women
rising alongside the new-found esteem of the labour task, they ended up
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training the very men who rose above them. Instead of rising up the ranks,
women were structurally repositioned in terms of both pay and prestige
away from the higher grades of work. Therefore, rather than inviting
people to ‘work their way up’ employment hierarchies, Hicks concludes,
we should look at the larger cultural and historical reasons why so
many more women than men, and so many more black women than
white women, have to start from the very bottom and often get stuck
there.
(Hicks 2016: 33)
It is also interesting to consider the model of ‘progression’ itself, and particu-
larly the extent of what we could call the ‘verticality’ of the dominant model
of employment in terms of pay and prestige. Undoubtedly the vast terrain
of work includes very diﬀerent tasks and responsibilities: diﬀerent jobs
require diﬀerent skills, some jobs require more skills or are particularly com-
plex, not everybody can do everything, experience needs to be valued. Yet
the way work can be rewarded is variable. It can be rewarded through, for
example, more time oﬀ after a certain length of service (as in Australian
universities, where academics get a term oﬀ after a decade served) or as
compensation for a particularly unattractive task (as in Alan Fox’s idea of
‘cross-grading’ discussed in chapter 1, where rubbish collectors get extra
leisure time due to the nature of their work).
To adapt a model so often applied to politics and social movements, the
structure of ranks within a workplace can be diﬀerently organised in horizontal
and vertical terms. An extremely hierarchical, vertical model will require
little collaboration between ranks; an extremely horizontal model will
require endless collaboration. The civil service was often taken as oﬀering
an excellent example of meritocracy. It was also a means through which
competitive hierarchies of progression became more widely disseminated in
the world of employment from the nineteenth century.4 Its model, com-
bining open recruitment with progressing through diﬀerent ranks on the
basis of merit rather than seniority, had been borrowed from the Indian civil
service as it mutated from the East India Company (O’Toole 2006: 46–60).
An imperialist militaristic corporation was then the template for what
became the Northcote–Trevelyan report and the modern civil service.
Notably the Northcote–Trevelyan report also sought to revoke a model in
which progression was coterminous with seniority and explicitly advocated
hiring more young men on the grounds that they were cheaper and would
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compete for better wages (O’Toole 2006: 57). This combination of open
competition and pronounced, competitive hierarchical ranking was there-
fore normalised as a desirable labour practice. It is not that progressing,
developing and the ﬂourishing of capabilities are not necessary or useful – of
course, they are vital – but their channelling and normalisation through an
extremely vertical, competitive ladder-like system are noteworthy here. To
what extent is this pronounced vertical ladder system, of competing to
move up ranks, a system which perpetuates ﬁnancial and classed diﬀerences
and prevents, rather than fosters, ﬂourishing?
At the high point of the welfare state, the expansion of professional jobs,
particularly in the public sector, oﬀered a route up the ladder, a means of
social mobility. At the same time such social mobility was frequently painful.
For some, like Richard Hoggart’s working-class ‘scholarship boy’ who
entered the middle-class domain of grammar school in the 1950s or the
middle-class suburban women from working-class backgrounds interviewed
by Steph Lawler in the 1990s, it led to a cultural isolation, a dissociation
from support networks and/or ‘imposter syndrome’ alongside the longed-for
material ease and opportunity (Hoggart 1957; Lawler 1999). Contemporary
sociological work such as Sam Friedman’s study of social mobility amongst
comedians shows that a similar lack of cultural validation and aﬀective dis-
sonance remains acutely felt today (Friedman 2013). The point is not that
people should somehow stay in an allotted, essentialised place, but rather
that the classed, competitive hierarchies of ‘a ladder of opportunity’ leaves
people behind.
Selling 1968
A later and equally pivotal inﬂuence on the idea of meritocracy and rising
up was the eﬀects of the mid-to-late-twentieth-century liberation move-
ments. The increasingly insistent demands for greater equality in terms of
gender, race and sexuality from the 1960s in the Global North came to be
widely culturally accepted as demands that were right and just. Whilst the
realities of progress have been uneven and problematic, the argument that
societies should be equal in terms of gender, race and sexuality was largely
won. Signiﬁcant acts and moments of progress were made in many respects
on all fronts: for example, from the Equal Pay Act in UK in 1970 (1963 in
the US) outlawing men and women being paid diﬀerent amounts for the
same job, through legislation outlawing discrimination on grounds of race
or ethnicity in the UK Race Relations Act of 1976 (in the US, the Civil
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Rights Act was passed in 1964) and to the wave of legalisation of gay
marriage across most of Europe, New Zealand and Mexico in the early
twenty-ﬁrst century. Such dreams of equality have not exactly come to
complete fruition. The move towards progressive social change is not, as
liberal discourse would have it, automatically moving upwards on a steadily
increasing curve. It is erratic and has to be continually fought for. These
egalitarian movements, including demands for sexual liberation, anti-Vietnam
War protests and worker reforms are sometimes referred to under the ‘sign
of 1968’, the year of public uprisings, when 9 million people went on strike
in France (Ross 2002; Gilbert 2008). The victories of this generation are
enormously signiﬁcant in terms of both their material gains and in terms of
their colonisation of hegemonic common sense about what a ‘just’ society
should be.
Yet these gains were also seized upon by corporate business discourse.
The liberation movements for rights on the basis of gender, race, sexuality
and environmentalism was seized upon by capitalism, its marketing gurus
selling the dream of equality back to us as something we could have and
possess if only we just bought this product. This process is dramatised at the
end of the US HBO TV series Mad Men. The main character, advertising
executive Don Draper, is featured channelling his recent experience in a
Californian hippy retreat into creating Coca-Cola’s famous hands-around-
the-world corporate equal-opportunities anthem, ‘I’d Like to Buy the
World a Coke’. A real advert inserted into this ﬁctional drama and sung to
the tune of ‘I’d Like to Teach the World to Sing’, the footage of the
famous advert features a self-consciously wide range of people singing who
are supposed to represent the diversity of the world’s population and marks
the sucking-up of holistic environmentalism and multicultural universalism
to refresh the corporate brand identity of a ﬁzzy brown sugary drink.
The process of hijacking strands of 1960s-and-onwards progressive social
movements was (and remains) not complete but uneven and continually
contested. Liberation movements were themselves ideologically complex and
multifaceted but were notably often produced through strong commitments
to greater economic equality alongside that of race, sexual orientation and
gender and often in innovative intersectional forms. The Black Panthers in
the US, for example, set up both breakfast clubs to feed local kids and
healthcare clinics in their communities (Nelson 2011; Cleaver and Katsiaﬁcas
2001). In the UK, sections of the environmental and women’s liberation
movement joined with workers from heavily masculine trade unions to create
the innovative ‘Alternative Plan’ for socially useful production when the
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Lucas Aerospace plant was threatened with closure (Wainwright 2009;
Rowbotham, Segal and Wainwright 2012). The corporate embrace of the
new movements for equality was also complex and inventive, a mixture of
carrot and stick: of being forced to comply with equal rights through legisla-
tion, and an eager embrace of the new marketing opportunities jacking your
product to the promise of liberation might bring. What more potent
advertising jingle than that oﬀered by freedom?
Understanding the processes through which corporate discourse
embraced these movements whilst simultaneously eroding workers’ rights,
the security of the full-time job and ultimately the welfare state has been a
preoccupation of many scholars and activists for a couple of decades now
(Frank 1998; Brooks 2001; Boltanski and Chiapello 2005; Hardt and Negri
2000; McGuigan 2009). Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello examine how
management absorbed and reused the ‘aesthetic critique’, the imagery,
rhetoric and vitalism of the 1968 counterculture to generate new forms of
exploitation as part of what they termed The New Spirit of Capitalism (Boltanski
and Chiapello 2005). After the Protestant work ethic that animated the
industrial revolution from the eighteenth century and the bureaucratic spirit
which marked the centralised uniformity of mid-twentieth-century Fordism
and its ‘company man’ came this new rebel spirit, from the 1970s, forged in the
networked knowledge economy. In his book on American politics and
society, Twilight of the Elites, Christopher Hayes usefully argues that this
moment can be understood as promising a ‘second age of equality’, as oﬀering
liberation from the unjust hierarchies of race, gender and sexual orien-
tation, but swapped in their place a new hierarchy based on the notion
that people are deeply unequal in ability and drive.
(Hayes 2012: 22)
As public funding for the public sector has been cut, sections sold oﬀ and
marketised, and working conditions throughout the private sector have been
weakened, the structural problems that were not addressed – the extremely
hierarchical nature of the social ladder, the continued prejudice against and
lack of opportunities for many women and those who were not white and
the large majority of working-class people – have in a variety of ways
become exacerbated. The picture is undoubtedly complex: the success of
movements against sexism and racism allowed some mobility, particularly in
terms of the entry of women into professional workplaces, but ongoing
prejudice combined with structural economic inequality has kept the
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majority down. Meanwhile, the stories of the ones who ‘made it’, their
‘inner talent’ and drive causing them to rise up against the odds, are spot-
lighted, awarded a mediated power, and packaged into parables of progress
through which to shame the rest.
Parables of progress: luminous media fables
Rising up the social hierarchy is a narrative with considerable history,
tending to appear – in diﬀerent forms and with diﬀerent articulations –
wherever there is social inequality (Littler 2004). But it has been reinvigo-
rated as a form within neoliberal culture and calibrated through an insistent
emphasis on the self-fashioning of the entrepreneurial, self-promotional
working subject. Stories about ‘working really hard’ to activate your talent
form the structural template of many media texts, from self-help books
through magazines to reality TV, presenting the journey of ‘ordinary sub-
jects’, who become spotlighted, or made ‘luminous’, to borrow Angela
McRobbie’s inspired use of Deleuze (McRobbie 2009), and fashioned into
moralising parables of meritocracy.
Indeed, mediated forms of competitive self-improvement are now ubiqui-
tous. Perhaps nowhere has climbing the ladder of competitive individualism
been represented so vividly as in the crystalline example of the genre of
reality TV shows that are structured around ‘making it’, and so it is worth
considering this example here in a little more detail. Wildly successful
transnational franchises such as Idol, The Apprentice, Voice, Got Talent and
Top Model repeatedly address ordinary subjects who can ‘make it to the top’
of their particular profession, particularly in the performing arts and business,
through hard work and self-fashioning (Banet-Weiser 2012; Couldry and
Littler 2008, 2011; Ouellette and Hay 2008; Stahl 2004; Turner 2010). The
extent to which this subgenre of reality TV has provided a space through
which work can be represented as above all a ruthless struggle between
competing people for scarce prizes is remarkable. The Apprentice, for example,
naturalises competitive individualism – in which all teamwork is a temporary
means to an individualistic end – by oﬀering itself up as a dramatic but
essential truth of the harsh realities of how work ‘just is’ (Couldry and Littler
2008, 2011).
The degree to which both reality TV and its ‘making it’ subgenre have
become small-screen staples makes it harder to remember the novelty of the
format when it was so swiftly developed. The Apprentice’s promotion of
entrepreneurialism as accessible for all, for instance, has long roots in the
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Thatcherite enterprise culture that I discuss in the next chapter. But these
terms have also been carefully cultivated and expanded, through the valorisation
of entrepreneurialism as a signiﬁcant factor of all employment, by the
framing of the programme as ‘educational’ and its use in embedding entre-
preneurialism as a subject children should be taught in schools. In the UK,
the presenter Sir Alan Sugar was appointed ‘Enterprise Tsar’ for the govern-
ment in 2009 and 2016 (Couldry and Littler 2008, 2011; BBC 2009, 2016).
The glossy, meritocratic parables of rising up oﬀered by the TV show and
their surrounding media commentary are a key means through which entre-
preneurialism, as both a discourse and a practice, has not simply been ‘con-
tinued’ but has been reinvigorated and extended into new domains,
including, in the US, presidential candidacies.
Reality TV shows like Idol and The Apprentice oﬀer dramas of rising up
starring ‘real’ people. Reality television can be read and decoded in a variety
of ways, and some critiques can harbour elitist snobberies (Skeggs and Wood
2011, 2012). The eruption of representations of ordinary, previously non-
famous people (or ‘civilians’ in celebrity parlance) has for some critics been an
invigorating sign of progressive representation of ordinary lives, or, in John
Hartley’s phrase, ‘democratainment’ (Hartley 1999). Yet for others, reality
TV has been only too full of problems, problems which might be divided
into two thematic areas. Firstly, it has been widely observed that the repre-
sentation of ordinary people on reality TV has often been not only less than
ﬂattering, but has routinely involved ridicule and public forms of shame and
humiliation (McRobbie 2009: 124–129; Ouellette and Hay 2008; Skeggs and
Wood 2011, 2012; Biressi and Nunn 2005). In Milly Williamson’s terms,
‘ordinariness is circumscribed’ on the majority of reality TV shows: instead of
opening up a wide range of representations of ordinary people, it denigrates a
large swathe of them whilst glorifying the winners (Williamson 2016).
Secondly, its economic basis, production and labour has been analysed
and condemned as exploitative. The genre that Graeme Turner astutely
described as involving a ‘demotic turn’ (Turner 2010) – or the increased
representation of working- and lower-middle-class people – expanded from
the 1990s primarily because such formats were cheap to make (Chalaby 2016)
enabling employers to cut labour costs whilst the owners of the production
companies harvested huge proﬁts (Skeggs and Wood 2011: 2). In the process,
as Milly Williamson puts it,
Reality TV contributed signiﬁcantly to the restructuring of the television
industry, which, rather than opening up the industry democratically,
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has resulted in attacks on the conditions of those who work in the
industry and those who try to enter the ranks of fame by this means.
(Williamson 2016: 102)
Reality TV’s promotion of ordinary people therefore came at the expense
of shutting down access routes to employment and good conditions for
workers in the TV industry. On the one hand, then, the trajectory of
people winning competitions and fulﬁlling their latent talent was being
made ‘luminous’, was being spotlighted as a model route to success by reality
TV shows. On the other – whether through helping to close the doors to
employment or to socially denigrate the working class – it functioned, in
terms of both production and cultural discourse, to reduce career possibilities
and to help make the process of actually accessing and progressing through
the creative industries more diﬃcult (Williamson 2016). As such they have
become a vivid example of neoliberal meritocracy: for the majority, they
present fables of progress whilst restricting possibilities.
Not so cool: unequal employment
These restricted possibilities have begun to be more widely publicised. Over
the past few years, the diﬃculties of entering the most publicly visible sections
of the creative industries has become increasingly noted by workers, con-
sumers, journalists and academics, as what has begun to be called ‘the class
ceiling’ becomes more and more conspicuous. In the UK, actor Julie Walters,
for instance, stated that working-class actors like herself who were able to
attend drama school because their fees were paid and they received a full
student maintenance grant from the government ‘wouldn’t get a chance
today’ in an era of vastly reduced public spending (Hattenstone and Walker
2015). Articles noting the predominance of upper-class actors on screen
have been joined by others noting the aﬄuent backgrounds of many pop
stars, with conspicuous markers being either having attended expensive
fee-paying schools or their status as oﬀspring of other pop stars (Hensher
2013; Price 2014). In 2015, the UK shadow arts minister, Chris Bryant,
stated that if he became a government minister, one of his priorities would
be to encourage cultural organisations ‘to hire from a wider variety of
backgrounds. … We can’t just have a culture dominated by [actor] Eddie
Redmayne and [singer] James Blunt and their ilk.’ This statement
prompted a furious reaction (‘that classist, prejudiced wazzock’) from the
expensively educated singer James Blunt and a burst of media commentary
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on the increasingly conspicuous nature of class privilege in acting and
singing (Furness 2015).
A related wave of scholarly attention over the past decade has foregrounded
the lack of diversity in terms of gender, ethnicity and class in the no-collar,
technology and cultural industries (e.g. Banks, Conor and Mayer 2015;
Hesmondhalgh and Baker 2010; Hesmondhalgh and Saha 2013; Conor, Gill
and Taylor 2015). For example, in their analysis of the 2014 British Labour
Force Survey, Dave O’Brien and his colleagues argue that, despite considerable
variation across the creative industries, there is a general underrepresentation of
people from working-class origins across the sector, a phenomenon which is
particularly pronounced in publishing and music; and that a ‘class origin pay
gap’ persists (O’Brien et al. 2016). Taking a longer historical view and a more
speciﬁc sector-based focus, Kate Oakley and Mark Banks have examined how
art schools oﬀered an alternative space for working-class youth and a ﬂourish-
ing incubator for creative production in the post-war period. As these art
schools have been cut back and incorporated into the traditional university
sector, and as student grants and social security beneﬁts have been slashed, this
supportive context has unravelled, decimating an important space of expression
for working-class youth (Banks and Oakley 2016).
The continuing problems of covert and overt forms of racism, sexism and
class prejudice in acting, the technology sector and the gaming industry have
therefore received escalating media and academic coverage (e.g. Ross 2016).
Rosalind Gill’s work on European freelance new-media workers highlighted
the disparities between men and women in terms of both payment and of
diﬃculty of gaining jobs through ‘clubbable’ networks of male sociability
(Gill 2002). The mythologised features of ﬂexibility and informality work to
bolster inequality, and these characteristics combined with ‘the rejection by
most new media workers of any discourse that makes gender visible’ mean
‘you have a situation in which patterns of discrimination are naturalised and
inequality and injustice wear an egalitarian mask’ (Gill 2002: 86). There has
also been signiﬁcant analysis of the varieties of forms taken by sexism in the
online gaming industry, from overt abuse through homosocial nepotism to
what Alison Harvey and Stephanie Fisher describe as the subtle forms
of profession paternalism known as ‘dadding’ (Harvey and Fisher 2016:
655–656). And to take yet another instance, the ﬁlm industry in the US and
UK has come under renewed ﬁre for its paucity of female directors and
scriptwriters (Conor 2014; Geena Davis Institute on Gender in Media 2017).
The problem of the overwhelming whiteness of the ﬁlm industry erupted
into the consciousness of mainstream media commentary in 2015 with the
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popularisation of the #OscarsSoWhite hashtag on Twitter and the associa-
tive boycott of the Oscars by a range of stars, as I explore in chapter 5. The
lack of non-white actors in general has been honed in on by pressure
groups including the Act for Change Project.5 The paucity of people of
colour in prominent positions or positions of power in journalism has been
imaginatively responded to by new sites of cultural production such as
Media Diversiﬁed (a non-proﬁt organisation and platform ‘which seeks to
cultivate and promote skilled writers of colour’ in print and online).6 And
the small numbers of non-white workers (and audiences) in museums and
galleries has prompted events including a recent single evening event
showcasing contemporary artforms within London’s Victoria & Albert
Museum, curated by black women’s collective gal-dem which attracted four
thousand visitors (Okolosie 2016; Littler and Naidoo 2005).7
Of course, all of these problems of work access and progression in the
cultural industries and no-collar sectors are not evenly distributed and have
some highly speciﬁc characteristics (Conor, Gill and Taylor 2015). Art galleries,
for example, have a high proportion of female workers, yet most managers
and senior authority ﬁgures are male (Malik 2012). Publishing and PR are
known for being industries particularly dominated by the white and upper-
middle classes (Edwards 2013). The gaming industry is particularly patri-
archal both in terms of the sexism directed at its female employees and the
statistical proportion of women gaining entry to it. Yet a key point here is
that all these inequalities and diﬃculties – whilst being highly speciﬁc in
their complexity and particularity – are nonetheless happening, in the
broader sense, simultaneously on the levels of gender, race and class. And
these proven diﬃculties are in opposition to the dream that we have a level
playing ﬁeld, to the parables of progress, or to the liberal idea that equality is
slowly, but surely, advancing on all fronts.
The realities, then, are that for those not at the top of the social pyramid
it is harder to access these forms of social mobility through work, and yet
the prevailing mythos has been that they are accessible to anyone. On the
one hand, we only too clearly do not have a level playing ﬁeld; on the
other hand, we are told that we do.
Selling inequality: post-feminism, post-race … post-class?
How can we theorise these intersectional inequalities in contemporary
neoliberal meritocracy? Attempts by neoliberal capitalism to commodify the
impulses and desires of liberation movements have slowly started to be
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discussed by work in a range of disciplinary areas. But whilst work focusing
on gender and neoliberalism, class and neoliberalism, or ethnicity and neo-
liberalism often share an analytical focus, they also use diﬀerent languages or
terminology. Therefore it would seem to be useful and important to con-
sider how they are diﬀerently discussed and to put them more closely
together in the same frame, in order to consider relational commonalities as
well as the diﬀerences that are undoubtedly easier to identify.
Perhaps the area where the corporate hijacking of social demands for
equality in order to extract the elements compatible with capitalism has
received the most thorough ongoing analysis is in relation to feminism.
There is now a sizeable body of theoretical and cultural work considering
the corporate or neoliberal use of strands of feminism. For example, Nancy
Fraser’s recent collection Fortunes of Feminism foregrounds neoliberal bor-
rowings from feminism, and the largely successful inciting of women to be
complicit in individualising, privatising formations of gender: an updated
twist on liberal feminism in the service of neoliberal capital (Fraser 2013, see
also 2015). Angela McRobbie’s incisive work has considered a variety of
cultural modes through which women are encouraged to succeed, osten-
sibly as equals, by embracing individualised corporate rhetoric and beha-
vioural norms in work and leisure, whether though ‘being creative’ in the
cultural industries or through the cultural instruction of TV programmes
like What Not to Wear (McRobbie 2009, 2016).
Whilst the terms ‘neoliberal femininism’, ‘marketised feminism’ and
‘corporate feminism’ have all been mobilised to gesture toward or analyse
the articulation of feminism to neoliberal forces and agents, in academia
‘post-feminism’ remains the most ubiquitous term of choice to refer to these
processes. ‘Post-feminism’ is used to refer to a widely distributed ‘common
sense’, roughly from the 1980s and 1990s, that the movement for gender
equality has been achieved: that the need for feminism is ﬁnished and we
have a level playing ﬁeld through which we need to progress (McRobbie
2009; Gill 2006, 2007; Gill and Scharﬀ 2011; Banet-Weiser 2012). It
therefore often involves a distancing from or disavowal of the feminist
movement, heightened individualism and a resurgence of ideas of ‘natural’
sexual diﬀerence, often through a focus on self-surveillance and make-over
culture as ‘empowerment’: a constellation which for Rosalind Gill is best
understood as a ‘sensibility’ (Gill 2006). It can often harbour overtly ‘retrosexist’
discourse which is compatible with an anti-feminist backlash (Whelehan
2000). In similar fashion the marketplace’s embrace of gay rights and the
spending power of the ‘pink pound’ has produced formations of neoliberal
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sexuality that move away from queer socialism into gay and lesbian corpor-
atism (Hennessey 2000). Post-feminist discourse can at times be conspicuously
white, given that it often addresses wealthier women most directly in
attempting to solicit their spending, replicating the structural prejudice of
the systemic inequalities. Yet it is far from exclusively so, as work on post-
feminist interpellations of women in, for instance, Nigeria shows (Dosekun
2015).
How do these analyses of gender relate to the theorisation of neoliberalism’s
use of demands for racial or ethnic equality? Again no singular terminology
is uniformly mobilised; rather, a range of terms are used to describe and
interrogate various dimensions of this dynamic. In critical race theory there
has been an analytical focus on the widespread dissemination in the neoliberal
era of the idea that we are now in a post-discrimination moment: that we
are ‘post-race’, that we have a level playing ﬁeld and that anyone can get on
if they try hard enough (I explore this formation in more detail in chapter
5). David Theo Goldberg’s work, for example, has extensively elaborated
upon, critiqued and popularised the notion of ‘post-race’ (Goldberg 2015).
Racialised neoliberalism, in the form of ethnically marked mobilisations of
empowerment, is the subject of Jean Comaroﬀ and John Comaroﬀ’s book
Ethnicity, Inc. It is discussed both in terms of particularly ethnicised populations’
entrepreneurial self-branding and in terms of corporations’ use of racialisation
to open up new markets. As they put it, ‘despite the fact that it was supposed to
wither away and die with modernity’, ethnicity is ‘becoming more corporate,
more commodiﬁed, more implicated than ever before in the economics of
everyday life’ (Comaroﬀ and Comaroﬀ 2009: 1). Paul Gilroy’s instructive
work providing ‘fragments for a history of black vernacular neoliberalism’
traces the histories of the insistent interpellations to American black subjects
to make themselves rich – through such routes as the popular self-help
money-making/masculinity guide Rich Dad, Poor Dad (Gilroy 2013).
There is then an obvious semantic synchronicity and conceptual ‘family
resemblance’ between the analytical categories of post-feminism and post-
race, although this family resemblance is surprisingly under-discussed.
Interestingly, ‘post-class’ has not been mobilised as a term in the same way.
To some degree this is because the corporate co-option of struggles for
equality and liberation, of anti-racism and anti-sexism, to sell products to
produce proﬁt, has involved targeting people with enough wealth to buy the
products. Class is not always so easy a target in this regard as post-feminism –
easily the most conspicuously discussed of these ‘posts-’ – has been.8 Put
bluntly, this is because women are a large consumer market. Post-Fordist
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neoliberalism adopted the aspects of late-twentieth-century liberation
movements that it found compatible, absorbing many women and non-
white people into the workplace, making them professional. And the
increased spending power of women – obviously not all women, but still a
large proportion following the inﬂux of women into paid work – has made
feminism a particularly ripe zone for corporations to poach, package and
brand.
In the 1980s and 1990s, for many people identifying on the political left,
as well as the right, in the Global North, class was often presumed to be less
relevant than gender or ethnicity, as we shall see in the next chapter. This
particular worldview was helped along by the ambiguities of the meaning of
‘class’. ‘Class’ refers to ﬁnancial income and social location in relation to
wider stratiﬁcations and exploitations, particularly in relation to individual/
family occupation. Most famously, for Marx, it is deﬁned by position in the
relations of production (Marx and Engels 2004); for Weber, it also needs to
be understood in terms of status. Class also tends to refer to a constellation
of cultural attributes, dispositions and subjectivities which are formed in
relation to a particular habitus (Skeggs 2004; Steedman 1986; Crompton
2008). As Steph Lawler puts it, ‘class is not simply an “objective” position
which one occupies, but becomes conﬁgured into subjectivity’ (Lawler
1999: 6). The slippage between ﬁnancial positon and socio-cultural identi-
ﬁcation and behaviour has aided the ambiguities of class in relation to
meritocracy. The welfare state did reduce inequality, expanding social pro-
tection, introducing greater levels of ﬁnancial egalitarianism for all, both
engendering social mobility and helping reduce the length of the ladder in
ﬁnancial terms. An expanding middle class, combined with the eﬀects of new
social movements and the ‘decline of deference’ also produced considerable
ambiguity about social standing.
As post-Fordist marketing identiﬁed and targeted ever more particularised
‘lifestyle demographics’, the broad certainties of class looked to many less
certain. At the zenith of the post-Fordist retail boom, class often became
neglected as a category in academia, in part in favour of what were perceived
as more interestingly hybrid categories, in part due to challenges from the
feminism to the masculinism of class analysis, and in part due to the
emphasis on consumption (Crompton 2008). Rosemary Crompton’s diﬀerent
introductions to the reissues of her classic text Class and Stratiﬁcation is telling
here: she discusses the ﬂuctuating academic fortunes of class as an analytical
category, from avid debates in the 1960s to having to justify why class
should still be considered an important category at all in the 1980s and
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1990s, a moment when the end of class was regularly proclaimed. But by
the end of the decade of the 2000s the eﬀects of neoliberal inequality meant
it was increasingly apparent to even the most apolitical sociologist that class
could not be ignored (Crompton 2008: ix–x).
The dream of classlessness, the idea of it, was taken up by post-Fordist
capitalism through the promotion of many of its products even while its
production found new means to exploit the labour power of its workers
and extract proﬁt from their labour. The phrase which for me captures most
vividly this yoking of the selling of the idea of a new classlessness to the
desire to accumulate capitalistic proﬁts is Anthony Barnett’s phrase ‘corporate
populism’ (Barnett 2003). To Barnett, ‘corporate populism’ foregrounds
how an image of popular democracy was foregrounded by Blairism in the
Labour Party in the 1990s, at the very moment when democratic politics –
the meaningful involvement of more and more people in decision-making
over their own futures – was being emptied out, in a ‘post-democratic’
landscape, in favour of corporate hierarchies (Crouch 2004).
Whilst ‘post-class’ is not popularised as an analytical term, then, the
dream or ideology of classlessness has deﬁnitely been mobilised as a selling
point in the service of corporate capital. Just as the idea of empowerment
through freedom from discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, gender or
sexuality has been mobilised, so too has a certain discourse used the idea of
freedom from the constraints of class in the service of corporate proﬁt. We
saw this above in relation to what Graeme Turner analysed as the ‘demotic
populism’ of media forms such as reality TV, and Jim McGuigan analysed as
‘cool capitalism’ (Turner 2010; McGuigan 2009). To bring it into line with
the terms ‘post-race’ and ‘post-feminism’, we can term this formation – this
idea that we are beyond class – ‘post-class’.
Neoliberal justice narratives
These recent strands of academic work analysing ‘post-class’, ‘post-feminism’
and ‘post-race’ have many resemblances. Putting these terms side by side
helps highlight how they share a logic, whilst being simultaneously moulded
through their own particular, ascribed formations (as well as being hybrid
and interwoven with each other). All these terms foreground the neoliberal,
entrepreneurial, corporate market-based logic that suggests it oﬀsets and
rectiﬁes inequalities of class, race and gender. Their persuasive currency is
undoubtedly rooted in the fact that they do oﬀer the partially privileged
more privilege. Neoliberal meritocratic post-feminism, for example, can
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work well for you if you are a professional woman with no children.
Neoliberal post-racism, for example, can work well for you if you are
wealthy and brown or wealthy and white. These discourses do not work for
those with less social and economic capital: for those who are insistently
told to pull themselves up by their bootstraps when they are unable to
aﬀord the boots to begin with.
Such ideological discourses work on an individualised level, for the
already privileged, whilst foreclosing any challenges using collective action,
universal provision or democratic organisation (and creating further and
diﬀerent forms of inequality). Neoliberal meritocracy has played the cards of
identity politics by creating and exploiting the meritocratic deﬁcit. Putting
these discourses side by side helps indicate just how much neoliberal
meritocracy is fed by and sources its galvanising energies from post-femin-
ism, post-racism and post-classism. These phenomena are sophisticatedly
detailed, to be sure, but they are also connected through neoliberal meritocracy
and crucially work together to give each other strength.
As we will see, in recent years there have been changes within this post-
class/feminism/race formation, with the widespread acceptability of the idea
that we are now beyond inequalities of class, race and gender. For the
extent to which such narratives simply do not ﬁt with the tangible material
reality of the majority of people’s experience has become increasingly
apparent and hard to ignore. Neoliberalism’s post-crash interregnum has
produced a new formation which recognises intersectional injustice but
promotes neoliberal marketisation as the solution: what I call the ‘neoliberal
justice narrative’. Whereas a pivotal component of post-feminism and post-
race sensibilities involve a distancing from (and disavowal of) the feminist
and anti-racist movements, neoliberal justice narratives recognise and draw
on them whilst prescribing capitalist meritocracy as the cure for their ills.
The idea of feminism has been more sympathetically and overtly drawn
upon for commercial purposes, promising forms of commoditised
‘empowerment’ in, for example, adverts for Always sanitary towels, which
took stereotypical misogynistic slander about ‘throwing like a girl’ to task, or
in the adverts for Dove featuring diﬀerently sized ‘real women’ (Banet-
Weiser 2012: 15–50). Such forms of ‘commodity feminism’ or ‘femvertising’
are now routinely (if still, overall, marginally) discussed in journalism and
academia. Andi Zeisler’s We Were Feminists Once: From Riot Grrl to Cover Girl
(2016), for instance, attacks the ‘selling out’ of the feminist movement (located
later than usual) into marketplace feminism, in which commercial compa-
nies are involved in selling empowerment as a means to attractively package
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their brand. Such corporate use of feminist symbolism is a signiﬁcant shift
from post-feminism: as in post-feminism, the temporal distancing from the
feminist movement is a key feature and, indeed, one signiﬁed through
the term itself. They are both variants of neoliberal feminism, but they have
diﬀerent temporal and aﬀective relationships to the feminist movement.
Similarly, there have been recent high-proﬁle commercial activities
which do not suggest that the social playing ﬁeld in relation to ethnicity
is level – but rather loudly proclaim that it is anything but. Beyoncé’s pow-
erful mobilisation of the iconography of the Black Power movement at the
US Superbowl in 2016, the foregrounding of Black Lives Matter and the
institutional racism of the response to Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans in
the song and incendiary video ‘Formation’ and her album Lemonade are
much-discussed cases in point here (London 2016). They have had the
highest media proﬁle of any recent examples of anti-racism in US popular
culture, and they have a powerful charge in a time of resurgent racism.
They are also very obviously commercial products. Indeed, Beyoncé posi-
tions her accumulation of vast wealth as an anti-racist ‘fuck-you’ badge of
pride, with the lyrics to the song ‘Formation’ proclaiming: ‘I just might be
a black Bill Gates in the making.’ This is a commercial song and persona
with a profoundly anti-racist yet profoundly capitalist message, a form of
powerful and neoliberal anti-racism and feminism. It has a diﬀerent rela-
tionship to racism than that of the neoliberal post-racial.
Whilst post-feminism, post-race and post-class are all recognisably evoked
discourses, then, they have been joined by newer variants of neoliberal
feminism, anti-racism and populism. This formation takes a slightly diﬀerent
angle of approach to neoliberal meritocracy. It does not disrupt its basic
tenets of competitive individualism and eﬀort (or the end result of the
production of greater inequality). Instead, it is propelled by recognisable and
profound intersectional injustices to climb harder up the ladder. This is
neoliberal meritocracy as social justice narrative. Neoliberal justice narratives
recognise existing unjust social dynamics in relation to ethnicity, gender and
class, and suggest that neoliberal marketisation will solve these problems to
produce greater meritocracy.
Egalitarian and meritocratic deﬁcits
In the Global North, then, for very well-discussed historical reasons, the
positions of greatest social and economic power have tended, and still tend to
be, occupied by rich white men. Inequality disproportionately aﬀects those
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from the working or lower-middle classes, who are not white and who are
female.9 This is not exclusively the case and is not by any means uniform.
(Therefore chapter 4, on meritocracy and elitism, considers examples which
disrupt this pattern, and chapter 6 discusses middle-class women.) Yet
notably it is often people who face signiﬁcant disempowerment in terms of
the extent of their resources and the range of available choices who are most
intensely incited to construct a neoliberal meritocratic self. In other words,
people who are not part of the elite and who are not rich white men start
from positions of reduced power, and, at the same time, they are simulta-
neously incited to address their lack of privilege themselves, individually,
through cultural discourses of neoliberal meritocracy which deploy particular
languages and accents of gender, race and class. Less privileged constituencies
are then positioned as particularly amenable to a meritocratic discourse of
empowerment by becoming ‘entrepreneurial selves’, whilst, at the very same
time, these constituencies continue to face far greater diﬃculties in terms of
both recognition and redistribution. This gap, in the face of the demand to
move upwards, is a double penalty: they face a double egalitarian deﬁcit.
The idea of the double egalitarian deﬁcit foregrounds how progressing
upwards is not the easy task that the various permutations of the meritocratic
myth would have us believe. It indicates the extent of the ingrained and
structural obstacles in the way of people who do not have the economic,
social and cultural power of those at the top of the pile and who are incited
to work hard individually to overcome them. To understand the reasons for
the double egalitarian deﬁcit and the mythic structure of neoliberal meritocracy
in relation to work, this chapter looked in two directions. Firstly, the ideal
of ‘progression’ itself as an employment category was traced to the growth
in democratic career opportunities during the high point of the Fordist
welfare state with its simultaneous expanded opportunities and ‘blindspots’
(or exploitations). The limited and incomplete nature of this progression
was discussed using the example of the civil service which, whilst signiﬁcantly
open in many ways, also remained severely limited in terms of access and
movement up the career hierarchy to women, ethnic minorities and
working-class people. It considered the limitations of what such progression
meant – in terms of who was included, of the extended competitive verti-
cality of rank and the wider terrain of social reproduction – alongside the
vast possibilities it opened up.
Secondly, the chapter looked at the corporate exploitation of identity
politics and liberation demands from the 1960s and 1970s: at how the
emergence of neoliberalism extrapolated and re-appropriated selective
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discourse from wider movements for equality in the name of gender, race,
class, environmentalism and sexuality. Today, progression up the social
ladder is selectively presented in media fables which make stories of everyday
stratospheric upward job mobility both ordinary and luminous (McRobbie
2009). But there is now ample evidence of the decidedly unmeritocratic
nature of contemporary work in many of these ‘desirable’ jobs despite their
‘cool, creative and egalitarian’ image (Gill 2002). The image of work as
‘hip’ and egalitarian can therefore be situated in relation to the wider con-
text of the decline of deference and the ‘rebel’ ‘spirit of capitalism’ that Luc
Boltanski and Eve Chiapello have identiﬁed as the animating aspect of the
dominant contemporary corporate ethos (Boltanski and Chiapello 2005).
Such an aesthetic of corporate rebellion borrowed from the demands of the
1968 generation for gender, racial and sexual equality, accepting selective
elements compatible with liberal capitalism whilst helping perpetuate, and
generate new forms of, structural inequality.
These historical developments were traced to theorisations of post-race,
post-feminism and post-class. All these discourses deny that there are any
longer any inequalities that matter at the level of race, class or gender. They
feed neoliberal meritocracy by suggesting there is a level playing ﬁeld and
inciting those who face a greater uphill battle for success with greater
degrees of ‘responsibilisation’. More recently neoliberal meritocracy has
been extended through the addition of neoliberal justice narratives, which,
unlike post-feminism, post-race and post-class, recognise injustices at the
level of race, gender and class, but like them suggest that it is the responsi-
bility of neoliberal marketisation and the individual to redress these
inequalities. Neoliberal justice narratives recognise the egalitarian deﬁcit as a
meritocratic deﬁcit and prescribe competitive neoliberal meritocracy as the
solution, which in turn produces more inequality.
All these discourses of neoliberal meritocracy are powerful and, as I show
in chapter 6, frequently work by being ‘internalised’. There is often a diﬀerent
tenor and expenditure of energy to them than to the meritocratic discourses
inhabited by elites (as I discuss in chapter 4). They inhabit a similar neoliberal
entrepreneurial logic but at very diﬀerent points on the scale: occupying
diﬀerent aﬀective positions and positions of power. The position occupied
by elites inhabits, externalises and radiates outwards the privileges proﬀered
by the neoliberal meritocratic system. But this is qualitatively diﬀerent from
how less privileged constituencies are able to relate to neoliberal meritocracy:
they are always in a particularly exploited process which has to labour
harder and harder to oﬀset the structural inequalities which are there to begin
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with; and they are also, as we will see in chapter 6, often marked by a tenor
of desperation. Whilst the elite access meritocracy through a rapid express
elevator, these constituencies have to run hard just to keep on the same spot.
To consider in more detail how disempowered constituencies have been
positioned as especially amenable to a meritocratic discourse of empowerment,
chapters 4 and 5 therefore focus on case studies where the incitement to
internalised meritocratic subjects is taking place: in the form of racialisation
on the reality TV show Project Greenlight and through the emergent social
ﬁgure of the mumpreneur. But before we turn to the case studies, we need
to ask: how was the neoliberal meritocratic political settlement achieved?
This chapter has focused on the relationship between meritocracy, inter-
sectional inequalities and worlds of work. The next chapter considers how
this settlement was achieved through political discourse.
Notes
1 The Stuart Hall Project 2013.
2 ‘Meritocracy is your ideal partner for ﬁnding and attracting top Millennials’
(Meritocracy n.d.).
3 There are eight men and two women depicted on the management team: they
could all pass as white (Meritocracy n.d.).
4 I am grateful to Judith Watson and Ben Little for sharing their knowledge of
these histories with me.
5 www.act-for-change.com. Accessed 1 December 2016.
6 https://mediadiversiﬁed.org. Accessed 1 December 2016.
7 www.gal-dem.com. Accessed 1 December 2016.
8 Post-class discourse and its lack of critical deﬁnition is also, of course, because the new
left’s socialist egalitarianism, which Kristin Ross calls ‘the properly 1960s aspiration to
equality’ (K. Ross 2002: 10) was defeated. And it is also because socialism is harder to
extract elements from for neoliberal purposes, given that they are antithetical, even
though projects like the UK prime minister David Cameron’s ‘Big Society’, which
sought to oﬀset public sector cuts by encouraging volunteering and using a language
of solidarity, or the neoliberal encouragement in Italy of social family networks to
replace state provision, for example, have tried hard (Muehlebach 2012).
9 There is, of course, an endlessly proliferating diversity of intersectional positions
in and around such social identities. The position of a middle-class black woman
in Birmingham is not the same as a brown transsexual in Helsinki or a white
working-class woman in Detroit.
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3
MERITOCRATIC FEELING
The movement of meritocracy in
political rhetoric
There is no value-free deﬁnition of meritocracy.
Ronald Bénadou1
Meritocratic feeling
So far, this book has considered how the discourse of neoliberal meritocracy
emerged and mutated in social theory and how it has been shaped through
the changing dynamics of work and through the legacies of 1960s social
movements. In this chapter, the book turns its attention to how such
changes in the meaning of meritocracy were made possible in the political
sphere. It pays particular attention to the rhetorical and discursive strategies
used by major ﬁgures in mainstream British political parties, and particularly
to the personas of prime ministers in the period we now consider as neo-
liberal (since the late 1970s). This chapter therefore investigates how the
meaning and genealogy of meritocracy is shaped by political discourse,
focusing on the UK and connecting its particularity to wider transnational
cultures. In doing so, it explores how what I call ‘meritocratic feeling’ has
been conveyed and encoded in mainstream political discourse, emphasising
the cultural rhetoric and emotive appeals that have taken diﬀerent forms in
neoliberal culture. The term ‘meritocratic feeling’ borrows from Raymond
Williams’ suggestive idea of ‘structures of feeling’ alongside the swathe of
recent work across the humanities and social sciences which have
emphasised the importance of aﬀect (Williams 1977; Gregg and Seigworth
2012). In this chapter, I use it to foreground the tone, mood and appeal
made to particular constituencies by diﬀerent versions of neoliberal mer-
itocracy; how it shapes the appeal made to them; and what promises it
makes to extend their ‘capacity to act’ (Gilbert 2014; Read 2015).
Thatcherism in Britain
In Britain, neoliberal policies and ideas of meritocracy were profoundly
shaped, from the late 1970s, by Thatcherism, the set of meanings and poli-
cies coalescing around and promoted by Prime Minister Margaret Thatch-
er’s government between 1979 and 1990 (Hall 1988). Thatcher’s actions
were not the earliest instances of neoliberal policy in the UK. In 1976, the
Labour ﬁnance minister Denis Healey struck a contentious deal with the
International Monetary Fund (Beckett 2009). The ﬁnancial arrangement
Healey made with the IMF demanded that the government make brutal
cuts to UK public spending and services. These cuts in turn spawned a wave
of strikes that have become deeply associated with the 1970s in a mediated
popular memory of heatwaves and uncollected rubbish (garbage collectors
being one of the groups of workers on strike). As John Medhurst puts it
The IMF’s operation was political. It was designed to erase what
remained of the socialist aspirations in Labour’s 1973 Programme and
1974 Manifestos, to contain [the inﬂuential left-wing Labour MP]
Tony Benn, and to reassure the City that the nostrums and priorities of
the ﬁnancial sector, not elected politicians, were now setting the
economic agenda.
(Medhurst 2014: 133)
This moment, so obscured subsequently in popular memories of the
1970s, is now widely regarded as the formative moment of neoliberalism in
the Global North (Harvey 2005; Klein 2008). A set of ideas nurtured by
right-wing economists in Chicago and beyond, neoliberalism vigorously
promoted corporate power, the marketisation of collective forms of public
provision and the idea that competition was a ruling principle for all areas of
life. The political test-bed for these ideas had been Chile in 1973, where the
democratically elected socialist government of Salvador Allende had been
overthrown with US military backing under Richard Nixon, installing the
brutal right-wing dictatorship of General Pinochet, a process resulting in
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thousands of deaths and ‘disappeared’ citizens (Dorfman 2004). Neoliberalism
therefore achieved its power either through direct military intervention or
by leveraging local instabilities to gain control. The implementation of
neoliberalism’s ‘shock doctrine’, as Naomi Klein memorably put it, involved
either persuading the heads of diﬀerent national governments who were
experiencing economic instability to reorganise their nation-states through
unrestrained market competition or, as with Chile, doing so through brute
force (Klein 2008).
In the case of the UK, an enthusiastic extension of the logic of the IMF’s
terms, wrapped in a dream of meritocracy, was a hallmark of the Thatcherite
government that replaced Labour.2 Thatcherism made a meritocratic appeal
to ‘individual choice’ whilst dismantling the welfare state’s social safety net,
crushing union power and initiating a long wave of privatisations through
the sale of public utilities like gas, telecommunications and rail (Hall 1988).
Thatcher imposed monetarism, normalised the privitisation of public utilities
as the only possible response to the supposed malaise of the Keynesian
industrial economy (in her famous phrase, ‘there is no alternative’) and
articulated both to an idea of individual freedom. These practices were
closely aligned with those introduced by the Republican president, Ronald
Reagan, in the US, with whom Thatcher had a close working relationship.
The meaning meritocracy was taking at this moment was then clearly being
shaped by the broader emergence of neoliberalism from the 1970s.
It is worth revisiting the speciﬁc terms in which the Thatcherite mode of
meritocratic aspiration was expressed. There was a ﬂexibility and ambiguity
to her address which meant it could appeal to both working-class ‘grafters’
and to middle-class ‘yuppies’. The 1979 Conservative Party manifesto for
instance linked their pledge to cut income tax with hard work and saving,
in eﬀect channelling the Protestant work ethic (‘We shall cut income tax at
all levels to reward hard work, responsibility and success; tackle the poverty
trap; encourage saving and the wider ownership of property’). The 1987
Conservative Party manifesto linked the idea of ‘shares for all’ in the newly
privatised industries to now-normalised forms of hedonistic consumption:
‘Just as with cars, television sets, washing machines and foreign holidays,
[shares] would no longer be a privilege of the few; it would become the
expectation of the many’ (Conservative Party 1979, 1987). If Thatcherite
discourse initially emphasised the need for stoicism to save the national
malaise, it then quickly expanded to include the individual purchase of
goods as a barometer of success. As a form of meritocratic discourse, it
incrementally linked a notion of achievement and merit with successful
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consumption and habitually expressed distaste for ingrained privilege, parti-
cularly if it was supported by ‘the state’. At the same time Thatcherism was
typically characterised by social conservatism in its attitudes to sexuality,
ethnicity and gender: in particular, by attaching huge rhetorical importance
to the heteronormative nuclear family and by repeatedly invoking imperialist
white privilege.3
Whilst Thatcherism worked in multiple ways to secure consent for its
politics, one of its most important aspects was then its meritocratic appeal to
consumerism as oﬀering a general mode of participation in public life,
inviting people to identify with the notion of themselves as consumers
rather than as workers or citizens in a range of public settings (Gamble
1993). The presentation of acquisitive consumerism as the route to
empowerment in any social context was closely bound up with the implicit
assumption that the accumulation of consumer goods was at once a sign of
merit and its tangible reward. One of the most signiﬁcant moments in
Thatcher’s ﬁrst term, for instance, was precisely designed to reposition a
population of public-resource users as private owners/consumers: when she
gave municipal tenants the right to buy the housing they lived in for prices
that were very far below market rates. Crucially this government-subsidised
housing stock was not replaced. With the removal of social housing from
the market and the dismantling of rent controls and of legal protections for
tenants, private landlords were free to raise rents to astronomical levels, in the
long term fuelling both the housing boom which has had such deleterious
eﬀects on those sectors of the public unable to beneﬁt from it, as well as
massively increasing the public cost of subsidising the rents paid by welfare
claimants to private landlords (Prynn and Bryant 2013).
Consumption became central to Thatcherism’s iconography of ‘getting
ahead’. The new vanguard of conspicuous consumption were the business-
men and women, the stockbrokers and yuppies whose speedily acquired
lavish lifestyles were documented in Sunday supplements and glossy ads.
The idea of money pouring through the social body was enshrined in the
popular ﬁctional comic TV character played by Harry Enﬁeld called Load-
samoney!: a working-class plasterer from south-east England who had piles
of cash and waved it around in a wad, embodying the new class distinctions
between those who knew how to dispose of their income and those who
did not. At the same time, income in equality rose rapidly, child-poverty
doubled, unemployment rocketed and the privatised utilities generated at
least as many user complaints as the publicly owned predecessors which
they had been expected to outperform (Gamble 1994; Hall 1988).
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This, then, was a moment when UK citizens were coming to be imagined
by Thatcherite discourse primarily as individual consumers, as wholly
bounded entities whose only signiﬁcant sites of sociality were their families.
As Thatcher famously said in an interview for the magazine Woman’s Own,
‘there is no such thing as society. There are men and women and children
and there are families.’ This phenomenally atomised view of society was
made to seem familiar and unthreatening by ﬁguring Britain as a household,
with Thatcher in charge, balancing the household budget. As Angela
McRobbie has discussed, drawing on Foucault, such ﬁgurations of good
housekeeping have been a recurring motif of national neoliberal cultures
(McRobbie 2013; Foucault 2010). While Thatcher was an arch anti-fem-
inist, portraying the nation as a household with a consumer purse created a
gendered appeal (Campbell 1987; Nunn 2001, 2002). Thatcher always had
low electoral popularity but she was very successful at winning over
women, particularly lower-middle-class and upper-working-class women.
These were receptive constituencies both because they had traditionally
been denied access to power and because one of the few zones in which
traditionally women have had, though in circumscribed fashion, more
power than men, is consumption (Bowlby 1985; De Grazia and Furlough
1996; Littler 2009; Nava 2002). The use of consumerism as a means and an
apparent visual index of greater social mobility was key to securing consent
for Thatcherite neoliberalism, a gendered legacy which chapter 6 scrutinises
in more detail (Franklin, Lury and Stacey 1991: 221–304).
Under Thatcherism, then, meritocratic feeling was shaped and encour-
aged through aspirational femininity in particular and a very bounded,
individualised (and/or nuclear-family-based) form of consumerism in gen-
eral. Popular support for Thatcherism was an expression of some of the
most signiﬁcant iniquities and discontents that the Fordist settlement had
generated through its reliance on a hierarchical system of class, race and
gender. Resentment at ingrained class hierarchies and gendered subordina-
tion were, along with gay rights and anti-racism, what fuelled the fractures
in this settlement: the ruptures, rebellions and social movements of the late
1960s that we discussed in the last chapter. Thatcherism’s deployment of a
meritocratic popular consumerism addressed the gendered and classed
components of this disgruntlement in particularly important ways. Its culture
and rhetoric persuaded women, and especially lower-middle-class women –
the people who voted for her most – that the pursuit of satisfaction as an
individualised consumer in the private sphere was the route to empower-
ment and social mobility. Under Thatcherism neoliberal meritocracy was
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thereby presented as a pragmatic and emancipatory social solution to the
gendered inequalities and industrial strictures of the Fordist welfare
settlement.
Major meritocracy
Thatcher was ousted from power in 1990 by her own MPs who rebelled
against her increasingly unpopular policies. Her replacement as leader of the
Conservative Party and as prime minister was John Major. With his large
square glasses and mild-mannered demeanour, his projected persona
appeared in many ways to be the opposite of Margaret Thatcher’s haughty
bravura and regal posing. He was portrayed in the cartoons and caricatures
as a ‘grey man’. On the satirical political TV show which used puppets for
politicians, Spitting Image, the John Major puppet had completely grey skin,
as well as clothes. In Steve Bell’s widely distributed cartoons he appeared
wearing his Y-front underpants outside his suit. This was not a macho
masculinity but a weedy company man. If Thatcher had evoked Victorian
values, Major evoked early- to mid-twentieth-century surburbanism, his
appeal anchored in a reassuringly Fordist image of ordinariness. His vision of
Britain was even more nostalgic, as apparent in his much-quoted description
of the nation in which he hoped that
[f]ifty years on from now, Britain will still be the country of long sha-
dows on cricket grounds, warm beer, invincible green suburbs, dog
lovers and pools ﬁllers and, as George Orwell said, ‘Old maids bicycling
to holy communion through the morning mist’ and, if we get our way,
Shakespeare will still be read even in school.
(Major 1993)
The image was of an everyday small-town company man and ‘decent sort’.
Major’s unvarnished speaking style proved popular with older voters, and
his persona played into a longstanding British tradition of anti-intellectualism
as well as anti-elitism. His political prop was a soapbox, which he stood on
whilst speaking through a loudspeaker, drawing on a longstanding tradition
of spontaneous street-corner debates to cultivate an image of himself as
an ordinary local man with a passion. Despite these older historical reference
points, however, Major also seemed to fulﬁl the meritocratic dream of social
mobility in a way that none of his predecessors or successors did. Sig-
niﬁcantly, he really did hail from a non-elite background and had not
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married into money to anywhere near the extent that Margaret Thatcher had.
The son of a music-hall performer, he left school at 16 and went to work in a
bank, thereby not acquiring the cultural capital of those many MPs attending
elite universities. Despite her self-presentation as a greengrocer’s daughter and
budgeting housewife, Thatcher’s cultivated hauteur had a solidly upper-
middle-class ring to it; Major’s assertion of ordinariness had more credence.
Major’s policies largely continued in the vein of those pursued under
Thatcher, although they avoided the extreme antagonistic class-based con-
frontations that his predecessor had pursued through, for example, conﬂict
around the miner’s strike and poll tax. (Notably, his government also
demonstrated a surprising commitment to democratisation in higher edu-
cation, allowing polytechnics to convert to universities in 1992.) Like his
equivalent in the US at that time, President Bush, part of his image was
based on the idea of reigning in the excesses of his predecessor. Major also
involved the UK in the formation of the European Union through the
Maastricht Treaty in 1992. This action split opinion within the Con-
servative Party, a schism that was to erupt two decades later in 2016, when
‘Brexit’ was won by those campaigning in a national referendum to leave
the EU (when ‘leaving Europe’ was a position exploited by racist and
xenophobic groups and used as a protest by those who had suﬀered four
decades of neoliberalism). Major’s policies therefore pursued the extension
of neoliberal marketisation as the key model for the European Union whilst
simultaneously re-imaging a selective protectionism for Britain: both by
keeping Britain out of the Euro and by foregrounding the version of British-
ness outlined above, one evoking the national imaginary of the Fordist
family and the surburban 1950s.
Indeed, this image was augmented by the implicit and explicit privileging
of whiteness and the patriarchal dynamics of the government. There was only
one woman in Major’s 1990 cabinet, and all the people in it were white or at
least passed as such. In 1990 in Parliament the Labour MP Robert Hughes
asked: ‘with regard to the Prime Minister’s desire for a classless society and
social mobility, will he explain why there are no women in his Cabinet?’
Major replied:
In recent years, in all aspects of life in this country, women have been
taking a higher proﬁle: in the law, in commerce, in the civil service, in
industry and in politics – and that will continue. As those women
would wish it to be, they will reach the top on merit.
(Hansard HC [series 5], vol. 181, col. 1015 [29 Nov. 1990])
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Such pronouncements evoked the liberal myth of seamless progress. They
also promoted the idea of a level playing ﬁeld, with merit as the only
abstract criterion, part of a longer tradition of blindness and indiﬀerence to
issues of gender equality in British politics, which the Labour Party was to
oﬀer a stark alternative to, through their mid-1990s’ use of all-women shortlists
for local and parliamentary elections. Despite his personal disapproval of all-
women shortlists, Tony Blair beneﬁtted from the progressive image their
results gave when the most women in UK history were voted in as Labour
MPs. He appointed high numbers of women into prominent cabinet posi-
tions, a level of visibility which led to this new group of women being
framed by the tabloid press as ‘Blair’s Babes’, which was their jocular and
sexist way of signifying New Labour’s progressiveness on gender.
One ill-fated part of Major’s policy agenda was his attempt to relaunch a
moralising social agenda under the slogan of ‘Back to Basics’. Probably the
single most politically signiﬁcant dimension of the ‘Back to Basics’ agenda
was a moral panic around single mothers that the media massaged by stig-
matising single mothers as feckless and the source of social irresponsibility
and moral breakdown (Woodward 1997: 256–260). At this point in the
early 1990s in British public life the ‘merit’ of meritocracy was being pro-
foundly gendered and racialised and was dependent on patriarchal family
values for its ‘success’. It was wedded to an ideology and aesthetic of con-
servative Britishness which exacerbated social inequality and promoted
marketisation and deregulation at home and in Europe. However, the
governing elite’s claims to moral merit unravelled as Major’s term was
rocked by a series of sex and sleaze scandals in the Conservative Party.
Numerous grey-suited MPs and cabinet members were revealed to have
secret children, to be embroiled in aﬀairs or to have participated in unusual
sexual practices inconsistent with the Conservative Party’s ‘Back to Basics’
moral values. Two ministers were caught taking cash for questions by
accepting bribes from lobbyists to ask questions in Parliament, and the
defence minister, Jonathan Aitken, was convicted for perjury when caught
lying under oath in court.
In the Major years, a discourse of meritocracy, in which society was
understood as being egalitarian enough and in which getting on was simply
framed as a matter of merit, was conveyed through the imagery of early to
mid-twentieth-century safe suburbanism. These reference points were to
shift under the next prime minister, Tony Blair, whose imagery borrowed
from a diﬀerent historical period: a selective, cleaned-up version of Harold
Wilson’s 1960s, with its connotations of the ‘white heat’ of the
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technological revolution, social liberalism and the idea of a creative, swinging
Britain: a set of associations encouraged through such cultural manifestations
as Britpop, Young British Artists and Union Jack interior décor (Bewes and
Gilbert 1999; McGuigan 2009; Driver and Martell 1998).
Blairism and beyond
By the late 1990s, meritocracy, understood in these marketised terms, had
become a key theme within New Labour policy discourse, which, whilst
equally populist, was less anti-intellectual than Thatcherism and, crucially, far
more socially liberal than either Thatcher and Major. Blair used the ﬁve-
syllable term ‘meritocracy’ more than any other prime minister, used it
repeatedly and used it in a wholly favourable way. It was counterposed to the
notion of an old elite establishment and signiﬁed social liberalism and
tolerance. ‘The Britain of the elite is over’, he pronounced in 1997 when
taking oﬃce. ‘The new Britain is a meritocracy where we break down the
barriers of class, religion, race and culture’ (Hansard HL [series 5], vol. 582,
col. 996 [28 Oct. 1997]). Two years later, it was coterminous with an
expanding middle class that ‘exploited’ (note the corporate language) social
potential: ‘The old establishment is being replaced by a larger, more
meritocratic middle-class. … The meritocratic society is the only society
that can exploit its potential to the full for all the people’ (BBC 1999).
New Labour’s use of meritocratic themes was described (and inﬂuenced)
by the work of the sociologist Anthony Giddens. In Where Now for New
Labour? Giddens argued strongly that ‘we should want a society that is more
egalitarian than it is today, but which is meritocratic … a meritocratic
approach to inequality is inevitable’ (Giddens 2002: 38–39). As John Beck
argues, when ‘meritocracy’ was not always explicitly used in New Labour
discourse, it was there in its constellation of synonyms: social inclusion,
poverty of aspiration, social justice, talent, empowered individuals (Beck
2008: 12–17).
This dual embrace of the idea of retaining some forms of social protection
(like the introduction of the minimum wage and paid paternity leave)
alongside the erosion of social protection through neoliberal expansion (for
example, public–private partnerships, the deregulation of the European
labour market and the introduction of academy schools, which were the
equivalent of the US’s charter schools) structured and guided New Labour’s time
in power (Finlayson 2003). This back-and-forth movement was memorably
termed ‘New Labour’s double shuﬄe’ by Stuart Hall (Hall 2003: 10–24).
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As Jeremy Gilbert pointed out, the forms of protection being promoted
were less consistent with social democratic egalitarianism than with neoliberal
meritocracy which sought to provide ‘equality of opportunity’ on marketised
and individualised terms (Gilbert 2004). Whilst Thatcherism simply cut back
and sold sections of the public sector, Blairism sought to restructure more
extensively existing provision in the public sector through the logic of
marketisation, for example through the public–private partnerships of the
Private Finance Initiative (PFI). Blair’s advocacy of neoliberal meritocracy
promoted equality of opportunity rather than equality of outcomes. It
combined the extension of economic marketisation with selective welfare
interventions in the early years (around education and child poverty) and a
socially liberal approach.
Blair’s agenda was heavily inﬂuenced by the success of Democratic President
Bill Clinton in the US: Blair was Clinton’s UK equivalent. Both were
centre-left politicians promoting a socially liberal version of neoliberalism.
New Labour famously projected itself as beyond left and right, drawing on
Anthony Giddens’ conceptualisation of ‘the third way’ (Giddens 1998); as
‘beyond ideology’, a project of modernity, its ‘latent vanguardism’ appealing
to reﬂexive individuals who had transcended class boundaries and other
‘restrictive’ categories of identity politics (Finlayson 2003: 202). This was a
socially liberal version of neoliberal meritocracy. It endorsed feminism and
anti-racism only to the extent that they were or could be made compatible
with capitalism. For instance, New Labour extended paid parental leave but
did not shorten the working week so that men and women could share
childcare. It promoted a carefully fashioned image of inclusive national
multiculturalism when it suited it and ignored it when it did not. For
instance, its cultural policy initiatives often emphasised the importance of
organisational diversity, but then it introduced new British cultural citizen-
ship tests based on a very un-diverse understanding of Britishness (see Littler
and Naidoo 2005; Byrne 2014).
Blair’s socially liberal variant of neoliberal meritocracy therefore tried to
not only enable people to rise up the social ladder but also to replace the
old guard of the Establishment with new middle-class meritocrats.
But simultaneously the Establishment was being protected by the pro-
fessionalisation of politics. Politics was increasingly seen as the domain of
think tanks, political consultants and professional journalists. In the Labour
Party in particular Blair initiated a series of reforms severing links between
local, or grassroots, constituency Labour Party members and an increas-
ingly professionalised party machine. The Blair project like Clinton’s
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relied on intense media management and messaging and removing many
crucial layers of the participation process from ordinary members. MPs
were often centrally chosen and parachuted into local constituencies
despite having had no previous dealings with the area. Constituency
meetings became more of a facade in that they focused on enlisting
support for goals that had been predetermined by the central party rather
than being representative of localised and grassroots activity. Local parties
no longer had a crucial role in debating national policy, and the Party
became an aggregation of postal voters getting information not from
constituency Labour parties but from the media. As such New Labour
constituted a form that the political scientist Peter Mair terms ‘partyless
democracy’ (Mair 2000).
The idea of movement up the social ladder also raises the question of
what exactly is being reached for. In Michael Young’s book The Rise of the
Meritocracy what was being reached for was a blend of money and classed
prestige. By the late 1990s both were being reconﬁgured in the wake of the
Thatcherite challenge to the social order, New Labour’s embrace of the
ﬁnancial sector, and London as a centre for ﬁnancial transactions and
the principal motor of the UK economy (Massey 2007). As New Labour’s
trade and industry secretary Peter Mandelson famously put it in 1998,
‘we are intensely relaxed about people becoming ﬁlthy rich’ (Keegan
1998). What was being positioned as the top of the ladder was mutating, as
CEO pay soared and media’s demotic turn popularised ‘tempa-celebrities’ –
or ‘celetoids’, to borrow Chris Rojek’s deﬁnition (Rojek 2001). What
merit was, and how it was being ranked through status, was therefore
changing to reﬂect New Labour’s dual imperatives of corporate growth
and populist access – a phenomenon which, as we saw in the last chapter,
Anthony Barnett astutely terms ‘corporate populism’ (Barnett 2003; see
also Littler 2000).
As John Beck caustically put it in his perceptive analysis of New Labour’s
use of the term in relation to education, while even a brief dip into the
history serves to highlight how meritocracy and measurement are peren-
nially contested matters, this appears ‘to have had remarkably little eﬀect on
politicians, particularly those of the centre Left or centre Right, in whose
discourse and policies, meritocratic ideas remain persistently prominent’
(Beck 2008: 11). The neoliberal meanings of meritocracy, which was now
extensively deployed as a prime ministerial keyword, was to be promoted as
unproblematically positive from Tony Blair to Theresa May, albeit with
diﬀerent articulations.
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‘Aspiration Nation’
Gordon Brown, Labour’s ﬁnance minister, took over as prime minister
from Tony Blair when he resigned in 2007. Whereas Blair’s smart-casual
media-friendly metropolitan image and neoliberal agenda won him favourable
media coverage, Gordon Brown’s dour introverted Puritan persona did not.
The trade unions and the social democratic majority in the Labour Party
expected Brown to pursue a diﬀerent, more left-wing and progressive
agenda than that of Blair. But they were to be sorely disappointed. Whilst
pursuing broadly similar policies to Blair, Brown’s team dealt with the
ﬁnancial crash of 2008 by bailing out the banks that caused the crisis, and
thus failed to create a coherent left-wing political and media response to it.
Three years after he became prime minister, in 2010, New Labour lost their
hold on power.
Yet the powerful language of neoliberal meritocracy, connected to
aspiration, social mobility and opportunity for all to rise through the social
structure, did not become muted in Britain, despite a double-dip recession,
growing inequality and a historically unprecedented drop in living standards for
the working majority. On the contrary, it escalated under the Conservative–
Liberal Democrat coalition government, which came to power in 2010 and
whose use of the idea of meritocracy represented a new stage in its develop-
ment. The language of meritocracy was deployed without the introduction of
ameliorating initiatives or forms of collective provision (like the minimum
wage), and in conjunction with speciﬁc policies directly aimed at cutting
the incomes of the poor (like the ‘bedroom tax’). The coalition government
continued, and sped up, the implementation of neoliberal policies marketising
the welfare state – such as the extension of internal markets and corporate
involvement in prisons and in the health service – whilst using the alibi of
the recession (Hall, Massey and Rustin 2013). Simultaneously, at the 2012
Conservative Party conference, Prime Minister David Cameron declared
that under his leadership Britain was now an ‘Aspiration Nation’: ‘we are
the party of the want-to-be better-oﬀ’ (Cameron 2012).
In Cameron’s worldview, the ability to ‘believe in yourself’ and, by
extension, your child was primary. This was a psychologising discourse
which vested not only power but also moral virtue in the very act of hope,
in the mental and emotional capacity to believe and aspire. Hope and promise
become more integral in an unequal society in which hard work alone had less
and less chance of reaping the prizes. Through such a rhetorical mechanism,
the act of addressing inequality became insistently ‘responsibilised’ as an
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individual’s moral meritocratic task instead of addressing social inequality as
a solvable problem. This process devolved onto the individual personal
responsibility not just for their success in the meritocratic competition but for
the very will to compete and the expectation of victory which were now
ﬁgured as moral imperatives in themselves. Not investing in aspiration, in
expectation, was aggressively positioned as an abdication of responsibility
which condemns yourself – and, even worse, your child – to the social
scrapheap. To quote Cameron’s 2012 Conservative Party conference speech:
It’s that toxic culture of low expectations – that lack of ambition for
every child – which has held this country back.
The Labour party theorists … stand in the way of aspirational parents
by excusing low expectations and blaming social disadvantage.
(Cameron 2012)
Here, aspirational meritocracy works by increasingly aggressively positioning
itself against any investment in collective provision, which becomes framed
as both a symptom and a cause of low expectation. In his 2013 party con-
ference speech, Cameron reiterated the ‘Aspiration Nation’ theme, intensi-
fying the rhetoric by describing himself as engaged in a battle against
opponents whom he characterised explicitly as not being hard workers –
‘smug, self-satisﬁed socialists’. ‘That’s who we’re ﬁghting against’, he asserted,
‘and we know who we’re ﬁghting for: for all those who work hard and
want to get on’ (Huﬃngton Post 2013).
In this formulation, social disadvantage is only real in that it is an obstacle
over which pure mental will and aspiration – if they are expressed correctly
by being combined with hard work – can triumph. These tropes and discursive
elements help generate the experiential zone that Lauren Berlant aptly
identiﬁed as ‘cruel optimism’: the aﬀective state produced under neoliberal
culture which is cruel because it encourages an optimistic attachment to the
idea of a brighter future whilst such attachments are, at the same time,
‘actively impeded’ by the harsh precarities and instabilities of neoliberalism
(Berlant 2012). If Cameron’s ‘Aspiration Nation’ discourse is one manifes-
tation of such cruel optimism, it also draws on the English trope of ‘having
a go’, which involves a sort of non-competitive competitiveness, of being
prepared to compete without any expectation of winning, out of a recognition
that sporting competition is a mode of social participation. The diﬀerence is
that within Cameron’s ‘Aspiration Nation’ you cannot just do your best:
you have to want to win (a more familiar sensibility in the US). Cameron,
90 Geneaologies
using language borrowed from the Australian right through his advisor
Lynton Crosby, distilled this down into a simple binary formulation: you
are a ‘striver or a skiver’.
But the psychosocial resources required to engage in aspiration are easier
for some classes to obtain and deploy than others. There is a rich tradition
in the cultural studies of education of analysing how middle-class children
are encouraged to aspire while working-class children are instead – to cite
the title of Paul Willis’s classic book – ‘learning to labour’ (Willis 1977).
Valerie Gilles’ analysis of aspirational language used (or not) by parents
when talking about their child’s behaviour at school is particularly instructive
here. Her research showed how for working-class parents, the attributes
most likely to be proudly described were children’s ability to stay out of
trouble, get on with others and work hard, which inculcates the strength to
struggle and to defend scant resources; whereas middle-class parents foster
‘the right to be bright’ and code problematic behaviour in the classroom in
terms of intelligence and of needs the classroom should be able to accom-
modate, which helps reproduce middle-class success. Writing in the Blair
years, Gilles criticised New Labour’s education policy for encoding middle-
class behaviour as morally correct and blaming the poor ‘with almost mis-
sionary zeal’ for their own failure (Gilles 2005: 850). This project was to be
extended by Cameron, who was regularly hailed as a prime minister owing
much to Blair, and whose accession was made possible by him (Seymour
2010).
Such tendencies have been continued and extended in politics and pop-
ular culture in the post-Blair years. From the 2010s, there was a widespread
tendency to ‘blame the parents’ for any problems at the expense of any
other social factor such as economic and social impoverishment (extending
the early demonisation of single mothers and making it slightly less sexist).
This tendency was conveyed, for instance, through the ﬁxation on parenting
styles ‘over and above all other factors’ in relation to children’s behaviour
and life chances (Jensen 2012). It was foregrounded through the framing of
parental responsibility by TV programmes such as Supernanny, the reality
show where a nanny sorted out parents struggling with their children’s
behaviour (Jensen 2010; Fisher 2009) and in government and media
responses to the 2011 London riots (Allen and Taylor 2012; Couldry and
Littler 2011). The tendency to blame the parents is closely bound up with
how the family is increasingly ﬁgured as a bounded entrepreneurial unit
(McRobbie 2013), the ramiﬁcations of which I explore in relation to
meritocracy, women and work in chapter 5.
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Tragi-comedy: Bojo’s ‘hard work’
‘Aspiration Nation’ as a rhetorical strategy and as an expression of meri-
tocratic feeling connected self-belief and aspiration with the trope of hard
work. It has been striking how, again and again, hard work combined
with self-belief is employed by an unprecedentedly privileged cadre of
politicians and millionaire elites to justify their position and success and to
prescribe this as the route for others. ‘Working hard and wanting to get
on’ is ﬁgured as the way to progress. This trope was repeatedly deployed
by former mayor of London and Conservative MP Boris Johnson (later
foreign secretary) who, in the words of the Daily Mail, ‘hailed the Olympics
for embodying the “Conservative lesson of life” that hard work leads to
reward’ (Peev 2012). In 2013 Johnson told Britons that they needed to
work much harder, otherwise jobs would go to economic migrants (Johnson
2013).
How does this rhetoric of hard work, such a feature of the contemporary
meritocratic deal, work, given that there is a swathe of research proving that
inheriting opportunity in the form of ﬁnance and social connections is by
far more important a factor in the route to riches? (Dorling 2015; Freeland
2012). It is notable that plenty of millionaires who inherited their own
wealth, including Boris Johnson and David Cameron, have conveniently
promoted hard work as the most inﬂuential factor in social mobility. Such
discourse simultaneously helps to erase any image of over-privileged indolence
from the speaker’s persona whilst interpellating the listener as able to
achieve a similar social status: a degree of social mobility which is in practice
attainable only for a tiny minority. As McNamee and Miller put it, ‘meri-
tocracy tends to be believed in more by the privileged’ (McNamee and
Miller 2009: 3). But the rhetoric of hard work is crucial to today’s merito-
cratic feeling. In research conducted at St Paul’s, an elite North American
fee-paying school, Khan and Jerolmack noted that typically these students
were conscious of the idea of their privilege and replaced a frame of enti-
tlement with one based around merit by continually emphasising how hard
they had worked. The researchers argued that ‘they generally do not work
hard, although they are adept at performing a kind of busyness that looks
and feels like hard work’. (Students that did regularly go to the library were
conversely positioned as ‘freaks’.) As they put it, ‘“hard work” is mostly a
form of talk – but important talk nonetheless. It is a rhetorical strategy
deployed by students in a world of “new elites.”’ These are elites ‘saying
meritocracy but doing the ease of privilege’ (Khan and Jerolmack 2013;
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Khan 2010). In the UK, at the opposite end of a similar spectrum, Jessica
Abrahams’ work on graduates ﬁnding employment has shown that whereas
middle-class students are far more willing to use their more extensive pre-
existing contacts to ‘get a foot in the door’, working-class students regularly
exhibit reluctance to use recent contacts out of a sense that they have to
‘prove themselves’ through hard work and staying honourable (Abrahams
2016).
Similarly, the UK coalition government’s investment in hard work used
words with profoundly working-class connotations whilst eliding the dis/
advantages of class through their usage. Hard work was coded as ‘graft’ even
when voiced by millionaires or billionaires, celebrities and children at elite
private fee-paying schools. This is not completely new: it was a key element
in the rhetoric of Thatcherism as well as Blairism. Thatcher notably ﬁgured
herself as rising up through the classes. As Tom Mills points out, the
importance to her success of her husband’s considerable wealth was barely
acknowledged by Thatcher. She preferred to dwell on her humble roots as
a grocer’s daughter and to imagine that her achievements were attributable
to drudgery and self-discipline (Mills 2013). Cameron and his cabinet, just
like Boris Johnson, did not draw on such early moments to calibrate their
self-narrative, mainly because they did not have them: their backgrounds
are aristocratic or quasi-aristocratic. They did, however, borrow the
rhetoric of hard work as graft, just like the privileged children interviewed
by Khan and Jerolmack. The very act of saying hard work invites those
who do work hard to identify with them and ﬂatters the rest. Then hard
work is connected, rather than to a particular lower-class reﬂexive posi-
tion, to the necessity of having aspirations: you cannot have one without
the other, in this rhetorical strategy, in this worldview: to lack either is a
moral failure.
In this way Cameron and Johnson activated a similar discursive frame to
Thatcher whilst de-articulating the highly selective, reﬂexive class bio-
graphical detail and replacing it with a generalised notion of aspiration.
These actions and tropes were similar to some deployed under Blairism.
However, the crucial diﬀerence was that the Conservatives’ abandonment
of the concessions to equality of opportunity that Blair promoted – whilst
pushing through neoliberal reforms – in favour of a much more dramatic
cutting of the social safety net and a vicious, moralising stigmatisation of the
underclass. Cumulatively, the eﬀects of these policies and discourse made
the distance aspiration needs to travel that much further and, thus, far less
likely to be traversed.
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Blue-collar billionaires: Farage, Trump and the
destabilisation of merit
A further way to understand these processes is by pointing, as James Meek
does, towards their re-articulation of the Robin Hood myth (Meek 2015,
2016). The people put into the roles of the greedy sheriﬀ and the renegade
deliverer of justice have now swapped places. In this version, the traditional
poor (such as the unemployed, disabled and refugees) have been placed
into the conceptual box where the rich used to be. It is they, the social
category previously labelled ‘poor’, who are accused of living in big
houses, wallowing in luxury and not needing to work, while those
previously considered rich are re-designated as the ones who work
terribly hard for fair reward or less. … In this version the sheriﬀ of
Nottingham runs a ruthless realm of plunder and political correctness,
ransacking the homesteads of honest peasants for money to ﬁnance the
conceptual rich – that is, the unemployed, the disabled, refugees,
working-class single mothers, dodgers, scroungers, chavs, chisellers and
cheats.
(Meek 2016)
Nigel Farage, an extremely wealthy former stockbroker and the leader of
the UK Independence Party (UKIP) since 2006, with some breaks in service,
has operated in exactly this way. Farage has placed himself and his party in
the rhetorical position of the exploited, stoking hatred toward elites and
immigrants in the process. This rhetorical pattern is similar to that mobilised
in the US by right-wing populist billionaires: as Thomas Frank argues, ‘the
conservative renaissance rewrites history according to the political demands
of the moment, generates thick smokescreens of deliberate bewilderment,
grabs for itself the nobility of the common toiler, and projects onto its rivals
the arrogance of the aristocrat’ (Frank 2012: 44).
Likewise, Donald Trump, who was advised by Nigel Farage in his 2016
US presidential campaign, presented himself as a poor, but strong and angry,
billionaire, at the mercy of welfare-scroungers and immigrants and as willing
to wreak retribution on them by banning Muslims from the US and
building a wall on the US–Mexican border. So too, with local and gen-
dered variations, have a range of privileged right-wing populists in Europe
including the Netherlands’ Geert Wilders and France’s Marine Le Pen
placed themselves in the rhetorical position of the unjustly exploited.
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All these variants of super-rich neoliberal meritocracy exhibit what
Thomas Piketty terms ‘meritocratic extremism’: the ‘apparent need of
modern society, and especially US society, to designate certain individuals as
“winners”, and to reward them all the more generously if they seem to
have been selected on the basis of their intrinsic merits rather than birth or
background’ (Piketty 2013: 334). As a broad deﬁnition this is useful and
accurate. There is also a need to identify both the ideological leanings of
such meritocratic extremism and the character it takes, and to emphasise the
extent to which a neoliberal plutocratic elite rely on actively constructing
such images to maintain their power. This is why this book delineated in
chapter 2 a number of diﬀerent phases of meritocratic meaning, from
socialist slander to social democratic meritocracy to neoliberal meritocracy
and why it emphasises diﬀerent versions of neoliberal meritocracy and the
range of characteristics it can adopt.
Noticeably in the more right-wing populist examples, the meaning of
merit itself also tends to be more profoundly destabilised, and the link
between ‘merit’ and ability attenuated. Anti-intellectualism becomes
articulated to anti-elitism. Successfully emoting about your ‘passion’ and
‘drive’ starts to replace ability or merit – or to become the new merit.
When the MP Andrea Leadsom stood as a potential leader of the Con-
servative Party in 2016, for example, she repeatedly spoke of her ‘passion’
for Britain and for justice. Similarly, the US president, Donald Trump,
projects a persona embodying passion-based drive, of a ‘winner’ (Elmer and
Todd 2016: 660–662). As Alison Hearn points out, this wild self-promotion
itself becomes a sign of merit:
Against the backdrop of growing economic insecurity, most people
must now assiduously self-promote and hustle in order to ﬁnd or protect
their jobs. Trump supporters are not ‘dupes’ buying the hype then;
they recognize that Trump’s brand is his skill set, admire it, and see it as
all the qualiﬁcation he needs to become president.
(Hearn 2016: 656)
In the version of neoliberal meritocracy Trump promotes, the notion of
merit has shifted markedly away from an association with expert knowledge.
It is still a competitive race to the top in which there are most deﬁnitely
extreme winners and losers – indeed the winners are foregrounded (as
Trump would put it, ‘bigly’). But in this race previous notions of merit
associated with exclusive elites are jettisoned: in the politics of the 2016
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presidential campaign, ‘post-truth’ statements were used with abandon. The
aﬀective image of being on the side of ordinary people, of blue-collar
labour and the squeezed middle classes, against a corrupt elite that perpetuated
the policies producing declining living standards is paramount. Drawing on
and stoking xenophobia, racism and sexism, ripping up state spending on
climate change, Trump promises a structurally similar formation of compe-
titive meritocracy organised around a reﬁgured notion of merit whose
bottom line is unregulated business opportunities for those within its
nationalistic borders. Trump, writes Laurie Ouellette, is ‘the embodiment of
an enterprising subjectivity and a “no nonsense” approach to leadership that
draws legitimacy from the market’ (Ouellette 2016: 649).
How can such post-truth scapegoating by billionaires pretending to be
speaking for the oppressed masses and ordinary people come unstuck?
There have been brief examples in the UK. Boris Johnson’s abrupt about-
turn from campaigning for Britain to remain in the European Union to
campaign to leave was widely perceived in the press as a blatant and
unprincipled lurch for power, and his departure when the Leave vote won
was copiously reported as a cowardly refusal to clean up his mess. Cameron,
who called the referendum, was also blamed for Brexit, but he arrived earlier
at his personal reputational Armageddon in ‘pig gate’, the allegations that he
had stuck his penis in the mouth of a dead pig during the revelries of a
secret society he belonged to during his time as a student at Oxford
University.
In an astute piece of writing on the meaning of pig gate, Lawrence
Richards argued that why the British were really laughing was because the
masochistic/sadistic nature of the secrets kept by the British Establishment as
a mechanism for bribery, corruption and control had been spectacularly
exposed, in the process viscerally belittling its own myth of meritocracy.
Richards drew connections between a series of scandals in recent years – of
the widespread establishment silence over the sexual abuse conducted
from the 1970s by BBC TV star Jimmy Saville, the ministerial paedophile
ring that Margaret Thatcher and Theresa May both refused to investigate,
humiliating initiation rituals at Oxbridge societies and the secrets used by
Conservative Party whips to bribe their MPs to toe the party line – with the
hypocritical nature of narratives of meritocracy.
The secrets being kept are designed by powerful men to keep other
powerful men under control. That kind of arrangement is the antithesis
of democracy. And it is also the antithesis to the meritocracy they
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proclaim. Not just because it’s rich boys getting an easy ride to the
top – we already knew that – but because David Cameron’s nasty little
scandal speaks to a suspicion many people already have: that in British
society, you don’t get to become Prime Minister because you’re
talented or because you work hard. You don’t even get there just
because you’re rich. You get there by traumatising the homeless and
skull-fucking a dead pig, and that ritual gives you power because you
have demonstrated utter, pathetic submission to your fellow oligarchs.
That is why we’re laughing.
(Richards 2015)
Richards’ perceptive narrative ﬁgured neoliberal meritocracy as not simply
involving discrepancies of wealth, but abuse and exploitation that also
involves ‘pathetic submission’ to others who are equally exploitative,
lessening their humanity: a process rarely revealed so baldly.
Theresa May and the Middle England meritocrats
In the wake of the Brexit vote in 2016, David Cameron resigned and
Theresa May became the new Conservative prime minister. May’s speedy
cabinet re-shuﬄe axed the vast majority of Cameron’s expensively educated
friends’ allies, the upper-class ‘Notting Hill set’ (or ‘chumocracy’). In their
wake came a diﬀerent cohort of conservative MPs: not diﬀerent in terms of
changing the demographic of the Conservative cabinet from being over-
whelmingly white and male (a tradition May upheld) but in terms of their
privileged class and educational background: 29% of May’s cabinet went to
private school. Despite only 7% of the UK population going to private
school, this ﬁgure was, for the Conservative Party – traditionally the party
of the Establishment and the rich – something of a departure. Fifty per cent
of Cameron’s cabinet, for instance, had attended private school (Domin-
iczak, Hope and Bingham 2016). This ‘bold’ new government, the British
right-wing populist tabloids The Daily Mail and The Sun announced, was a
‘March of the Meritocrats’: this was a ‘Mayritocracy’ (Figure 3.1) (Slack,
Groves and Harding 2016; Davidson 2016).
In her ﬁrst signiﬁcant speech as prime minster in July 2016, May expanded
this newly fashioned idea of the Conservative Party as involving and
representing more ordinary and less privileged people than before. Her
rhetoric not only included expressions of righteous sympathy for the
‘ordinary working class’ (a phrase rarely heard spilling from the lips of
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FIGURE 3.1 UK newspaper The Sun announces that Prime Minister Theresa May
is oﬀering ‘Mayritocracy’ through a new wave of grammar schools.
Photograph by Nick Ansell / PA Wire / PA Images (PA.28579747).
Reproduced courtesy of The Sun and the Press Association.
Conservative MPs) but also the unequal injustices faced by a variety of
constituencies, from black people through women and the youth to the
mentally ill. Promising that ‘when it comes to taxes we will prioritise not
the wealthy, but you’, May’s new vision of unity now professed that it
would be ﬁghting against ‘the burning injustice that if you’re born poor
you will die on average nine years earlier than others’ and the fact that ‘if
you’re black you are treated more harshly by the criminal justice system
than if you’re white’. Somewhat breathtakingly for a Conservative prime
minister, then, Theresa May continued to present her public with a list of
intersectional injustices:
If you’re a woman you will earn less than a man.
If you’re young you will ﬁnd it harder than ever before to own your
own home. If you’re from an ordinary working-class family, life is
much harder than many people in Westminster realise.
(May 2016)
Here, May clearly proclaims that she is very aware of social inequalities: of
the diﬃculties people now face, of their unjust unevenness. The Con-
servative Party, in government, under her, she states, will recognise and
redress this injustice. ‘When it comes to opportunity we won’t entrench the
advantages of the fortunate few, we will do everything we can to help
anybody, whatever your background, to go as far as your talents will take
you.’ (May 2016).4 This is a discourse of neoliberal meritocracy but a dif-
ferent strand to that oﬀered by Cameron. Cameron’s discourse was blind to
social inequality: this acknowledges it. Whilst May’s speech recognises the
egalitarian deﬁcit, it reframes this as a deﬁcit not of egalitarianism but of
meritocracy. Its solution is yet more privatisation and individualisation,
which on the basis of historical evidence works to further entrench, rather
than redress, the problems that are rightly identiﬁed.
A range of political commentators highlighted the mismatch between
Theresa May’s new-found identiﬁcation of social inequality and the fact
that her previous voting record as a government minister directly con-
tributed to cause them. May proclaimed she would work for the ordinary
workers, help those made poorer oﬀ through the recession, would not
favour the wealthy, yet she had already voted against protecting tenants in
the rental sector, against legislation tightening the capacity of payday loan
purveyors (loan sharks), against reforming the banking sector and against
investing in aﬀordable housing (Baxter 2016). Theresa May has worn a
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T-shirt espousing feminism (she had been photographed in a Fawcett
Society T-shirt proclaiming ‘this is what a feminist looks like’) and yet has
made cuts across a range of support and protection aﬀecting women most,
from domestic violence centres, rape counselling services, legal aid, health in
pregnancy grants, to children’s Sure Start centres: a list so long that if it
were printed on the back of the T-shirt, pointed out the feminist comedian
Bridget Christie, ‘it would look like a tailcoat’ (Christie 2015). Yet these
critical voices had to battle against widespread positive media coverage of
Theresa May’s statements.
The meritocratic discourse mobilised here, then, is profoundly compatible
with the examples of neoliberal feminism and neoliberal anti-racism that we
considered in the previous chapter. In diﬀerent ways and to varying degrees,
they all recognise gendered and/or racialised injustice whilst being supportive
of neoliberal capitalism and suggesting that these phenomena together are not
incompatible. I term these ‘neoliberal justice narratives’ and ‘corporate justice
narratives’. They acknowledge social injustice, ﬂag it up, foreground it and
yet pronounce that extending neoliberalism is the best way to deal with it.
The solution for inequality is better inequality. Commentators are debating
whether the advent of Trump and May means the continuation of neoli-
beralism or not, as Brexit’s borders and Trump’s nationalism promise to
disrupt the ﬂows of international ﬁnance capital as well as people’s citizen-
ship and personal lives. But at present this formation mainly constitutes a
kind of neoliberalism with borders: their policies on target to produce more
privatisation, inequality and individualisation, its collectivism not built around
sharing the wealth but through capitalism, newly competitive hierarchies,
moral distinction and a militarily empowered nationalism.
‘I want Britain to be the great meritocracy of the world,’ pronounced
May several months later, using the word ‘meritocracy’ with more force and
repetition than any prime minister since Tony Blair. This was the title of a
speech in which she repeated the word several times, alongside multiple
references to the Conservatives being the party of the working classes (May
2016), phrases repeated shortly afterwards by her education secretary Justine
Greening (Couglan 2016). The speech outlined her new policy of restarting
selective secondary grammar schools – the very type of selective education
that spawned Michael Young’s book The Rise of the Meritocracy and Hannah
Arendt’s barbed commentary on British education – a policy which had
been on ice since the 1970s, with existing schools converting to compre-
hensives and some remaining in place but no new ones permitted to open.
There is widely disseminated proof, including 2016 evidence published by
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the OECD, that overall grammar schools reduce rather than enable social
mobility; that they are disproportionally full of the upper- and middle-class
children whose parents can pay for tuition to get them in; and that selecting
students to enter on the basis of intellectual ability, whilst the ‘failures’ went
to a secondary modern, has in the past left deep psychologically scarring
eﬀects on many of those who took the test (Couglan 2016). If the idea of
reintroducing grammar schools is related to longstanding Conservative dis-
courses of worth and achievement, then, it is also related to contemporary
post-truth politics.
As with Blair’s earlier use of the word, in May’s usage there is no
recognition of the alternative meaning of meritocracy: it is simply and
wholly valorised as positive. But there is a particular layer of irony to its use
in this context, given that the word ‘meritocracy’ is now being used to
promote selective education: the very subject which, in the 1950s, meant
the word became mobilised as a caustic critique. May’s usage of meritocracy
built on the meanings given to it through the Thatcher, Major and Blair
years in particular. Theresa May’s language of meritocracy has been marked
to date by three features. First, it is self-consciously presented as inclusive,
oﬀering competitive opportunity to all. Second, and intimately connected
to this, it recognises, at a rhetorical level, post-recession inequality. Third, it
is wrapped in the ﬂag, through the constant reiteration of ‘Britain’, which
serves as a signiﬁer to appease those who voted for Brexit, as part of the
reconstructed nationalism and ‘a protective state’ (Davies 2016). ‘Mayr-
itocracy’ adopts the neoliberal imperatives of extending competition into all
areas of our lives and cutting public provision and services, yet it also focuses
incessantly on national sovereignty, policing its own borders, appealing to
xenophobic models of belonging and creating a securitised state. It is an
extremely nationalistic iteration of meritocracy, acknowledging inequalities,
using neoliberal justice narratives to ‘solve’ the problems they extend and
perpetuate.
‘Aspiration for All’?
To conclude this chapter we should consider what political alternatives to
neoliberal meritocracy are being circulated today. In 2015 the socialist MP
Jeremy Corbyn, who had been sitting on the backbenches in parliament for
over three decades, was the shock winner of the Labour leadership contest.
Nominated at the last minute by a group of MPs in response to demands for
a less politically narrow, centrist ﬁeld of candidates, he was not expected to
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win. Indeed, some of the MPs who nominated him said they regretted
having done so: they did not want him to win, just to widen the ﬁeld. It
was a shock to the press and an upheaval for much of the Parliamentary
Labour Party, the composition of which had continued to drift rightward
since the days of Blair and was dominated by MPs with a ‘professional’
proﬁle (‘moderate’ politics, a technocratic approach, and usually educated at
Oxford University).5
One of Corbyn’s key slogans was ‘Aspiration for All’. ‘The most important
message my election oﬀers’, he stated
is that the party is now unequivocally on their side. We understand
aspiration and we understand that it is only collectively that our
aspirations can be realised.
Arguing that everyone ‘aspires to an aﬀordable home, a secure job, better
living standards, reliable healthcare and a decent pension’, Corbyn criticised
the Conservative trade union bill (with customary rhetorical under-
statement) as a policy which would ‘make it harder’ for these traditional
aspirations to materialise and pledged that Labour would vote against it
(Corbyn 2015a). At the Labour Party conference he repeated the phrase
slightly diﬀerently by focusing on the young: ‘We have aspirations for all
children, not just a few’ (Corbyn 2015b). Through this rhetoric Corbyn
was directly challenging the Blairite version of aspiration by pluralising it,
disconnecting it from emulation of the rich and reconnecting it to the
redistribution of wealth. ‘Aspiration’ had also been a keyword of his contender
for the Labour leadership Liz Kendall, the Blairite candidate who initially
expected to win but who came last and whose campaign recurrently reiterated
that not only had Labour failed to connect with aspirational voters but that
working-class children too often lacked aspiration (Gilbert 2015a). There
was thus very little between Conservative and New Labour usage of
aspiration, and disillusion with these narrow strata of neoliberal politics
propelled Corbyn to victory as a candidate who presented an alternative to
the political status quo.
After Corbyn emerged onto the political stage, Conservative discourse
attempted to harness the words ‘Aspiration for All’. For instance, Cameron
argued during the Prime Minister’s Questions debate over the dramatic
extension of neoliberal policies in schools in the House of Commons: ‘That
is why we need this reform [making all schools private academies]: to make
good schools even better and to help to raise the aspiration of all. That is
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what it is all about’ (Hansard HC [series 5], vol. 608, col. 913 [20
Apr. 2016]). But the emphasis between what it is connected or articulated
to by these diﬀerent parties was clearly profoundly diﬀerent. For Cameron
it was private interests, including corporations, being able to run, and proﬁt
from running, schools, and the idea of individualised success. For Corbyn,
‘Aspiration for All’ involved the rights of workers, public ownership of
schools, strengthening teachers’ trade union representation and collective
success (Jones et al. 2015).
The task for left politics to actually win electoral victory in the UK is
very considerable. This is why Corbyn’s initial victory as leader was greeted
by an unprecedented level of popular enthusiasm: it suddenly made it seem
feasible, with people ﬂocking to local meetings and rejoining the Labour
Party at levels unprecedented since the 1970s. The UK media is dominated by
a right-wing political–corporate monopoly which was allowed to continue
throughout the thirteen years of Labour government (Freeman 2008).
Whilst the UK has a multi-party system, political representation in the UK
is not proportional but based on ‘ﬁrst past the post’, meaning that huge
attention is given to ‘swing voters’ in marginal constituencies and that many
parties on both the left and right are not represented in parliament despite
the amount of votes they receive. The only ostensibly left-wing govern-
ment achieving electoral success in Britain in decades, the Blair government,
came to power, as we have seen, by adopting a neoliberal agenda and a
managerial structure disempowering its local members and branches within
the party.
The strength of institutional resistance to an actual left-wing political
programme is thus considerable on multiple levels: in the Parliamentary Labour
Party, the majority of the mainstream media and amongst Labour Party
members wanting to prioritise a tactical appeal to swing voters in Con-
servative-held seats. In addition, there has been vigorous debate over the
precise politics, style and eﬀectiveness of Corbyn’s cabinet and approach,
both before and after he survived a bitter leadership contest (or attempted
coup) and the fallout from the Brexit vote, which he was argued to have
not campaigned passionately enough over: both of which considerably
damaged his reputation.6
Corbyn’s platform therefore began to oﬀer an alternative to neoliberal
meritocracy that was rooted in a diﬀerent approach to competitive indivi-
dualism and consumer success. Yet it has to date not achieved the populism
necessary to win. On the one hand, his popularity in the polls is very low,
and there is widespread media hostility towards him; on the other hand,
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despite his personal unpopularity, there is evidence that much of the policy
approach, particularly on universal service provision, is popular (Gilbert
2015b).
There are parallels and connections between Corbyn in the UK and
Bernie Sanders in the US. Sanders, a longstanding independent senator from
Vermont, ran as a Democratic candidate for the presidential nomination
during 2015/16, against Hillary Clinton. The popularity of Sanders, who
raised more money in the form of small, individual donations than any
other candidate in US congressional history, took many by surprise in its
extent and reach. Like Corbyn, his political platform oﬀered an alternative
to neoliberal meritocracy based around collective provision and the redis-
tribution of wealth. Some aspects of Sanders’ and Corbyn’s challenges have
been diﬀerent. Sanders was overly slow in connecting with black voters,
and he could not be accused of dispassionate public speaking, as Corbyn has
been. But other challenges they have faced have been similar, including a
backlash from the right of the party; hostile media coverage; and the gaping
fact that left-of-centre parties have been historically monumentally slow to
elect female leaders (and when women have been put forward they have
been to the right of the left, rather than charismatic left populists). In
whatever shape it takes, the media, the conservative left and diversity are
three core issues that any successful extension of the egalitarian challenge to
neoliberal meritocracy has to address.
Meritocracy versus mutuality
The popularisation of the meritocratic idea of social opportunity and
mobility is not new in Britain. In Victorian times, it was palpable in the idea
of ‘self-help’ as the only way to climb the long social ladder up from the
street or the workhouse. This discourse was only substantially knocked
back, as we saw in the last chapter, by the introduction of collective forms
of welfare state provision in the twentieth century. But still, after the forms
of collective provision in terms of healthcare, schooling, sick pay, parental
leave and pensions were introduced, discrepancies in income combined
with class privilege meant that it remained the case that what class you were
born into mattered most:
After 1945, successive governments presented Britain as a meritocracy,
in which anyone could climb the ladder with hard work and talent.
But only a few could attain ‘success’. Far from being a ‘meritocracy’, in
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which anyone could succeed if they worked hard, post-war Britain
remained a society where birth mattered more than eﬀort.… The Labour
government maintained private housing, education and healthcare, and
the diﬀerential wage rates that rewarded salaried professionals and
managers more than manual workers. These measures were intended to
help create a meritocracy, in which anyone could get on with hard
work and talent. But in reality, these policies reinforced existing social
divisions, by encouraging middle-class voters to see themselves as a
separate interest group from the working class. The 1945 rhetoric of
‘the people’ against ‘vested interests’ rang increasingly hollow.
(Todd 2015: 153)
As we saw in the last chapter, income inequality has worsened since the
mid-century. Neoliberal meritocratic discourse has adapted itself in certain
ways to the demands for liberation made on the basis of gender and ethnicity.
The dismantling of mechanisms of collective provision has been accom-
panied by a vigorous discourse of meritocracy in the neoliberal period
which has taken various forms under diﬀerent government regimes, as I
have sketched out in this chapter. It is, of course, not the case that a single
leader is responsible for these diﬀerent regimes, despite the strength of our
investment in what political theorist Archie Brown has termed, in the title
of his book, The Myth of the Strong Leader (Brown 2014). Yet it is also pre-
cisely the strength of current investment in this notion – both in terms of
cultural discourse and political mechanisms – which means that the tone
and message set by whoever the prime minister is obviously has great
inﬂuence in shaping the conjuncture and political mood.
The commitment of the political class to an ideology of neoliberal mer-
itocracy has marked the period I have been discussing in this chapter, which
has attempted to trace the diﬀerent modes such abuse has taken. In Britain,
Thatcherism’s elision of collective state welfare with the ingrained privileges
of ‘the great and the good’ were mobilised into an anti-intellectual acquisitive,
consumerist form of meritocracy. The meritocratic feeling promulgated by
the Cameron government perpetuated a possessive individualist, consumerist
notion of meritocracy, like the New Labour government before it. Despite
these similarities, Cameronism by contrast to Blairism adopted a particularly
punitive approach. Its meritocratic feeling placed moral virtue in the aﬀective
acts of aspiration and hope, which, when combined with the trope of hard
work, is now explicitly pitted against any form of collective provision or
mutual forms of social reproduction. ‘Aspiration Nation’ deﬁned itself
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against mutuality. You are a striver or a skiver: believing in the necessity of
any kind of collective form of social reproduction was demarcated by the
Conservatives as simply a lazy excuse for not striving.
This aggressively moralistic dimension of neoliberal meritocracy has
become more xenophobic and sadistic in some of its more recent right-wing
populist incarnations: in Britain, through some of the rhetoric deployed by
UKIP and Nigel Farage as well as Cameron and, in the US, most specta-
cularly through Donald Trump’s election pledges to build a wall to keep
Mexicans out of the US and to ban Muslims from entering the country. As
we have seen, however, neoliberal meritocracy takes a variety of forms: it
mutates (to the extent that there is now debate over whether it is ‘ending’
in favour of neo-nationalist capitalism [see Jacques 2016]). Theresa May is
currently converting demotic populism into a diﬀerent vein by referring to
the diﬃculties of the working class, of women, of non-white people in
order to cultivate an image of a ‘stern but fair’ version of neoliberal meri-
tocracy. At exactly the same time, vast swathes of the community mechanisms
that do most to support people with few resources – childcare centres,
beneﬁts to women in crisis, libraries – are being axed, and greater provision
beneﬁtting the already wealthy, like grammar schools, are being introduced.
Corporate justice narratives claim to address the meritocratic deﬁcit, but
capitalism, in both its neoliberal and neo-nationalist variations, structurally
perpetuates and extends it.
Notes
1 Bénabou 1999: 335.
2 In the 1970s capitalism had hit a bust part of its boom–bust cycle, and the Middle
East oil embargo had sent oil prices soaring.
3 As Adam Curtis’s ﬁlm The Attic shows, the iconography of Victorian Britain was
central to her imagery, at the same time as she waged war on the traditional ‘great
and the good’.
4 May’s speech also had some parallels to Cameron’s ﬁrst speech as prime minister
in that he highlighted inequality and social mobility and vaunted his solution, his
vision of an ‘Aspiration Nation’. Along with the suggestions that we should look
after the socially excluded (‘hug a hoodie’), and the promise, conveyed through
Arctic photo-shoots, that he would look after the environment (‘hug a husky’),
these ambitions disappeared from his agenda not long after being elected leader,
in favour of the language of austerity as ‘hard medicine’ and the moralising
stigmatisation of a reconstituted underclass.
5 One of the progressive policies enacted by Corbyn’s predecessor Ed Miliband,
who had lost the 2015 general election, was to attempt to reinvigorate the
Labour Party membership, which had slumped like that of the other parties over
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the past few ‘post-political’ decades. The introduction of a cheap, £3 registered
supporter option, combined with the excitement of a candidate who did not
occupy or oﬀer a politics of the technocratic centre, meant that the numbers of
new registered supporters (who could now vote in leadership elections) and new
members swelled. Corbyn was elected as leader with a very large mandate, as he
subsequently frequently reminded detractors (Seymour 2016).
6 A bitter leadership contest took place in 2016 after several Labour MPs resigned,
citing Corbyn’s managerial incompetence and voted a motion of no conﬁdence
in him, with the Welsh MP Owen Smith emerged as the key challenger to
become the new leader. Whilst he protested he did not want to privatise the
NHS, questions were raised as to Smith’s background as a PR man for the large
pharmaceutical company Pﬁzer and previous endorsement, in a newspaper
interview, of private providers in public services including hospitals and schools
(Shipton 2006/16). Smith has been understood by many commentators and
much of the Labour membership as part of a ‘Blairite coup’, like Angela Eagle
before him, one which is failing to connect with the membership but has sub-
stantial mainstream media allies. The challenge for the leadership election, strung
out over months, successfully damaged the image of Corbyn’s leadership, a process
helped by weaknesses in his inner management team, whilst being unsuccessful in
winning widespread support for this alternative.
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JUST LIKE US?
Normcore plutocrats and the popularisation
of elitism
There’s class warfare, all right. But it’s my class, the rich class, that’s making
war, and we’re winning.
Warren Buﬀett1
Meritocracy and the extension of privilege
How do plutocratic elites use discourses of meritocracy to maintain and
reproduce their privilege? Whilst the existence of elites is hardly new, what
is to some degree more historically novel is the extent to which large sections
of today’s plutocracy feels the need to pretend they are not an elite at all.
This chapter examines how elites present themselves as ordinary: as ‘just like
us’. It suggests that we might consider such presentations of the super-rich
in relation to a broader palette of social dispositions and a wider diﬀer-
entiated range of mediated cultural tropes. These are: ﬁrst, the ‘normcore
plutocrat’, when the ultra-wealthy are presented as ‘just like us’; second, the
‘kind parent’, when they look imperiously after the needs of society; and
third, the ‘luxurious winner’, when they ﬂaunt material excess.
This chapter traces such motifs across a range of media, in the process
considering a number of examples including the rehabilitation of the UK
royal family, changes in CEO culture, the website Rich Kids of Instagram, the
TV series Downton Abbey and the ﬁlms Annie and The King’s Speech, analysing
them in relation to changes in both the demographics of the international
super-rich and to the ﬂuctuating meanings of ‘meritocracy’. It focuses on
how, in such populist modes of presentation, elites are actively mobilising
the widely felt injustices of post-democracy and rechannelling these feelings
about injustice for their own beneﬁt. Then it analyses the speciﬁcity of the
normcore plutocrat in a longer historical perspective. For whereas pluto-
cratic excesses were curbed in the post-war period, today they have not
been: they have been permitted to ﬂourish, which in turn makes it much
more pressing for them to appear ‘just like us’.
The 1%, the new rentiers and transnational asset-stripping
To answer the question of how plutocratic elites negotiate with the idea of
meritocracy in public it is useful to consider how elites have changed in recent
years. The quantity and demographics of plutocrats have been changing in sig-
niﬁcant ways in terms of both numbers and composition. The most obvious
change is in terms of the sheer amount of money that the ultra-wealthy control:
a proportion of global wealth that has simultaneously expanded and received
more publicity during the time I have been writing this book. In 2016, the
charity Oxfam published the results of research showing that 62 people now
own the same amount of money as half the world’s population, down from 388
people in 2010; and that the richest 1% now own more wealth than the rest of
the world combined (Hardoon, Fuentes-Nieva and Ayele 2016).
The scale of this ﬁnancial shift from the many to the few is breathtaking
in its extremity. As Andrew Sayer puts it: ‘in a nutshell, such a transfer of
wealth has happened because changes to institutions and practices have made it
possible’ (Sayer 2016; my italics). Neoliberalism – the expansion of market-
isation into areas and zones which were previously not for sale, the ﬁnan-
cialised commodiﬁcation of debt, the weakening of regulation designed to
protect citizens from the extremities of the market, the passing of laws to
increase the wealth of the already rich – has made it possible (Sayer 2016;
Brown 2015; Klein 2008; Piketty 2013; Foucault 2010). To understand
how the changes to such practices, policies and laws have been able to be
presented as acceptable, as convincing, is now a relatively sizeable emergent
body of analysis to which this book has aimed to make a contribution. In
this particular chapter, I consider this issue in terms of how the rich occupy
roles which draw on the neoliberal ideology of meritocracy. How have
plutocrats made themselves palatable?
The Occupy movement’s popularisation of the idea of ‘the 1% versus the
99%’, and the phrase ‘we are the 99%’, reverberated way beyond the protest
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camps asserting the necessity of reclaiming the public sphere and basic
amenities for all. As Danny Dorling points out, it is an apt and statistically
correct concept, for the 1/99 is the most signiﬁcant dividing line in terms of
wealth in the contemporary era, much more than say, the 80% and the
20%. The bottom 99% are increasingly, as Dorling points out, ‘all in this
together’ as the income and standard of living contracts for the squeezed
middle (Dorling 2014) and as what has been termed ‘the precariat’ expands
beyond the working class (Standing 2011). Yet within the 1% itself there is
a vast amount of internal diﬀerentiation; in particular it is the top 0.1%
whose wealth has surged ahead, so much so that in the UK the 0.1% owns
four times as much as the average 1 percenter (and the top 0.01% way
beyond this; Dorling 2014: 11; see also Freeland 2012: 80–3; Hecht 2014).
Inequality is not consistent across countries: in the UK, for example, a ‘pre-tax
household income for a childless couple of £160,000 puts you among the
very poorest of the 1%; in the US you would need $324,000 to be in the
same category (Dorling 2014: 10; see also Grsuky and Szelenyi 2011). This
is not inevitable: in the far more equitable Japan and the Netherlands the
incomes of the 1% have reduced over past decades (Dorling 2014: 10).
However, the increasing chasm between the 1% and the 99% is particularly
acute in countries where right-wing politicians have implemented ‘shock
doctrine’ neoliberal policies (Piketty 2013; Klein 2008; Dorling 2014).
How has this surge in wealth for the 1% and especially the 0.1% been
able to happen? In his insightful book Why We Can’t Aﬀord the Rich,
sociologist Andrew Sayer emphasises the important distinction between
earned and unearned income. First, there is money that comes from con-
trolling means of production, which is earned income, producing ‘the
working rich’. Second, there are those who get most of their income from
the fact they already own control of existing assets that yield rent, interest or
capital gains. This is unearned income, and these people are ‘rentiers’ (Sayer
2016; see also Lapavitsas 2013; Valentine 2005). A neoliberal political
system supports, above all, rentier interests, in which the 99% become
increasingly indebted to the 1%. It is a form of wealth extraction, but it
becomes packaged as, and confused with, wealth creation. As Sayer points
out, even arch conservative Winston Churchill thought that particular way
of earning income was parasitical; today, it is enthusiastically encouraged by
neoliberal politicians (Sayer 2016: 49–50).
The super-wealthy now overwhelmingly get their wealth from ‘proﬁting
without producing’, as Costas Lapavitsas put it, through unearned income
from their assets: as interest, rent or proﬁt from selling investments (capital
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gains) (Lapavitsas 2013). This simple fact is also at the heart of Thomas
Piketty’s much quoted book Capital in the Twenty-First Century, in which he
deﬁnes the rentier as ‘the enemy of democracy’ (Piketty 2013: 422). Capital
in the Twenty-First Century presents as its key ﬁnding the formula R > G. In
this formula ‘G’ is economic growth in a national economy in general, and
‘R’ is the rate of return for capital. Piketty’s conclusions are that the
economies of the countries he examined grow at 1.0–1.5% per year, but
capital at 4.0–5.0% per year, meaning that the wealthy will get vastly
more wealthy, unless diﬀerent political measures are introduced. Piketty’s
suggested solution is a wealth tax (Piketty 2013).
The neoliberal mantra that the socialised provisions of the welfare state
should be gradually sold oﬀ to the private sector, piece by piece, has resulted
in widespread ‘asset stripping’ (Meek 2014). Transnational investors buy
national assets like housing, trains, telephone, steel or water companies that
are being sold oﬀ by national governments. This process is of such a magnitude
that it is often likened to earlier historical acts of selling oﬀ the commons,
such as the enclosures, dividing and selling common land which escalated at
the beginning of the Industrial Revolution in Europe: it is a similar form of
‘primitive accumulation’ (Terranova 2015). To say this is not to suggest that
history is condemned to repeat itself in some inevitable formula. It does
mean that the constant battle over sharing (or not sharing) wealth has taken
on very diﬀerent historical shapes and forms. The most complex of these
new forms is the labyrinthine matrix of ﬁnancialisation, the casino of spec-
ulation developed through the commodiﬁcation of debt (Ross 2013; Massey
2007, 2013).2
Today the majority of the proﬁts of the super-rich are made through
unearned income on property and through speculation in the ﬁnancial
sector. Politicians have been voted into power who have loosened the
constraints on capitalism. They have acted, in one memorable phrase, as
‘butlers’ to transnational capitalists who have been able to vastly inﬂate the
income they get just by having, or by playing around with, the assets they
already have (York 2015; Atkinson, Parker and Burrows 2016).
Alongside this immense hoovering-up of global wealth, the plutocratic
elite now have other distinguishing features which have become of interest
to the reinvigorated academic ﬁeld of ‘elite studies’, which has resuscitated
some of the earlier debates on the subject (e.g. Davis 2007, 2015; Williams
and Savage 2008; Gilens and Page 2014; Poulantzas 1975; Miliband 1969;
Mills 1956). There is a change in the global composition of elites. Chrystia
Freeland points out that whilst North Americans are no longer the largest
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group of millionaires in the world, taken as a group – 37.0% compared to
Europeans at 37.2% – they still dominate the ‘super-wealthy’ (people
worth over $50 million). Forty-four per cent of the super-wealthy are in
the US, 28.0% in Europe, 19.2% in Asia and the Paciﬁc, and 3.4% in
China (Freeland 2012: 35). They are therefore to some extent ‘more
global, and more diverse geographically and racially’ (Khan 2012: 363). In
relative terms there are a few more self-made working rich than in the
past (Khan 2012). The leveraging of wealth of the working rich through
unearned income means that self-made entrepreneurs such as Alan Sugar
(businessman and star of UK’s The Apprentice) are able to easily inﬂate their
assets once they have them. The extensive media presence of such ﬁgures
exaggerates their numbers and the reasons why they have been able to
inﬂate their assets are frequently translated by the media as simply due to
individual ‘savvy’.
Whilst social mobility is increasingly diﬃcult for the 99%, there is one
place where there is pronounced upward mobility: amongst the upper
echelons of the elite. As Seamus Khan puts it of the US:
Elites have experienced considerable wage movements in the past several
decades. A wealthy individual has likely enjoyed income and wealth
gains at rates far greater than those immediately below him. Simulta-
neously, those immediately above him have far outpaced his own
considerable gains. Furthermore, there has been a relative increase
in self-made elites. Unlike most Americans, elites have experienced
considerable wage growth and mobility.
(Khan 2012: 367)
In these terms we can see how the ideology of neoliberal meritocracy
works for the rich in particular: how supremely easy and how very proﬁtable it
is for them to believe it is the best social system. Of course, it is not the case
that all the rich are wholly comfortable with this system. The billionaire
Warren Buﬀett for example has regularly called for the rich to be taxed: a
minority of the 1% are uncomfortable with the extent of ‘the divide’
(Hecht 2014). Still, others are profoundly comfortable with it. Indeed, a far
larger proportion actively campaign for a continuation of their rights, whether
on an overt level (such as the bankers who formed the ‘Occupy Occupy
Wall Street’ protest or Boris Johnson arguing that the rich should be taxed
far less as they provide a public service) or on a covert level (through passive
acquiescence or the extensive networks of discreet lobbying) (Johnson 2013;
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Billera 2011; Monbiot 2016; Stauber and Rampton 1995). Indeed, we can
see how very easy it is for the ultra-rich who are the main social group
experiencing social mobility to believe, or to try to believe, in the widely
peddled idea of neoliberal meritocracy’s upward mobility: for it is their own
experience as well as suiting their vested ﬁnancial interests.
The following sections consider how wealthy elites publicly negotiate
the ideology of meritocracy in media discourse. Of course, not all wealthy
elites are keen to show themselves in public at all: ﬁnancial elites are less
conspicuously or publicly individualised. The sections of the rich that do
tend to court and be subject to media representation are framed in a variety
of ways to appear egalitarian and, in the process, often draw on meritocratic
discourse. In this chapter I identify three forms which do so. First, those
sections of the ultra-wealthy who try to appear profoundly ordinary or
normal, or what I call ‘normcore plutocrats’. Second, the idea that the rich
look after us, or are what I term ‘kind parents’; and third, the seductive yet
potentially more risky position of the ‘luxury-ﬂaunter’. These are, of course,
not hermetic categories or consistent social types but rather prevalent
cultural–political motifs or tropes which gain traction through their
seemingly endless media repetition.
Normcore plutocrats
‘Normcore’ was the quasi-parodic name given to a fashion trend which
junked searching for yet another new clothing style in favour of the
everyday: of hoodies and jeans (Farrell 2014). Its gently comic appeal is
generated by the word ‘normcore’ itself, a juxtaposition bolting together
the unassuming everyday (the ‘norm’) with the ﬁerce intensity (the ‘core’)
deriving from its play on the word ‘hardcore’. As an expression it is mildly
satirical of the insistent search for newness inherent in the proﬁt-driven
nature of the fashion cycle and of the idea that ‘normal’ can ﬁt the usually
outlandish category of cool. At the same time, it also suggests – as the work
of anthropologists and cultural studies practitioners have taught us for
decades – that ‘normal’ is a set of constructed characteristics.
‘Normcore plutocrat’ is a phrase indicating how the plutocrat – whose
power is gained to an extensive degree through wealth – can attempt to
maintain and increase their power and wealth by ‘performing ordinariness’.
Such discourse expresses the idea that the rich are not that diﬀerent: they
are just like us, everyday, ordinary beings. Whilst it has a long history
(Winters 2011), it is not a coincidence that this motif becomes pronounced
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at moments when the rich are under increased public scrutiny about their
increased share of the wealth.
Take, for example, recent CEO culture. Chief executive oﬃcers are the
most senior ﬁgures in charge of managing a corporation.3 As I have written
about elsewhere (Littler 2007), today publicity about CEOs is not restricted
to the pages of business publications: on the contrary, many CEOs actively
court coverage across the gamut of media, from tabloid newspapers through
TV to Twitter (Guthey, Clark and Jackson 2009). And in the process many
insistently construct and promote an image of ‘extraordinary ordinariness’.
The UK businessman Alan Sugar, for example, has become prominent over
the past decade by building his persona in the tabloid press and through the
TV show The Apprentice, the UK version of the transnational reality show
discussed in chapter 2.
Sugar’s persona has gained popularity through the presentation of a
straight-talking working-class cockney who does not mince his words. This,
we are told, is an ordinary bloke who did not need any fancy training or
cultural capital to rise to the top of the ladder, who treats all his ‘apprentices’
with equal directness. The titles of his bestselling books graphically indicate
this forthrightness: What You See is What You Get, The Way I See It and
Unscripted: My Ten Years in Telly (Sugar 2011, 2012, 2015). ‘If I, the barrow
boy Sugar can “make it”’, is his message, ‘so can anybody – as long as you
sort yourself out in the way I did’.
Alan Sugar’s promotion of his blunt normality has been extremely prof-
itable in securing his rise to elite status. When The Apprentice began, he was
already 24th in the Sunday Times Rich List, and the TV programme did not
make him as much money as his ‘regular work’ (Hutton 2005). But what
Sugar’s newfound celebrity as gruﬀ TV guru did provide was the opportunity
for wider public recognition beyond the business sector: as a basis for columns
and interviews, an expansive, proliferating cross-media coverage. As we saw
in chapter 2, The Apprentice has been vastly inﬂuential in promoting cultural
norms of entrepreneurialism and competition in the wider culture and has
been instrumental in helping extend and embed these norms within state
school education.
In delivering a message that no matter where you start oﬀ in life, you
can, with passion and eﬀort, compete and rise up in business, Sugar is most
deﬁnitely not alone: it is a recurrent message in contemporary business dis-
course. Anyone Can Do It, for example, is the title of a book by the businessman
Duncan Bannatyne (Figure 4.1). Bannatyne accumulated his fortune
through a number of routes, including privatised childcare, ﬁtness centres
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and nursing homes (in part, then, cashing in on the privatisation of the
welfare state), and gained his fame primarily through his appearance as a
judge on the reality TV business talent show Dragon’s Den, in which
entrepreneurs have three minutes to pitch a business idea to corporate
‘experts’ including him. Anyone Can Do It is promoted by the publisher
through classic neoliberal meritocratic discourse: the blurb on the back
cover tells us that this is a book in which our hero ‘relives his colourful path
FIGURE 4.1 Cover of Duncan Bannatyne, Anyone Can Do It. Reproduced
courtesy of Orion Books.
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to riches, from ice-cream salesman to multi-millionaire, explaining
how anyone could take the same route as he did – if they really want to’
(Bannatyne 2007).
Today’s CEO can occupy their unique cultural location due to a con-
ﬂuence of factors, including and beyond new media platforms and formats.
One factor is the image of insistent, ‘radical’ informality produced by post-
Fordist capitalism: where ‘dress-down Fridays’, shared oﬃce space and cor-
porate playtimes encourage ostensibly risk-taking subjects, manifesting what
Boltanski and Chiapello identify as ‘the new spirit of capitalism’ (Boltanski
and Chiapello 2005). Another factor is the restructuring of ﬁnance capital
from the 1980s and 1990s, as discussed above. In business commentary and
beyond one expression of this movement and consolidation of money into
the hands of a small elite was the widespread cultural lionisation of CEOs. As
the business writer Constance L. Hays puts it, during the 1980s an ‘infor-
mation industry burst forth to spread and share information about the
business world’, and ‘CEOs who posted superb results lost their facelessness
and became celebrities, their photographs featured on the covers of maga-
zines and their names dropped on talk shows. It was a startling shift’ (Hays
2005: 146–147).
As CEOs became celebrities both within and beyond the expanding
realm of business media, some took demotic self-presentation beyond the
normcore to more ﬂamboyant extremes. The American Apparel CEO Dov
Charney liked to appear in his own advertisements with his back to the
camera, naked from the waist down; and was happy to talk extensively
about his sexual preferences in women’s magazines. His sexual harassment
of employees eventually landed him with several lawsuits, and he was
sacked from his own company (Littler 2007; Moor and Littler 2008).
Business writer James Surowiecki comments that ‘one of the deep paradoxes
of the 1990s’ was that ‘even as companies paid greater attention to the virtues
of decentralisation and the importance of bottom-up mechanisms, they also
treated their CEOs as superheroes’ (Surowiecki, 2004: 216). Despite their
diﬀerences, Sugar, Bannatyne and Charney show how the public ﬁgure of
the celebrity CEO oﬀered a means of reconciling this paradox: by inter-
twining the twin imperatives of being a ‘corporate superhero’ with the new
‘bottom-up’ ambience symptomatic of the cultural turn. In other words, the
persona of many contemporary celebrity CEOs works by trying to turn ‘fat
cats’ into ‘cool cats’. They use discourses of bottom-up power and of
demotic, normcore ordinariness to do so, and they ﬂaunt such images across
an expanded range of media contexts. Cultivating a normcore image means
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cultivating the appearance of social ﬂuidity, providing the celebrity CEO
with a populist reach which is crucial in today’s ostensibly meritocratic
culture and society.
All these businessmen are plutocrats: their power derives from their
wealth. Yet they, as these examples show, are able to attain more wealth,
and more power, by extending their celebrity capital and using narratives of
neoliberal meritocracy across a range of media. With Alan Sugar, this included
becoming an advisor to the government, as we saw in chapter 2, as well as
being knighted as Lord Sugar (a non-hereditary life peer). Narratives of neo-
liberal meritocracy help facilitate mobility within elite circuits of power: being
a normcore plutocrat eases access to power as well as to more money.
Normcore aristocrats
It is worth considering how the normcore plutocrat narrative relates to
more established forms of elite wealth. Plutocrats’ power derives from their
wealth, whereas aristocrats’ power technically derives from their title,
although, much of the time, considerable associated wealth and land goes
with it. Take the particular, yet resonant, example of Britain’s royal family.
The popularity of the royal family was low in the 1990s, when there was
publicity about the Queen’s tax-exempt status and just before the death of
Diana, Princess of Wales, and it dipped again in the early 2000s (IPSOS-Mori
2012). By this I am not suggesting that republicanism was about to break
through – that particular cause did not galvanise any signiﬁcant numbers –
but rather that levels of indiﬀerence were, for the modern period, at a record
high (IPSOS-Mori 2012).
In recent years, however, the popularity of the British royal family has
resurged. A key reason is the popularity of ‘Wills and Kate’, Prince William
and Princess Catherine, the Duke and Duchess of Cambridge. Indeed, most
people who want the monarchy to continue want the crown to skip over
Prince Charles and for William to be made king instead (Clark 2012). One
of the key routes through which they have regained popularity is through
their performance of ordinariness. If attempting to present the royals as
ordinary is not new, nor has it been consistent or eﬀective (Clancy 2015).
Wills, Kate and sympathetic sections of the media have together created an
image of everyday normality. Their style and self-presentation is relentlessly
at the upper fringes of the middle class: as aspirational yet attainable,
respectable yet ‘relaxed’ (what we might term, after the upper-middle-class
clothing company, ‘Bodenesque’).4
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Kate Middleton was from the beginning often depicted in the media as
a commoner, the elements of her background sounding less immensely
privileged (such as her mother being an airline hostess or distant ancestors
being coal miners) and being relentlessly dragged into the foreground, as
Kim Allen and Laura Clancy have pointed out (Allen et al. 2015; Clancy
2015). She has regularly been described by the press as a modest, humble,
austerity-minded, thrift queen who shops at TK Maxx and often wears the
same dress twice. Meanwhile, other key information is routinely and
conveniently elided, like the fact that Middleton attended a series of pri-
vate schools, her parents bought her a ﬂat in the extremely aﬄuent
London area of Chelsea and her parents’ business Party Pieces had an
estimated worth of £8 million, even before the royal connection (with
the royal connection, it is now worth an estimated £30 million [This is
Money 2011]).
Images of normality and ordinariness have been carefully cultivated by
the royal family through, for example, staged photo opportunities in casual
conservative clothing in the Middletons’ garden:
The very image of the couple on the grass with baby George is carefully
choreographed to match the middle-class ideal, right down to being
taken in the Middleton family garden, and there’s certainly no opulent
palace towering behind them.
(Clancy 2015)
Such insistence on domestic normality was also fully in operation around
the Queen’s 90th birthday celebrations in April 2016, with the BBC pro-
gramme Elizabeth at 90: A Family Tribute depicting Princes William and
Harry and other relatives watching home video footage, Gogglebox-style, of
their family. These were just like ordinary family members watching ﬁlms
of their nan! Just like us, only richer and tied into the living heritage
experience attraction of the UK royal family. Such tropes of the domestic
and the technological everyday were extended a few weeks later through a
comic viral video sketch promoting the Invictus Games, an athletics com-
petition for US and UK military personnel who have been injured in war,
which was circulated to the press and on social media. Whilst Prince Harry
is explaining the games to the Queen, his mobile rings with the ‘Hail to the
Chief’ tune. ‘It’s Michelle [Obama]!’ Harry exclaims, and the Obamas
challenge Harry to ‘Bring it on’: ‘Boom!’ (BBC 2016). If this tightly scripted
sketch works through the trusted comic impact of the mock-spar, it also
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builds its comedy by juxtaposing a degree of American black cool with
uptight white aristocratic chintz-laden tradition. In the process, Harry and
the royal family become themselves a little cooler and show ‘they have a sense
of humour’. The edited viral video provides none of the scope for oﬀ-message
comedy excess that the one-oﬀ charity TV gameshow ‘It’s A Royal
Knockout!’ – featuring members of the royal family throwing custard pies –
did so disastrously in the 1980s (Roseman 1996). As such it also contributes
to Prince Harry’s recent rehabilitated persona as an ordinary, fun-loving
royal – kind-hearted and full of banter – contributing to replacing a previous
image of him as a spoilt, lazy, irresponsible prince, who in 2005 thought it
funny to wear a Nazi uniform to attend a racist aristocratic ‘colonial and
natives’ party (Tweedie and Kallenbach 2005).
Part of what makes the UK royal family – like other European royals –
amenable to being positioned as ‘like us’ is because they are positioned as
having a role ostensibly outside the political sphere. They are outside politics in
that they have a largely ceremonial role and no remit to engage directly with
political debate (meaning whoever is elected prime minister has a vast degree
of unchecked power in comparison with other liberal democracies). Thus
royalty operates as a highly paid example of a real, living heritage attraction.
Yet the Queen’s position is political in that it is fundamental to the con-
stitution: she has to approve bills in parliament before they become law.
Operating at the apparent border zone of parliamentary politics, royalty is
nonetheless hugely signiﬁcant in terms of its royal prerogative powers, its role
as guarantor of establishment hierarchies and its ambiguous, latent political
potential, alongside the fact that the monarch is the recipient of obviously
sizeable wealth and privilege (Barnett 1994). The royal family is extremely
wealthy and includes some of the richest landlords in the country: the Crown
Estate, which includes signiﬁcant sections of central London and around half
the UK shoreline, was in 2016 worth £12 billion (Crown Estate 2016).
In an era when politics has, to a large extent, been colonised by techno-
crats in suits and is implemented from the top-down, being outside politics
is a post-democratic space we have been increasingly encouraged to occupy
(Crouch 2004). Such post-democratic culture provides an extremely
amenable space for the monarchy to court popularity: it enables them to
make a similar linkage – like us, they are outside politics, they are ordinary.
This connection is also one of several reasons why Prince Charles, who likes
to speak out on selective political matters (particularly environmentalism)
whilst retaining a pronounced air of aristocratic formality, is so unpopular
(Clark 2012).
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The link between monarchy and populace as ostensibly connected
through a lack of political power in a post-democracy is also dramatised in
the 2010 ﬁlm The King’s Speech. This major worldwide box-oﬃce critical
and commercial success – now regularly pronounced ‘the most successful
independent British ﬁlm ever’ (Brooks 2011) – shows the trials of a stuttering
man who is unexpectedly ﬂung into the role of king after his brother’s
abdication. He is expected to speak to and for the nation on the daunting
new-fangled technology of wireless radio. At one point the new king bursts
out in frustration:
You know, if I’m a king, where’s my power? Can I form a govern-
ment, can I levy a tax, declare a war? No. And yet I’m the seat of all
authority. Why? Because the nation believes that when I speak, I speak
for them! But I can’t speak.
(The King’s Speech 2010)
Later, of course, the king learns to speak. The visual backdrop to his successful
broadcast is a powerful montage of scenes of people from all backgrounds in
Britain whilst the king speaks for them at a time of profound anxiety, the
outbreak of the Second World War. Rich and poor are united by their
shared lack of political power, but the king has gained a voice, and in the
process, the assertive aﬀective implication is, of course, that so have they. The
ﬁlm oﬀers an entertaining conservative narrative in which joy – as a stuttering
man overcomes his hardship – becomes fused with the triumphant success
of the king speaking for everyone. As such it also links to the category I
explore next, paternalism; but in terms of representing the monarchy-as-
ordinary, what is particularly interesting about this ﬁlm is how it dramatises
the idea of a shared lack of power between royalty and commoners. George
VI and his diﬃculty in speaking, in having a voice, becomes a metaphor for
the nation’s people. As Michael Billig pointed out, when people are ‘talking
of the royal family’ they are invariably talking of other things too (Billig
1992). In this case, the ﬁlm is speaking of the disempowerment of con-
temporary post-democracy whilst it dramatises the past. Importantly, its
ﬁlmic power comes from changing this situation, through the powerful
concept of gaining a political voice (Couldry 2010), even though this
becomes channelled into conservative ends. In this sense it is another, much
more covert example of how monarchy has rehabilitated itself in a post-
political age – presenting itself as ordinary, with the problem of ﬁnding any
eﬀective voice.
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Clearly, the hereditary privilege that the monarchy possesses, as indicated
by the titles of aristocracy, is not a state which applies to all the rich. This
is the important distinction between the aristocrat and the plutocrat.
However, there is an extremely important unifying narrative between them.
The issue of innate privilege and how such assets are then leveraged through
vastly inﬂated returns on unearned income is symptomatic of a wider story
about elites in terms of inherited wealth. It also indicates something of the
blurred cultural and behavioural boundaries between aristocrats and pluto-
crats. For instance, until his death in 2016, one of the UK’s richest people,
and its richest royal, was the sixth Duke of Westminster, Gerald Cavendish
Grosvenor. His wealth had been accrued through generations of Grosvenor
parents who passed on property-based wealth to their sons and daughters.
Originally involving London-based properties – his company, the Grosvenor
Group, owns swathes of property in Britain, particularly in ultra-aﬄuent
areas of London such as Knightsbridge, Covent Garden, Kensington and
Chelsea – in the 1950s and 1960s it expanded into properties worldwide in
the US, Canada, Australasia and, in the 1990s, into Asia. The Duke acquired
his stratospheric levels of wealth through initial income from inherited
wealth in the form of land-based assets which was ﬁnancialised and com-
modiﬁed through a property empire stretching from Belgravia to Tokyo.
Mainly taking the route of plutocratic reticence, when he did appear in rare
media interviews his ‘normality’ was insistently foregrounded, indeed in a
not dissimilar vein to that oﬀered by The King’s Speech: he was the country
child who grew up playing in the ﬁelds, never expecting to be wealthy, ‘the
man who wanted to be a beef farmer and ended up the richest man in
Britain’ (Treneman 1998). Whilst these media representations focus on the
normcore plutocrat as profoundly everyday, in 2015 the UK government
sought to extend inheritance rights of the wealthy by enabling people to
pass on homes worth up to £1 million to their children without being
taxed at all: a strategy which extends the wealth of the already wealthy and
disadvantages the majority of people, whose parents cannot aﬀord to buy
them a house in an overinﬂated housing market.
As we saw in chapter 3, it is notable that the rich will frequently talk
extremely loudly about how hard they work, especially when their money
comes from unearned income, trying to oﬀset extensive privilege by framing
their activity in terms of manual labour. Seamus Khan’s astute study of the
US elite fee-paying school St Pauls beautifully traces how hyper-privileged
children constantly talk about their hard work whilst usually not working
particularly hard at all and indeed simultaneously wearing an air of relaxed,
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natural learning (Khan 2010). This combination is a necessary mode of self-
presentation for contemporary entitled elites. The US Republican president,
Donald Trump, the son of a billionaire, regularly uses such a classed language
of graft. As we saw in chapter 3, so too does the UK prime minister, David
Cameron. The Mayor of London, Boris Johnson, invokes it by castigating
Londoners for not working as hard as the Chinese, whilst lobbying for tax
breaks for billionaires, all the while foregrounding his jocular ‘down to
earth’ persona.
The urgency with which the ultra-wealthy adopt a range of strategies to
appear like normcore plutocrats is remarkable. Whilst the existence of elites
is hardly new, then, what is to some degree more historically novel is the
extent to which large sections of today’s plutocracy feels the need to pretend
they are not an elite at all. What is notable is the prominence of a generation
of wealthy elites who insistently present themselves as hardworking and
meritocratic in order to keep the idea of social mobility churning and to
legitimate their own position within this wildly exaggerated schema in
order to protect their own interests.
The kind parent
The second stock character in our tour through personiﬁcations of the
contemporary rich is that of the kind parent. This ﬁgure relates to neoliberal
myths of meritocracy somewhat diﬀerently but no less insistently works to
attempt to reinforce it. The kind parent ﬁgure suggests that they look after
us: they are paternalistic custodians of society. It is a deeply reassuring motif.
Everyone needs a degree of parenting, from some source, even as an adult.
The world can in many ways be a scary place, and these people are presented
as ﬁgures that will look after us. The problem is that they primarily look
after themselves and their friends under the guise of looking after others. As
with the ﬁrst stock character, there is interesting traﬃc between examples in
which meritocratic narrative is very palpable and overt and its more selective
use by older archetypes which draw on speciﬁc elements of contemporary
meritocratic discourse in order to justify and bolster their position.
Such narratives have been particularly apparent in the immensely popular
TV series Downton Abbey which dramatises the range of lives, from cooks to
ladies, butlers to lords, in a British stately home in the early decades of the
twentieth century. Downton Abbey, a joint US/UK production, constructed
a slice of British heritage for the domestic and international export market,
with extremely and at times unprecedentedly high ratings across a wide
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range of countries including China, Brazil, Singapore, Denmark, Israel,
Belgium and Iceland (Egner 2013). Tightly scripted and plotted, featuring
very well-known actors and with a pronounced streak of comedy to its
drama, the series presents an account of historical change whilst in the
process raising questions about the social and cultural dynamics of class, race
and gender (Littler and Naidoo forthcoming).
Part of how and why the drama is so watchable and has achieved such
success is precisely because it does explore the idea of diﬀerent social ranks
and privilege. It does raise questions as to whether such social divisions are
fair, whilst depicting historical change in such terms as the raising hemlines
of fashion, shifting cultural codes of acceptability around relationships,
the dwindling numbers of servants in the country house, the arrival of the
motor car, the rise of public education for children and the advent of the
labour movement. In this respect an important part of its success is
undoubtedly produced through its generous provision of multiple narratives
about how history altered and changed.
And yet the drama reinvigorates an idea of a deeply divided society,
explores its divisions, and then channels them into a profoundly conservative
narrative about what is inevitable and pleasing and what is not. Most sig-
niﬁcantly, it presents an extremely economically unequal social order as
ultimately a happy, cheerful community-spirited place. (The ending of the
series is particularly symptomatic in this respect, featuring all of the characters
in turn – from those who clean the stairs to those who glide down them in
luxury eveningwear – toasting everyone ‘Happy New Year’). It is highly
selective in what it presents as impossible to change – as an interracial rela-
tionship, for example, is introduced but it is explicitly presented as just
something that could not happen at that time when in reality, the actual
historical people whose story it drew on and ﬁctionalised, Edwina Mount-
batten and Leslie Hutchinson, had a relationship for over four years (Breese
2012). Yet, and crucially, other kinds of change are embraced and presented
as inevitable – such as the aristocrats becoming businessmen and women,
through developing enterprise initiatives involving housing, pig-farming and
car dealerships.
Within this context Downton Abbey ﬁgures the rich as complex characters,
to be sure, but primarily as benevolent ‘mummy and daddy’ ﬁgures. The
earl of Grantham is created as a likeable father-ﬁgure, running the whole
estate, sympathetic to the needs of his ﬂock and their diﬃculties: as a thor-
oughly decent man. His American wife (again reﬂecting the joint US/UK
nature of the production) oﬀers a kind, socially ﬂuid femininity to his
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occasionally emotionally challenged stiﬀ upper lip masculinity, taking on
charitable work and oﬀering leadership to the new hospital. Their daughters,
in a stand for liberal feminism, strike out into business: one moving to
London to branch out into Bloomsbury-style magazine editing, the other
adapting the estate by developing a side-line in pig-farming (when she is
not charitably helping her maid with her medical needs). Extreme social
privilege is portrayed through such characterisation above all as decent and
forward-looking and thus as produced primarily through the savvy of self-
governance and wise conduct. And crucially this context is used to valorise
enterprise and entrepreneurialism.
It is no accident that such depiction is constructed during a grossly
unequal present, a fact which has not gone without media comment. The
UK satirical magazine Private Eye produced a parodic cover featuring the
faces of the millionaire leaders of the UK Conservative Party (David
Cameron, Theresa May), members of the Liberal Democrat coalition (Nick
Clegg, Vince Cable) and Margaret Thatcher all superimposed onto the
costumed bodies of lead characters of the show and standing in front of the
building of ‘Downturn Abbey’ (Private Eye 2010). The show was also
invoked by the leader of the Trades Union Congress, Frances O’Grady, to
argue in 2014 that ‘Britain was in danger of becoming a Downton Abbey
style society … in which social mobility has hit reverse’ (Parkinson 2014).
The motif of the rich as a ‘kind parent’ in Downton Abbey is packaged for a
nostalgic heritage/tourist gaze and works to humanise and justify extreme
social inequality. It is presented as simultaneously a natural state of aﬀairs
and as a situation which has to adapt to the future. It is no accident that
Downton’s aristocratic lords and ladies adapt so ﬂuently to multiple forms of
entrepreneurialism and ‘Big Society’-style patronage.
The rich as kind parents was also, of course, a trope deployed as a justi-
ﬁcation for imperialism. Britain as ‘the mother country’ was a motif that was
repeated in an attempt to gain deep ideological traction, to legitimise the
idea that brutal imperial dominance was not only reasonable but as caring as
a parent’s love for their oﬀspring. As Catherine Hall writes, it domesticates
and naturalises colonial power relations (Hall 1998: 190–191). A related
domain where these thematic strands – of the rich as kind parent, imperial
parenting and wealthy benevolence – are fused is in ‘philanthrocapitalism’.
This term describes the fusion of global acts of charity by the super-rich
with acts that extend their own corporate business interests (Littler 2015).
The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, for example, simultaneously performs
charitable acts working to disseminate anti-malaria vaccines whilst
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vigorously promoting private business interests which perpetuate and extend
existing inequalities (McGoey 2015). This dual approach, linking philan-
thropy and capitalism thus solves, or appears to solve, some medical or social
problems linked to poverty whilst creating new forms of inequality and
poverty (Richey and Ponte 2011).
Philanthrocapitalism has been the subject of stinging critique from the
voluntary, or third, sector, particularly in Michael Edwards’ broadsides Just
Another Emperor and Small Change: Why Business won’t Save the World
(Edwards 2008, 2010; see also Hayes and Price 2009) where he argues that
these projects serve corporations more than their intended beneﬁciaries.
Citing a survey of 25 joint ventures in the US between charity and business,
Edwards points out that in 22 cases there were ‘signiﬁcant conﬂicts between
mission and the demands of corporate stakeholders’ (Edwards 2009: 13).
Moreover, he writes, on a larger-scale philanthrocapitalism has weakened
the third sector and civil society ‘through co-optation instead of equal
partnership’ (Edwards 2009: 15). His argument is therefore to ‘reaﬃrm the
importance of a “civil-society-strong” perspective in face of a tsunami of
pro-business thinking’ (Edwards 2009: 55). For there is, Edwards writes, a
fundamental problem with philanthrocapitalism: if it really wanted to
achieve its ostensible goals, it would reform its own working practices.
After all, if business and the super-rich are serious about their social
responsibilities there is plenty of work to be done in changing the way
that wealth is produced and distributed without the smokescreen of
philanthropy. Taking the right steps on wages, working conditions,
beneﬁts, consumer standards, tax obligations, political lobbying,
monopolies and competition at the heart of business would have a
huge social impact. As Daniel Lubetzky (a leading social entrepreneur
himself) put it: ‘what most resonates with me about the unexamined
“noise” surrounding philanthrocapitalism is that it is often used to mask
dishonest or noxious behaviour from corporations’.
(Edwards 2009: 63)
The idea of the rich as essentially benevolent itself incorporates the fantasy
of global trickle-down economics: that ‘wealth creation’ at the top will
gradually ﬂow, like some muniﬁcent waterfall, to those on ledges at the
sides and those stuck at the bottom of the social valley. Study after study has
proven this to be untrue. Yet considerable eﬀort goes into repeating and
attempting to perpetuate the idea of wealth creation, a phrase which, as
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Andrew Sayer points out, could more aptly be termed ‘wealth extraction’
(Sayer 2016: 46).
For the stock type of the kind parent, the fantasy of wealth creation,
followed by benevolent wealth distribution, is paramount. In the logic of
such narratives, it is ﬁne that they rule us: in fact it is better, because, ﬁrstly,
they have worked hard to activate their talent to achieve individualised
greatness, which legitimises their privilege; and, secondly, because emotionally,
aﬀectively they are just so kind.
Luxury-ﬂaunters
A third motif which routinely appears in public mediated discourse is that of
the rich as materially superabundant: living lives of outlandish or admirable
glamour and luxury. Luxurious excess is ﬂaunted across a range of online
and oﬄine spaces: from perfume advertising on gigantic billboards to TV
shows like Lifestyles of the Rich and Famous and Made in Chelsea, from
magazines such as Hello! to the popular social media site Rich Kids of Instagram.
The forms such representations of luxury take are not singular. Even on the
right-wing of the political spectrum, media sites will present the rich in
particular ways depending on what class fractions they are addressing and
how they want to engage and position readers as consumers and citizens.
For example, on the one hand, UK mid-market tabloid newspaper The
Daily Mail with its notoriously barbed critical commentary encourages us to
be full of envy, desire and resentment, yet not to challenge the position of
the rich at the top of the social hierarchy.5 Hello! magazine, with its glossy
colour spreads dealing with the lavish celebrations or interior décors of the
super-rich and famous, will, on the other hand, encourage us to be cowed
yet pointlessly aspirational at the spectacle of their wealth. As readers we are
addressed or interpellated in particular ways – encouraged to feel diﬀerent
things, to embrace diﬀerent aﬀective dispositions: to be intrigued, dazzled or
oﬀended.
Spectacles of luxury are often presented in ambiguous ways. The popular
Tumblr blog, Rich Kids of Instagram,6 for example, with its arch tagline ‘they
have more money than you and this is what they do’ reposts selﬁes that the
sons and daughters of the international super-rich have shared on the social-
media photography site Instagram. Examples include a close-up of seven
Rolex-watch-clad hands ﬁst-pumping together (26 April 2016), a photo-
graph of a luxury car parked next to a palatial home with the tagline ‘Home
at last’ (18 April 2016) and numerous photographs of shopping expeditions
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and young people partying on yachts. Rich Kids of Instagram, as Alice Marwick
points out, ‘functions as both a critique of income inequality and a cele-
bration of it’ (Marwick 2015: 154). We are invited to look at the lavish lives
of these oﬀspring of the ultra-wealthy like a snake, in fascination; both to
gawp and laugh at them. These are the lifestyles that we do not have; they
are diﬀerent from us.
However, spectacles of material superabundance even though (and
because) they emanate from extreme privilege are still regularly presented
through the mythology of neoliberal meritocracy through the neoliberal
meritocratic trope of hard work, as discussed in chapter 3. Marwick dis-
cusses how Kane Lim, a 22-year-old Singaporean student studying fashion
in California, who regularly posts pictures of his Cartier watches (worth
over $10,000) and extensive collection of more than 50 pairs of designer
shoes by Louboutin (at least $1,300 each) and who has garnered a degree of
micro-celebrity or ‘instafame’ through social media, regularly invokes in
online conversation the idea that he earned it (‘we Asians work hard’)
(Marwick 2015: 155). In addition what can be at play in such particular
displays of classed hard work are attempts to make up for the deﬁcits of
neoliberal meritocracy: its disempowerments in terms of ethnicity and
gender as well as class, as we explored in chapter 2.
In her astute book Framing Class, Diana Kendall examines how American
media represents wealth and poverty, demonstrating the overwhelming
tendency of the majority of mainstream media forms to encourage their
audience to identify with the middle class, be awestruck at the elites, and
pity or condemn the poor (Kendall 2005). Kendall traces tendencies in
media production, such as how the 1980s US TV series Lifestyles of the Rich
and Famous used framing techniques that became popular with TV networks
in the 2000s, and identiﬁes a range of diﬀerent media frames of the rich,
including ‘admiration framing’ and ‘price-tag framing’ (Kendall 2005: 29–53).
Where does this interest in the super-rich, that we are invited to join and
participate in, come from? In their recent work developing what they term
‘critical luxury studies’, John Armitage and Joanne Roberts argue that not
only is luxury relative but that the desire for it is distinctly modern. Luxury
has a distinct status in the modern era in the West which is related to
changing Judeo-Christian notions of desire. In the pre-modern era, they
write, desire was predominantly thought of as sinful, yet in the modern era,
desire came to be a deﬁnite element in the modern imagination and thus
‘the engine and chief instrument of human morality’ (Armitage and Roberts
2016: 4; Berry 1994, 2016). Luxury was to be used as a vitalising, animating
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force for modern capitalism and as such was also to be condemned for being
part of the machinery of such inequality. As they put it, we have seen ‘the
development of new social graces for the superrich alongside new social
disgraces’ (Armitage and Roberts 2016: 13).
Intrigue can therefore be generated through diﬀerence – ‘they have more
money than you and this is what they do’ – and through desire, along with
condemnation. The fact that having a bountiful material life can be very
pleasurable and in Armitage and Goodman’s words oﬀer ‘extreme comfort’
will for many sound like a positive and desirable state. Such feelings are not
incompatible with anti-capitalism. Kristin Ross’s analysis of the demands of
the 1871 Paris Commune foregrounds its vision of ‘communal luxury’ and
the elaboration and continuation of the ideas by thinkers and doers like Karl
Marx and William Morris – all the way to contemporary protests and
campaigns to reclaim privatised public space (Ross 2015). For Jeremy Gilbert,
Oscar Wilde’s variety of socialism oﬀers an alternative to social conservation
or neoliberal individualism, foregrounding aesthetics and advocating socialism
‘not just because it is just or good, but because it would make us all freer
and our lives more sensuously pleasurable’ (Gilbert 2014). The recent
popularity on the left of the phrases ‘luxury communism for all’ and ‘fully
automated luxury communism’ envisages a society that deploys technology
to do the most tedious boring work and spreads around the more interesting
work and consumer goods with a radical egalitarianism (Merchant 2015;
Novara Media 2014; Srnicek and Williams 2015).
The displays of wealth referred to above are, of course, not the fruits of a
generous collective welfare state, the consequence of a radical egalitarian use
of technology or the result of a venture in co-operative ethical manu-
facturing. They are the handed-down fruits of late capitalist appropriation
and exploitation. Many of the people on Rich Kids of Instagram are children
of billionaires who gained their wealth through unearned income. Lim, for
instance, is widely rumoured to be Singaporean billionaire Peter Lim’s son
(Marwick 2015).
In addition there is the issue that whilst luxury for all is undoubtedly an
enticing prospect, in an era of excessive generation of carbon dioxide, the
world pays the environmental price for luxury. As the expression goes, if
the whole world bought as many consumer goods as the US, we would need
four planets (McDonald 2015). Whilst the production of carbon dioxide is
the result of the use of cement in building production, deforestation and the
pollution of dirty energy as much as it is from consumer goods, the factor of
environmentalism cannot be written out of any study of material excess and
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indeed needs to be central to discussions of it (Humphrey 2010; Goodman
et al. 2016).
The new rich are different
Some strands of the rich are more prominent than others. Financial elites
are often not conspicuously individualised or facialised: they lurk in the
shadows, as the title of Janine R. Wedel’s book on ‘how the world’s new
power brokers undermine democracy, government and the free market’,
Shadow Elite, puts it (Wedel 2009). The publication in 2016 of the ‘Panama
papers’, the leak of 11.5 million ﬁles from Mossack Fonesca, the world’s
fourth biggest oﬀshore law ﬁrm, provided an insight into the faceless rich by
showing many of the routes through which they avoid paying tax by
exploiting oﬀshore tax havens (Harding 2016). Notably, some of the actual
people on Rich Kids of Instagram inadvertently landed their parents in hot
water when the tax oﬃce wanted to know why a particular yacht or car did
not feature in their accounts (Marwick 2015).
Whilst these strategies are deployed by the super-rich, more people are
becoming poor, and proportionally the poor have been getting poorer. At
times unearned income is very obviously directly produced from the poor.
As Andrew Ross puts it in his account of contemporary indebtedness, this is
epitomised by the high-interest payday loans, their stores now peppering
the urban landscape:
Payday loan stores were virtually unheard of in the 1980s. Now there
are more in the US than McDonald’s restaurants, and they are con-
centrated in low-income minority neighborhoods, though, as the
economy worsens, they are cropping up on Main Street and in the strip
malls of middle-class suburbia.
(Ross 2013: 88)
In the US, what is sometimes termed ‘the criminalisation of poverty’ has
expanded as ‘a third of US states now jail people for not paying oﬀ their
debts, even for minor infractions like traﬃc ﬁnes’ (Ross 2013: 91–92).
Against this backdrop, numerous representations of the rich, as we have
seen throughout this chapter, depict them as a very palatable and accessible
constituency. Whilst this in itself is not completely new, there are signiﬁcant
historical diﬀerences in how the rich tend to be presented now in the
Global North from in the past.
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Take, for example, the story of Annie, a narrative which has had several
incarnations over the past century. In 1924, the New York Daily News pub-
lished Little Orphan Annie, a comic strip by Harold Gray, which during the
1930s became the most popular comic strip in the US (Gray 2008; Young
and Young 2007: 107).7 Its main characters are Daddy Warbucks, the
benevolent, emotionally challenged multi-millionaire; plucky Orphan Annie,
the kid he sporadically looks after; and Sandy, her oversized dog; alongside
an assorted retinue of women and self-consciously ‘Oriental’ villains and
sidekicks. It has from its beginnings been ‘one of the most conservative and
topical comic strips ever to grace the pages of American newspapers’
(Young and Young 2007: 297; see Schulman 2012; Rothman 2014). Pro-
duced in the Great Depression, it is sentimental noir, with trouble and
danger lurking round every corner, with the curiously blank-eyed Annie
(devoid of pupils) showing that ‘hard work and self-reliance, or grit, a
popular word for the times, provide the keys to happiness’ (Young and
Young 2007: 297).
Annie’s ongoing romanticisation of the rich–poor divide, in all its incar-
nations, is perhaps epitomised by the theme tune from the late 1970s
musical, based on the comic strip, which was popularised by the 1982 ﬁlm.
‘Tomorrow!’ is a song about how, as things might well get better tomor-
row, we do not really need major social change today. Annie the comic
strip targeted organised labour, unions and President Roosevelt’s New Deal
policies with vigour. For instance, 1935 saw ‘the demise of a sympathetic
kind-hearted inventor, trampled to death by an anti-capitalist mob’, and, in
the 1940s, Daddy Warbucks was depicted literally dying of disappointment
when FDR was elected, although he was later resurrected (much like the
character Bobby Ewing in Dallas) (Heer 2011: 5)
It is notable that Annie has been most vigorously resurrected and become
particularly popular at key times of capitalist crisis: the 1920s/30s (when
alongside the comic strip, two ﬁlms were made and it became a long-running
radio show); the late 1970s/80s (when a popular Broadway musical was
made and turned into one of the ﬁrst ﬁlms I remember being taken to the
cinema as a child to see, featuring a red-haired Annie in 1930s context, all
puce and grey clothes) and the present, when the musical has again been
updated and turned into a ﬁlm set in present-day New York.8
The most recent version, the 2014 ﬁlm, is set in the present-day US and is
telling of the contemporary conjuncture. In this version, neither Annie nor
Daddy Warbucks have to be white; instead, they are played by black actors
Quvenzhané Wallis and Jamie Foxx. The opening scene has a nice joke
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about this fact as it pictures kids in school doing their history presentations,
and a spoilt, white, redheaded, show-oﬀ Annie is shunted out of the way.
At the same time, however, the opening scene also shows the new Annie
doing her history presentation: a presentation where she tells her classmates
that FDR redistributed wealth to all the poor people. But, she tells the class
at the end, he also let the rich get even richer. This is a jaw-dropping piece
of conservative revisionism about the New Deal and the man who intro-
duced a piece of legislation in 1935 popularly known as the ‘soak the rich
tax’ (Heale 1999: 32).9 In this neoliberal meritocratic version of Annie,
everyone has opportunity, regardless of their skin colour and getting wildly
rich never ever hurts the poor.
As in the other versions, this ﬁlm works to justify the behaviour of elites
and rehumanise the sterile billionaire through his acquisition of a nuclear
family. At the same time it is astonishingly revealing of the imaginary of the
1%. What the producers (including Will Smith and Jay-Z) and director
(Will Gluck) imagine it is like to be poor is living in a large Brooklyn
brownstone, worth millions, with an interior clad with fairy lights and
messiness very like a middle-class bohemian house. A key diﬀerence from
the 1982 version, then, is that they appear no longer able to actually ima-
gine what poverty even looks like.
Annie, then, is a story which has been vigorously resurrected at key
moments of capitalist crisis, one which oﬀers a very conservative, reassuring
narrative about the problems of capitalism and the benevolent super-rich.
Yet there are particularly signiﬁcant features about the present-day version.
It has little awareness of actual poverty. It stokes the post-racial myth of it
being easy for black citizens to achieve billionaire status, by themselves,
eliding the problems of the meritocratic deﬁcit and social poverty. It promotes
an abstract idea of equality together with promoting the ability to become
super-rich, and separates out these features as being totally unconnected.
These are powerful myths of neoliberal meritocracy; myths which have
considerable cultural traction. It is part of a post-crash reaction that needs to
be compared to those of the past. As Andrew Sayer writes:
whereas then the reaction under the US New Deal was to impose high
taxes on the rich and tightly regulate ﬁnance, this time round neither of
these things are happening on either side of the Atlantic. The rich have
got away with it and the ﬁnancial sector is free to do more damage
again.
(Sayer 2016: 5)
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Warren Buﬀett, the US billionaire, puts it another way: ‘there’s class warfare,
all right. But it’s my class, the rich class, that’s making war, and we’re win-
ning’ (Stein 2006). Whereas reaction in the US after the 1930s crash, as
Sayer outlines, involved the relief and support systems of the New Deal and
curbing the practices of the super-rich, today there has been no signiﬁcant
undermining of the powers of the wealthy. Indeed, the ﬂourishing of the
ultra-wealthy has been continually enabled whilst socialised provision con-
tinues to come under repeated attack. It is an attack which happens by
stealth, and the super-rich continue to promote an idea that we can all get
to the top; that society is still equal, even though we have to knuckle down
and work even harder to rise; where eﬀorts to appear ordinary, to appear
‘one of us’, as hardworking and meritocratic are remarkably strenuous.
However, it is interesting that the newer Annie ﬁlm has been widely
panned.10 It does not convince. This is part of a wider formation: as the
social ladder lengthens, the top rungs more obviously out of reach, neoliberal
meritocracy, and indeed the possibility of meritocracy, is less believable than it
used to be. Yet whilst popular parables of neoliberal meritocracy are
increasingly framed and perceived as unrealistic and are ﬁnding it harder to
gain traction, the neoliberal meritocratic narratives of the ultra-rich – the
popular parables of normcore plutocrats, benevolent parents and bling
kings – are used as a powerful weapon in their arsenal of strategies to
maintain and extend their wealth and power.
Given the extent of this expanding inequality alongside the predominance
of positive representations of the super-rich, what are the alternatives?
Here we might consider the representations of ‘fat cats’ and ‘fat pigs’. These
have been widely circulated images in relation to CEOs and bankers in
particular (Littler 2007). They have had an important role in popularising
the conception that the super-rich can be a negative social force and oﬀset
the array of positive images promoted by mainstream media which over-
whelmingly tend to be owned by the super-rich or dependent on their
advertising money. The array of negative images could be widened; indeed,
this is partly why the idea of the 1% was so successful, providing another
vivid image and conceptualisation of the problem of the expanding super-rich.
Perhaps these images could be expanded further: an array of conceptualisa-
tions for an array of contexts. (Where are the images of the rich as a hoover,
sucking up collective wealth, for example?) At the same time, demarcating
bad behaviour as an abstract evil can only take us so far. Andrew Sayer
argues that instead of demonising individuals ‘we need a new line of attack,
one that focuses on the institutions and practices that allow this to happen’
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(Sayer 2016: 19). There is also a need for demarcating and popularising
alternatives. I begin to explore both of these themes in the following
chapters.
Notes
1 Stein 2006.
2 Discussing Marx’s description of a rentier economy, Jeremy Valentine wryly
notes: ‘of course Marx missed a dialectical trick by not anticipating the growth
of capitalism into a system of ﬁnance capital autonomous from industrial produc-
tion such that money has become a commodity in its own right, or rather, debt
has’ (Valentine 2007).
3 CEOs are today sometimes known as presidents; indeed, this conﬂation between
the corporation and the nation-state is one of a wide range of reasons why
Donald Trump was able to gain the US presidency.
4 After the UK-based upper-middle-class / mid-market clothing company Boden,
which often markets itself around a traditional, conservative and fairly white idea
of Britishness (www.boden.co.uk. Accessed 2 March 2017).
5 Take for example its reaction to the robbery of Kim Kardashian, when it ran
articles including glamourous pictures and suggested Kim was asking to be
robbed (Mail Online 2016).
6 http://richkidsoﬁnstagram.com. Accessed 3 March 2017. Rich Kids of Instagram
also has a presence on Facebook, Twitter and Instagram itself.
7 The title was taken from a much more gothic poem, ‘Little Orphant Annie’,
written by James Whitcomb Riley in 1885, in which naughty children are
snatched away by goblins. In the 1930s Little Orphan Annie became a radio series
(1931–1942) and two ﬁlms were also made, directed by John S. Robertson
(1932) and John Speaks (1938).
8 There was also a straight-to-DVD sequel, Annie: A Royal Adventure, directed by
Ian Toynton (1995) and a Disney made-for-TV movie, Annie, directed by Rob
Marshall (1999).
9 This was the 1935 Revenue Act which raised tax on higher-income levels and
was also known as the ‘wealth tax’.
10 For instance, the Rotten Tomatoes website, which collates ﬁlm reviews and
provides aggregate scores of critical and audience approval, scored the 2014
Annie ﬁlm at 29% overall, and counted 104 negative out of the 143 reviews it
assessed (Rotten Tomatoes n.d.).
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5
#DAMONSPLAINING AND
THE UNBEARABLE WHITENESS
OF MERIT
The possessive investment in whiteness [is] a poisonous system of privilege
that pits people against each other and prevents the creation of common
ground.
George Lipsitz1
#Damonsplaining and externalised white male privilege
In September 2015 a scene on the US HBO reality TV show Project
Greenlight, in which novice ﬁlmmakers compete to win the chance to make
a feature ﬁlm, caused a brief social-media storm. In the scene, the judges – a
room of white men, plus one white and one black woman – discuss which
director should be hired. Eﬃe Brown, award-winning producer of In the
Cut (2003) and Dear White People (2014), gently but ﬁrmly raises the issue of
diversity. She suggests the people in the room ‘need to think, whoever this
director is, about how they’re going to treat … the only black person [in
the movie] being a prostitute hit by her white pimp. I want to make sure
that you’re looking at this group, right here [in the room]; at who you’re
picking, and at the story that you’re doing’ (HBO 2015: ep. 1). Brown’s
encouragement to this overwhelmingly white male room to be reﬂexive
about both the racialised dynamics of the script and its production crew is
cut short by the white Hollywood actor and producer Matt Damon, who
very assertively talks across her so she cannot ﬁnish her sentence. Damon
tells her why the directorial team she is thinking of – a Vietnamese man and
a white woman – is simply not appropriate. Whilst Brown, several times, tries
to ﬁnish her thread, Damon continues cutting across her speech, telling her:
When we’re talking about diversity, we do it in the casting of the ﬁlm,
not in the casting of the show. Do you want the best director?
(HBO 2015: ep. 1)
Accounts of this incident blew up very quickly online and on social media.
It provided a graphic and instructive vignette of how white male privilege
can be perpetuated by attempting to silence women and people who are not
white (combined with a stunning lack of reﬂexivity about the speaker’s own
position). It is instructive to pick apart the hypocrisy of Damon’s intervention.
It involves a white man cutting oﬀ a black woman from speaking, in order to
lecture her on the ‘correct’, singular, meaning of diversity in ﬁlmmaking
practice and to unequivocally assert that diversity in ﬁlm production does
not matter at all. ‘Ooof!’ replied Brown in response, remaining remarkably
composed, whilst visibly incredulous, at this verbal and cultural slapdown.
The rise in popular feminist and anti-racist activisms, combined with
expanding publicity of the dramatic exclusions of the media industries,
provided a very fertile context for the incident to be satirised. The hashtag
#Damonsplaining began to trend on Twitter. ‘Damonsplaining’ was a variant
of ‘mansplaining’, a term originally coined in 2008 after the author Rebecca
Solnit wrote a widely shared article discussing how a man at a party
repeatedly patronised her by lecturing her on a subject she had written a
book on – even continuing at length when he had been told she wrote the
book he was telling her about (Solnit 2014: 14).2 ‘Mansplaining’, a description
resonating with many other women who had similar experiences of being
patronised by men explaining things to them that they already knew, gained
widespread traction, becoming one of the New York Times’ ‘Words of the
Year’ in 2010 (Sifton and Barrett 2010).
‘Mansplaining’ describes how the culturally blind overconﬁdence of
people who tend to have the most social power can translate into patron-
ising, undervaluing and downgrading the intelligence of others in the
micro-contexts of everyday life. This meaning, combined with its conjoined
nature (‘man’ + ‘explaining’), made it an easily adaptable term to talk about
race. Thus ‘whitesplaining’ was born, a word which ﬁt well in what Solnit
termed ‘the archipelago of arrogance’ (Solnit 2014: 8). The popular online
Urban Dictionary deﬁnes whitesplaining as
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The paternalistic lecture given by Whites toward a person of color
deﬁning what should and shouldn’t be considered racist, while obliv-
iously exhibiting their own racism.
(Urban Dictionary 2010)
Whitesplaining is clearly not a phenomenon conﬁned to the United
States. In an article in the UK’s Daily Telegraph newspaper, for instance,
the media producer Ella Achola reﬂected on her experience of white
people explaining racism to her in Britain and Germany in ‘a con-
descending, overconﬁdent, and often inaccurate or oversimpliﬁed manner’
(Achola 2015).3
In this episode of Project Greenlight Matt Damon was both ‘white-
splaining’ and ‘mansplaining’. The intersection of unequal racialised and
gendered power dynamics was given a further turn of the screw by the
fact it was being conducted by a named Hollywood celebrity. There is
power in the celebrity name. The elevated status of an ‘A-list’ star like
Damon provides him with extensive reputational capital, even though this
exists in a volatile, precarious context: his persona has been expansively
validated through the cultural spaces and places of media power (Couldry
2001; Cross and Littler 2010; Van Krieken 2012). In this case, such power
was being used to diminish others. Consequently this mansplaining/
overweening celebrity/whitesplaining mash-up was ridiculed through a
satirical hashtag on Twitter:
Can Matt Damon tell me why the caged bird sings? #damonsplaining
Viktor T. Kerney @wondermann5 14 September
Can someone get Matt Damon on the phone? I need him to suggest a
good protective style for my hair. #damonsplaining
Unapologetic Negro @HollaBlackGirl 14 September
Damon subsequently issued an apology:
My comments were part of a much broader conversation about diver-
sity in Hollywood and the fundamental nature of Project Greenlight
which did not make the show. … I am sorry that they oﬀended some
people, but, at the very least, I am happy that they started a conversation
about diversity in Hollywood.
(Saul 2015)
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That his actions were ‘oﬀensive’ is registered, but as an apology, this does
little to recognise the nature of the issue. As many children are told, only
saying you are sorry that you made someone sad is not really a proper
apology. Nor does it puncture the hauteur that was part of the problem
itself. To claim to have ‘started a conversation about diversity’ shows little
awareness that this conversation had already been started (and not just by
Eﬃe Brown); continues the claim of ownership of diversity that was such a
large part of the problem in the ﬁrst place; and demonstrates no awareness
of, nor sense of shame about, imperious power dynamics. Apologising for
oﬀence taken rather than for causing hurt ‘silently displaces the blame for
the oﬀense from the oﬀender to those taking oﬀense’ (Goldberg 2015: 80). It
is a liberal response that is ‘happy’ to have ‘a conversation about diversity’ – as
opposed to not being happy to talk about it or inhabiting more overt forms
of racism that do exist. But it does not address any action that might be
taken, nor does it show any sign of even considering the suggestions made
by Brown. Similarly Damon does not apologise for dismissing the whole of
the production process as having any kind of role in the perpetuation of
racialised dynamics: for asserting that the people involved in the production
process do not need to be more diverse.
Why this is so is framed and explained in terms of merit. Immediately
after the Damonsplaining scene in Project Greenlight, the programme cut to a
headshot of Matt Damon speaking alone to camera. In this scene he
acknowledges that he appreciated Brown raising the issue of diversity; but
then comes the ‘but’:
Ultimately if you suddenly change the rules of this competition at the
11th hour, it seems like you would undermine what this project is
about … which is about giving someone this job based entirely
on merit.
(HBO 2015: ep. 1)
‘Merit’ is mobilised here as a neutral, factually objective term, free from the
vagaries of diﬀerent subjective opinions, of cultural value judgements. For
Matt Damon merit is obvious, it is uncontroversial, it is universal: it is
simply that some people – like him – can see it more clearly than others. As
Brittney Cooper put it in her Salon article published soon after the incident:
Damon plays the merit card. The merit card is the white equivalent of a
race card – it is the highest trump card, in a game of spades. Merit is
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the supposedly race neutral rubric that everyone should naturally agree
is the best way to judge candidates, all questions of race aside. The
myth of meritocracy is one of the foundational and erroneous ideals of
white supremacy. Whether we are speaking about increasing racial
access to education or jobs, the term merit is thrown around as though it
exists in opposition to diversity.
(Cooper 2015; my italics)
As we have seen in earlier chapters, ‘merit’ is a profoundly contested term; a
loaded, yet unstable, signiﬁer. And as Cooper so cogently writes, it is, in this
particular example, and in the contemporary conjuncture, being used as if it
is diametrically opposed to diversity. In the following sections I want to
unravel something of the history, background and context of this racialised
usage of ‘merit’ to help consider how this construction operates and is being
disrupted in the present.
To do this, the chapter considers neoliberal meritocracy’s racialisation in a
number of ways. First, drawing on David Theo Goldberg’s work on the
post-racial, it discusses the racialisation of merit as an abstract category;
second, it considers these processes in relation to the ascribed merit of cultural
products; third, it relates this incident to the racialised exclusions of cultural
production in the media industries; and, ﬁnally, it analyses the viral status of
this event. The chapter reads the Damonsplaining incident as both an arch
example of a discourse of neoliberal post-racial meritocracy and also of its
rupture. In doing so, then, it explores the question: how is meritocracy
racialised in contemporary neoliberal culture, and what are the meanings of
its disruption?
Post-racial meritocracy
That ‘race’ is a ﬁction is nicely illustrated by the sheer geographical and
historical mobility of racialised stereotypes of merit in terms of intelligence:
‘in Japan Koreans are “dull”, while in the US Koreans are “bright”; Jews in
America were “dull” 75 years ago but are among the cognitive elite today’
(Fischer et al. 1996: 19–20). Today there is widespread agreement on the
lack of validity of race as a key means to classify human diﬀerences (Gilroy
1997; Osborne and Sandford 2002; Rattansi 2007). There is also an extensive
body of work tracing the geneaologies of ‘race’ – as an invented category
that was primarily used as an instrument of social domination – through
various eras including European modernity, scientiﬁc Enlightenment
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rationality, nineteenth-century governmentality and imperial expansion
(Bernasconi 2001; Hall 1997; Hannaford 1996).
But whilst race is a ﬁction, the catastrophic eﬀects of eighteenth- and
nineteenth-century concepts of race mean that its legacies are only too
palpably felt. In the US, these processes of racialisation structured the vio-
lence of slavery and of segregation. In the post-civil-rights era, their legacies
persist through savage inequalities and subtle forms of cultural racism. Overt
discrimination was outlawed in the 1964 Civil Rights Act and piecemeal
legislation has been introduced since attempting to tackle discrimination in a
range of other spheres (Goldberg 2009).
Since the 1970s, in the US the appearance of non-whites in professions
formerly reserved by whites for whites (including the president) became a
media-ampliﬁed reality. The idea that we do and should live in a multi-
cultural society gained enough traction to become common sense for vast
swathes of the population. At the same time, multiculturalism as an ideal
was embraced by neoliberal marketeers as a means to sell goods. Neoliberal
capitalism has not been backward in attempting to commodify the impulses
and desires of these social movements (Gilroy 2013; Hesse 2000). Some
anti-racist demands – like other demands from the 1968 generation around
gender and sexuality – have been met. But many others clearly have not.
New variants of racism (alongside misogyny and class disparagement) have
only too palpably moved into the ascendant.
As in much of Europe, the threat of ‘terror’ and the neo-imperial wars
that stoked it have facilitated the resurgent racist discourse in some con-
servative and republican quarters that multiculturalism has ‘gone too far’
(Lentin and Titley 2011). If the widening disparities between rich and poor
under the past few decades of neoliberalism have extended racialisation,
inequality and racialised inequalities, it has also helped facilitate the emergence
of new racisms in which ‘certain groups and behaviours … are pathologised
so that they might then be more easily particularised’ (Younge 2011: vi).
There is what Lentin and Titley term ‘the unstated division of subjects into
good diversity … and bad diversity’ (Lentin and Titley 2011: 7). Think of
how the movements of refugees and migrants are mediated on a daily basis.
In the array of new racist variations that have been produced, those coales-
cing in the US around ‘blackness’ have been particularly acute. This is borne
out by stark statistics. One in three black males born in the US today ‘can
expect to go to prison in his lifetime’, and there are currently more black
men in prison than in college (Goldberg 2015: 43). Almost half of black
children in the US live in poverty (Roy 2009; cited in Goldberg 2012:
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205). Rumours that President Obama cannot ‘really’ be American because
of his skin colour prompted the release of a copy of his birth certiﬁcate. The
rates of black Americans being incarcerated and killed by police is widely
reported and vigorously campaigned against through Black Lives Matter
activism. Neoliberal privatisation and the segregating racial state viciously
exacerbated the catastrophic devastation of Hurricane Katrina in New
Orleans. To put it in Kanye West’s words, ‘George Bush doesn’t care about
black people’ (cited in Goldberg 2009: 91).4
At the same time, the hegemonic norm of the neoliberal contract in the US,
like Europe, has been that everyone should have ‘equality of opportunity’. The
racialised expression of this contract has been the idea of being post-race: that
we have equal opportunities existing for everyone regardless of their skin
colour or ethnicity. It is a fragile discourse and one constructed through a
selective blindness to inequalities of power in the past and the present. Indeed,
an analogous term used in critical race theory is that of ‘colourblind racism’
(Gallagher 2003; Omi and Winant 1994; Valdez 2015). For Goldberg, post-
raciality is a discourse in which racisms have morphed into a new form, one
which ‘turn[s] the spotlight of attention away from the structural constitution
of America made and marked by race’ (Goldberg 2012: 205). Arguing that ‘the
post-racial is a “hyper-condition” of our times, the neo in neo-liberalism’
(Goldberg 2012: 203), Goldberg writes that race has become an indication of
what cannot be politically dealt with. Key to its functioning is the erasure of
the histories ‘producing the formations of racial power and privilege, burying
them alive but out of recognizable reach’ (Goldberg 2015: 101).
The post-racial as theorised by Goldberg ﬁts well with my theorisation of
neoliberal meritocracy. Neoliberal meritocracy and post-racialism are both
wishful myths denying massive structural inequalities. They are combined,
articulated and fused through what might be termed ‘post-racial neoliberal
meritocracy’. Just as the myth of meritocracy mobilises the idea of a level
playing ﬁeld in terms of class, then, so too does it mobilise the idea of
equality of opportunity in terms of race. As the ﬁeld is nowhere near level –
despite the gains since civil rights – these actually existing inequalities are
wished away in post-racial discourses. As Goldberg points out, whilst ‘it was
naïve to think that ﬁve hundred years of cemented racisms could be dis-
mantled in the wink of an election or two’ it is also ‘more revealing to ask:
what work is the postracial doing?’ (Goldberg 2015: 68). By envisaging
racism as ‘a stain on the social fabric, to be wished away as quickly as pos-
sible’, the structural problems and racialised inequalities are not addressed
and white privilege is reinforced.
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The Damonsplaining incident exempliﬁes the post-racial, carrying all the
ambivalence of the liberal tradition it is part of. Matt Damon did not con-
sciously want to be racist. Project Greenlight was full of white men. Eﬃe Brown
was included as a judge, both in recognition of her extensive experience
and in this particular context as a visible gesture to distance the show and its
players from racism. But the incident made it very clear that Brown’s pre-
sence was as far as the show was prepared to go to address racism in the
media industries. It was to be a token gesture: any further racialised
inequalities were not up for discussion or debate.
The post-racial condition, in which the category of race and its legacies
are erased in favour of a fantasy of equal harmony without addressing the
ingrained lingering injustices of the racial, is, as Goldberg argues, now a
dominant generalised social logic and one that tends to be extended by
default by those inhabiting racialised positions of power – ‘whiteness’ –
unless they are critical and reﬂexive enough (Goldberg 2015: 160). Matt
Damon’s forceful interjection to prevent any consideration whatsoever of
racialised injustices being addressed during the production process ﬁts only
too neatly into this paradigm. Equally tellingly, Damon’s co-producer on
Project Greenlight, the white Hollywood actor Ben Aﬄeck, received publicity
in 2015 for an incident shaped by similar post-racial logic. After a 2014
guest appearance on the PBS TV show Finding Your Roots, in which
celebrity family histories are traced, memos between Sony boss and host of
the show Henry Louis Gates Jr. were anonymously published on Wikileaks
revealing how Aﬄeck wanted to cover up the fact that one of his ancestors
owned slaves. (Notably, at least three other celebrities had already appeared
on the show discussing their slave-owning relatives). Instead, Aﬄeck chose
to highlight a distant ancestor who was a spiritualist at the time of the Civil
War and his mother’s work as a ‘freedom rider’ (civil rights activists who
rode non-segregated buses in parts of the south where racist violence was
rife and segregation was still being culturally adhered to even after it was
illegal).5 Aﬄeck later published a statement declaring he was ‘embarrassed’
about the connection (Collins 2015).
With diﬀerent inﬂections (Aﬄeck’s subsequent apology for suppressing it
appeared to acknowledge the importance of engaging with the legacies of
the past, which whilst gestural is more than can be said for Damon’s non-
apology) such behaviour occupies the similar wishful post-racial ground in
which a white person both beneﬁts from a racialised legacy of power
and wishes to erase any discussion of that racialised beneﬁt (Lipsitz 1998). It
is a white liberal position which wants to side against racism – thus
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appointing Eﬃe Brown, thus feting connections to civil rights activists – but
which does not want to interrogate any of its own privilege nor the ugly
exploitative constituent context of such privilege. Such whiteness ﬁnds not
only racism ‘unbearable’ but also its legacies and its own imbrications in
these histories: and in doing so unwittingly extends the logic of racist
inequalities. It is this uneven ground from which merit is judged.
The racialisation of merit: people
How is merit racialised? Merit is both a value judgement and a term that aﬀects
who is permitted to act and how. Contemporary narratives of meritocracy, as
we have seen, often work through the assumption that talent and intelligence
are primarily inborn abilities that are either given the chance to succeed or
not. In other words, meritocratic discourse can mobilise a very essentialised
conception of ability which ignores or downplays both social context and
the role social context has in deciding what merit might be. When Matt
Damon says ‘Do you want the best director?’ the argument is that there is to
be no argument as to what ‘the best’ means. But the best is a product of its
context, and that context is racialised.
There are numerous examples of how the racialisation of merit has a long
and problematic history in the US. One place it is particularly marked is
education. Take, for example, Harvard University admissions. At the
beginning of the nineteenth century, Harvard’s new president Charles
William Eliot, increasingly annoyed at getting applications from what he
called ‘the stupid sons of the rich’, abolished the part of the test that was in
Greek and tripled the number of locations where it was possible to sit it.
The result was many more public-school students, including more Catholics
and Jews, applied (Guinier 2015: 14).
In the 1920s, a racist panic over the slight erosion of WASP privilege
emerged. Because of the perceived ‘Jewish problem’ the tests were reformed
again under a new president, Lawrence Lowell. Crucially, at this juncture,
Harvard insisted on introducing the criteria of having a ‘well-rounded
character’ and of including photos, with all the attached scope for ideologi-
cally loaded connotations to play a far greater part in the selection procedure
(Guinier 2015: 15). Initially a ‘method to limit Jewish enrollment’ (Guinier
2015: 15) the amorphous criteria of a ‘well-rounded’ character and the lack
of phenotypical anonymity turned selection into a biopolitical process.
‘Well-rounded’ is a term similar to ‘merit’: a big, baggy capacious term
with extensive scope for plural deﬁnitions. If what is meant by it is not
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deﬁned and it intersects with racialisation, this capaciousness becomes both a
hiding place and a conduit for bias and abuse. In the 1990s, the ‘bell curve’
thesis of Hernstein and Murray received widespread publicity for appearing
to indicate that the jury was out on whether ‘ethnic minority’ IQs could be
lower than those of white. A range of inﬂammatory media reports seized on
their suggestions with barely concealed racist glee. It helped fuel neo-
conservative campaigns to dismantle race-based equity programmes (Valdez
2015; Omi and Winant 1994). The collaborative book Inequality by Design:
Cracking the Bell Curve Myth later exploded such assumptions by exhaus-
tively demonstrating, through its detailed multifaceted analysis, how ‘a racial
or ethnic group’s position in society determines its measured intelligence
rather than vice versa’ (Fischer et al. 1996: 173). Subordination leads to low
performance in such tests of merit, Fischer and his colleagues wrote, because
there are ‘three consequences of caste: deprivation, segregation and stigma’.
Socio-economic deprivation results in poor health and educational potential;
segregation concentrates disadvantage and accentuates it; the stigma of
inferiority based on the wider society’s perception of produces cultural and
psychological wounds (Fischer et al. 1996: 174). Inequality by Design also
discussed the profound limitations of the IQ test itself (originally designed for
army cadets) and its singular version of intelligence, as most psychometric tests
use a wide range of conceptions of intelligence (Fischer et al. 1996: 174).
The idea of merit is then related to the power dynamics of its context, a
context which in the modern era has been racialised in various ways. Whilst
the historical prejudices with college admissions tests now take diﬀerent
forms, their legacies linger. Christopher Hayes calls today’s American SATS
‘aﬃrmative action for the white middle classes’ because of the degree of
pre-test tuition privileged families can put in to pass this supposedly ‘merito-
cratic’ test (Hayes 2012: 58). The lawyer and civil-rights scholar Lani Guinier
advocates countering the unevenness both through admissions process and
in the structure of teaching and education itself. In her book The Tyranny of
the Meritocracy she calls for an end to the ‘testocracy’: for a far less stratiﬁed
educational system and for the mobilisation of what she calls ‘democratic
merit’, involving more collaborative methods of collective teaching and
learning (Guinier 2015).
In the case of Damonsplaining, ‘merit’ is mobilised as a term which is
ostensibly colour-blind and neutral. It ﬁts with the post-racial neoliberal
dream which simultaneously uses criteria that privilege white men. As
Goldberg remarked in an interview, ‘whiteness has continued to deﬁne the
career of merit and therefore meritocracy’ (Searls Giroux 2006: 44). This
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contemporary formation of post-racial neoliberal meritocracy moulds and is
shaped by the liberal belief that racism is in the past at the very same time as
merit is once again being re-coded as white. The ostensible neutrality of the
term it is mobilised to conceal the morphed racisms that ﬁt into the cate-
gory of ‘the best’ and in doing so draws on a long history of racialised merit.
The racialisation of merit: products
The location of merit, according to Matt Damon, is ostensibly to be found
in ‘the product itself’, which includes the actors but not any earlier or other
stage in the production process. This paradoxical statement will be con-
sidered in relation to the people involved in production below, but ﬁrst I
want to pause to consider the issue of the racialisation of merit in relation to
the status of the product.
In Damon’s discourse, things of merit are completely separate from
questions of diversity. Indeed, they will be diluted, diminished or polluted,
if considerations of diversity are brought into contact with them. This is a
logic that has been used for some time in the canon-formation of ‘great art’:
a complex subjective rationale, used in a multitude of conscious and
unconscious ways to judge and appreciate, becomes codiﬁed and passed on
as ‘greatness’, whilst the criteria being used often remain far less examined
and pass as ‘natural’. It is also a set of criteria – as decades worth of work by
art historians, literary critics and ﬁlm theorists has shown – which is itself
profoundly culturally, historically and socially speciﬁc and which has distinct
power dynamics (Nochlin 2015). As Griselda Pollock put it (writing about
art), ‘the canon is political in its patterns of exclusion’ (Pollock 1999: 6).
These exclusionary politics are racialised and gendered.
The canon of great, universal (and English) literature, for example, was
largely invented in the twentieth century by white male literary critics such
as F.R. Leavis and favoured elevating a very small group of literary works as
oﬀering exquisite insights into the nature of ‘universal’ human experience,
rather than a more inclusive, open approach – thus facilitating a particularly
kind of literary snobbery and conservative political outlook (Leavis 2011).6
‘English literature’ developed as an area of study in the nineteenth century
as a pursuit with a social mission: one providing a form of soft power that
would keep imperial wives busy and attempt to ‘civilise the natives’ (Baldick
1983). The sheer amount of eﬀort in maintaining a few texts by a few
white British upper- and upper-middle-class people as exclusively repre-
senting the best is striking. To say this is not to argue that such works do
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not have merit; rather, it is to highlight what an exclusive and narrow
deﬁnition of merit was being used.
Canons of great ﬁlm are more recent than those of literature and are
therefore subject to the social mores of their diﬀerent time and contexts,
most having been constructed from the early twentieth century onwards
(David Bordwell, cited in Davis et al. 2015: 385). Yet here too there is a
recurrent pronounced bias towards ﬁlms with white directors and actors.
For example, in the ﬁlm magazine Sight and Sound’s 2012 top 10, the only
ﬁlm with a non-white, non Anglo-US director, or indeed non-white lead
actors, was Tokyo Story directed by Ozu Yasujiro in 1953. Films like La
Haine or The Battle of Algiers for example – both often regarded as ground-
breaking works in terms of aesthetic innovation and cinematic style – could
easily ﬁt in the bracket of cinematic ‘high culture’ that the Sight and Sound
top 10 was obviously lauding, yet they did not make the cut.
Project Greenlight is not a show which aims primarily at producing
instantly canonical ﬁlms. Yet, in mobilising terms of ‘worth’ and ‘merit’, it
draws on such chains of association, chains of equivalence about what
quality in ﬁlms might be. Its conversation takes place in relation to a ﬁlmic
landscape of Hollywood cinema which has historically over-privileged
whiteness both in terms of production and representation (Bernadi 2007;
Hamilton and Block 2003; Negra and Asava 2013). The perpetuation of
reductively racialised roles has been the subject of decades worth of scholarly
attention (Bogle 2001, 2006; Dyer 1997; Hall 1997; Young 1995). As
Donald Bogle’s classic work Toms, Coons, Mulattoes, Mammies and Bucks: An
Interpretative History of Blacks in American Films highlights, this tradition
stretches back to the inception of American cinema: in 1903 Uncle Tom’s
Cabin featured a man in blackface; in 1915 D.W Griﬃth’s ‘epic’ Birth of a
Nation, one of the highest grossing ﬁlms of all time, presented black
Americans as aliens and the Klu Klux Klan as a heroic force and was widely
credited with increasing lynchings in 1915 before it was banned in 19 cities
(Bogle 2001: 1, 10–18; Fields and Fields 2012: 1–2). (Bogle writes of
watching The Birth of a Nation many decades later ‘with a black audience
that openly cheered for the black villains to defeat the white heroes’ [Bogle
2001: xxiv]). It is in relation to this long backdrop that Eﬃe Brown makes
her comments in Project Greenlight about the need to ‘take care’ with the
ﬁgure of the black prostitute.
Deﬁnitions of what things – what objects, what creative experiences,
what narratives – had merit, were, as a range of historians and sociologists
have pointed out, in turn shaped by the wider discourses and formulations
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of Western modernity from at least the sixteenth century, which were
profoundly racialised and gendered in their conceptions of scientiﬁc reason
and progress (Bhambra 2007, 2014; Hall 1997; Gilroy 1993; Ware 1992).
As we will discuss below, this is because of the associations that became
connected or articulated to the people who made them. As Ali Rattansi
puts it – whilst carefully tracing the evolution of Western modernity – by
the mid-nineteenth century,
women, blacks and the ‘lower orders’ were all classiﬁed together as
child-like, overly subject to the ‘passions’, incapable of rationality and
thus requiring strict government by white upper classes.
(Rattansi 2007: 38)
Assessing the work of a ﬁlm ‘entirely on merit’ is therefore not a simple
objective process but a complex judgement parlaying a number of diﬀerent
criteria. These criteria could be discussed and analysed. In many cases,
however – as with Matt Damon’s statement – they are not. When they are
not, the criteria remain abstract, diﬀuse, unknown. This is the way pro-
nouncements of greatness can stand, self-importantly, with the racialised
codings that implicitly inform them perpetuating themselves. ‘Do you want
the best director?’ is a closed question: its terms do not permit debating
what the best is, just responding ‘Yes’ or ‘No’. The word ‘merit’ is, in
Cooper’s phrase, ‘thrown around as if it exists in opposition to diversity’
(Cooper 2015) precisely because the question of diversity threatens it. It
threatens to expose its neutrality as a ﬁction. In this construction as neutral,
scientiﬁc, a construction handed down since the Enlightenment, merit
mutates in its actual application whilst remaining hermetically sealed as a
term: its very point is to act as a safeguard against a reduction in privilege on
the part of those wielding it.
The racialisation of merit: production
It may seem unfair to submit Matt Damon’s comments to such extensive
criticism when more obviously racist targets clearly exist. However, I pick
apart Damon’s responses because of the potential insight this incident oﬀers
into the racialisation of merit as a category and its liberal contortions.
Damon’s closed question/challenge ‘Do you want the best director?’, as we
have seen, positions being the most skilled in creating an end product as a
neutral, non-racialised and wholly objective issue, a skill some are more
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equipped to see than others. Having considered something of how merit is
racialised in terms of the creative product, we now need to think about
how these processes aﬀect the people who are, or are not, permitted to
make them: in terms of ﬁlm production, diversity in the cultural industries
more broadly and the wider issue of the racialisation of merit and who is
allowed to possess it.
Who is permitted to be a cultural worker is a critical and contradictory
issue in Damon’s diatribe. It is an issue that is the direct subject of the show
itself – it is, after all, a competition in which people compete to have their
ﬁlm made, and in the process to become professional ﬁlmmakers. Yet whilst
the importance of who is permitted to become a ﬁlmmaker is the pro-
gramme’s ostensible concern, Damon’s diatribe simultaneously dismisses the
work of people behind the scenes as not at all important when it comes to
questions of diversity (‘when we’re talking about diversity, we do it in the
casting of the ﬁlm, not in the casting of the show’). In this logic, reprodu-
cing racialised inequalities, not creating racist culture, is something which
can only be tackled by which actors play the parts in the ﬁlm, rather than in
terms of the ethnicity of who directs or produces it.
It is notable that Project Greenlight broadcast its ﬁrst three seasons between
2001 and 2005 with a cast of overwhelmingly white male judges and
mentors, as well as contestants.7 Most spectacularly, Season 3 featured a
panel of eight white men deciding which white male director to choose
from. After a hiatus of a decade, the show returned to the screen and
gradually became slightly more visibly diverse, with the inclusion in early
episodes of Jennifer Todd (president of Aﬄeck and Damon’s production
company, Pearl Street Films) and, throughout the series, producer Eﬃe
Brown. As Project Greenlight’s executive producer Perrin Chiles stated in a
media interview, the new diversity of the show was a conscious decision
made in the face of criticism about the previous series consisting of ‘a
bunch of white dudes choosing white dudes’ (Easton 2015). Whilst, of
course, not providing a level playing ﬁeld in terms of gender or race, these
inclusions were noteworthy in a media climate which was increasingly
starting to publicise the exclusions of the media industries and in which
those exclusions were in many cases getting worse. Taken together, these
contexts had made the white maleness of Project Greenlight unbearably
visible. Yet still the narrative of the show’s leaders that has to be stuck to,
which Damon voices, is avowedly post-racial: ‘We don’t do diversity in
production.’ No, they clearly do not, despite (and because of) their toke-
nistic attempts. Whilst the programme makes production its ostensible
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subject, then, simultaneously an attempt is made to render ﬁlm production
unimportant in terms of the diversity of the workforce. This contradiction
is partly what the show cannot contain; it is in part why the incident
went viral.
Studies of media production and the conditions and cultures of media
work have recently expanded in some innovative academic directions.
However, as Hesmondhalgh and Saha put it, there remains an ‘alarming’
lack of studies of ethnicity and race in relation to cultural production
(Hesmondhalgh and Saha 2013: 182; see also Downing and Husband 2005;
Thanki and Jeﬀreys 2007). This is indicative not only of the hegemonic
whiteness of the cultural industries but also of those who study it (and the
perspectives of those who study it) in academia. As Vicki Mayer argued in
Production Studies, there need to be more considered analyses of ‘the way
that power operates locally through media production to reproduce hier-
archies and social inequalities at the level of daily interactions’ (Mayer,
Banks and Thornton Caldwell 2009: 15).
One area which recent academic analysis has been good at highlighting is
how the cultural and creative industries cultivate an image of being ‘cool,
creative and egalitarian’ (Gill 2002) whilst in practice, they are anything but.
They are bastions of precarity, oﬀering unstable and short-term work, long
hours and little social protection, and therefore people who work in cultural
industries have been described as ‘poster children of the precariat’ (Gill and
Pratt 2008; Ross 2010; Standing 2014). The cultural industries’ myth of
egalitarian, meritocratic open access is exactly that: a myth. The precarious
conditions, combined with the informal networks of entry, mean that the
sons and daughters of people from wealthy and middle-class backgrounds
are over-represented. As we have seen in previous chapters, this situation
has become ampliﬁed over the past few neoliberal decades. Because wealth
is unevenly spread in terms of ethnicity – white people comprise a much
higher proportion of the wealthy in the US and the UK, for example – this
constitutes a major barrier to entry into the cultural industries for many
non-white people (Oakley and O’Brien 2015). Another key barrier is the
absence of legal or managerial policies on diversity and inclusion (such as
equal-opportunities legislation, anti-discrimination policies) which produce
what Jones and Pringle call ‘unmanageable inequalities’ (Jones and Pringle
2015). These go hand in hand with ‘relaxed’ codes of entry and the creation
of ‘informal networks of friends who supply each other with tips
and introductions and hire people they have worked well with before’
(Hesmondhalgh and Saha 2013: 192). The consequence for
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people outside such informal networks – historically and currently
typically including people of color and all women – is that access to
jobs and the establishment of a career is a great deal more arduous still
than for the average White male professional. For whom it is already
often remarkably hard.
(Downing and Husband 2005: 163)
This is the process Charles Tilly terms ‘opportunity hoarding’ (see Rattansi
2007: 143).
Not all sectors of the cultural industries are unequal in the same way.
Some are more unequal than others. Film is one of the domains where
these inequalities are most apparent.
Of all the directors of 2012’s top 250 grossing Hollywood movies, just
9 per cent were women. You have only to watch the parade of white
male ﬁgures walking up the steps to collect Academy Awards (save for
the female actors’ prizes) to realize that the groups of people who make
most mainstream ﬁlms fail to represent the diversity of the world
population. Unlike other sectors, the movie business sets up few safe-
guards to outlaw hiring practices that discriminate against women and
people of color.
(Davis et al. 2015: 206)
Despite the reams of writing and publications within ﬁlm studies, notor-
iously little analysis of what actually happens in the course of US ﬁlm pro-
duction has been generated since Hortense Powdermaker wrote up her
behind-the-scenes ethnographic observations made in 1946–7 in her book
Hollywood, the Dream Factory, published in 1950 (Powdermaker 2012). This
is primarily because it is so hard to get access. Sheri Ortner for example
wrote a piece analysing how hard she had found it to gain any access to
production cultures in Hollywood – either to interview producers or attend
meetings – and borrowed the words of one of the producers she did
manage to interview to describe Hollywood as ‘a culture that thrives on
exclusion’. It is structured around exclusion, from the visitor tours round
star homes where you only see high walls and mansion gates, to the con-
stant anxiety that people are at better events, parties and productions to
which you are not invited (Ortner 2010: 214). Emphasising the tightly
bound nature of the community, one screenwriter she interviewed ‘likened
it to a country club’ (Ortner 2010: 214).
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Country clubs, of course, are not known for their democratic access,
ethnic diversity, progressive gender dynamics or aﬀordable entry and neither
is Hollywood. The extensive UCLA 2015 Hollywood Diversity Report: Flip-
ping the Script makes this abundantly clear, its bald statistics revealing the
extent to which white males continued to dominate the positions from
which greenlighting and directoral decisions are made in Hollywood:
Film studio heads were 94 percent white and 100 percent male
Film studio unit heads were 96 percent white and 61 percent male
Television network and studio heads were 96 percent white and 71
percent male
Television unit heads were 86 percent white and 55 percent male.
(Hunt and Ramon 2015: 2)
Minorities accounted for 37.4 percent of [US] population … and
directed 17.8 percent of the ﬁlms (a slight improvement from previous
years). Women directors (from all ethnicities) were an even lower
percentage at 6.3%.
(Hunt and Ramon 2015: 11–12)
As Hunt and Ramon highlight, both television and ﬁlm are vastly unre-
presentative of the wider population. The more visible media exclusions
have become more widely publically discussed in the media in recent years.
This is particularly the case with regard to gender, using handy measure-
ment tools such as the Bechdel Test,8 newspaper and magazine publicity
given to female stars earning less than men, and the publicity given to the
Geena Davis Institute, which researches and advocates ways to change
gender disparities in the media.9 Publicity has been given to the dearth of
possibilities for black actors, with for example Viola Davis’ 2015 speech after
winning an Emmy for Best Actress highlighting the lack of roles available
for women of colour. The discussion of quotas has re-emerged in media
activism and commentary.10 Such media discussion has helped fuel a more
widespread perception that Hollywood privileges white men. It also tends
to favour the issue of gender disparity before that of race and to give the
most visible issue (acting) most priority. The question of production, and
race in production, can tend to fall to the bottom of the inequalities-to-be-
addressed list.
Such hierarchies make shows like Project Greenlight important as they
make the inequalities of cultural production visible, intentionally or not.
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Television becomes a powerful tool of media representation. As Mayer,
Banks and Thornton Caldwell write, ‘we frequently come to know about
media producers and their work, ironically, through the representations
they make’ of themselves as media producers (Mayer, Banks and Thornton
Caldwell 2009: 1). The issue of diversity in television as well as ﬁlm is parti-
cularly relevant here given that Project Greenlight is a television show about
the ﬁlm industry. Notably the fascination with the workings of the gated
communities of media production has spawned a number of TV shows,
including Episodes, a sitcom in which a British screenwriting couple see their
beloved show change beyond recognition when it’s remade in Los Angeles
and the comedy-drama Entourage about an actor ‘making it big’ in LA and
the consequences for him and his group of friends.
Project Greenlight, similarly, is ‘media telling stories about media’, here in
the form of a televisual construction of Hollywood which claims to show us
something of the real culture through a staged competition. Being a TV
show does, of course, provide another layer to its politics of race. Herman
Gray has analysed the movement of American TV from the 1960s and
1970s, when he argues that ‘television played a major role in circulating and
translating the civil rights discourse of equality to the level of everyday life
and common sense’, to later decades, when ‘television played an equally
powerful role in deconstructing and rearticulating that political common
sense to a neo-conservatism that culturally reinscribed and socially rein-
stalled white males as the universal subjects’ (Gray 2005: 107, see also 2004).
Highlighting the 1980s televisual framing of urban blackness and the
growth of the vehicle of the black family sitcom (The Cosby Show), Gray
emphasises how such images were disrupted from the 1990s, as the logic of
the neo-network spawned niche marketing and narrowcasting (leading to
the proliferation of comedy shows aimed at and featuring white middle-
class professionals like Frasier and Friends [Gray 2005: 83]). By 1999
NAACP were calling for an audience TV network boycott due to a dearth
of black actors on TV (Gray 2005: 81).
As a reality TV show, Project Greenlight shows ‘ordinary’ wannabe ﬁlm-
makers alongside existing ﬁlm production workers who are not famous,
alongside celebrity directors and actors who deﬁnitely are. The show has an
interestingly complex relationship to the concept of meritocracy, in that it
presents itself as a meritocratic rejoinder to the very diﬃculties of being able
to make it in Hollywood. As Ben Aﬄeck and Matt Damon put it in the
introductory sequence to Season 4’s ﬁrst episode: ‘it’s tough to get a
directing job … so we held a contest … and we’re going to give [the
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winning] director $3 million to direct a movie for HBO’ (HBO 2015: ep. 1).
Project Greenlight self-consciously seeks to create a mediated meritocratic
bubble, a space where the usual entry restrictions to Hollywood’s charmed
circle are not present, where instead raw talent can be given Aﬄeck, Damon
and the show’s help to make a ﬁlm, fast-tracked into a chance it would not
normally get. The artiﬁcial momentary meritocratic media bubble is, as I
explored in chapter 2, a staple of neoliberal contemporary media culture, part
of the grammar of banal neoliberal meritocracy. Project Greenlight demon-
strates with unintentional precision how such bubbles fail to address the wider
structural and ingrained issues of inequality, of recognition and representation.
The norms of competitiveness which structure the reality-show format –
in which producing creative products becomes an exercise in beating your
opponent rather than co-operatively learning from them – are metonymic
of wider neoliberal norms, in which brutal competition is positioned as the
key driver of everyday life. This is not a particularly productive climate in
which to learn how to overcome the legacies of imperialism. It is rather one
in which it’s only too easy to reinforce the white male privilege which
brought the show into being (through Damon and Aﬄeck as producers).
Damon’s pronouncements that ‘doing diversity’ only occurs through the
visible actors in the product, not in production, contradicts the fact that
viewers can see that Project Greenlight added in white and black women
judges to their own production formula.
Adding in Eﬃe Brown, as the TV producers surely expected, generated
further changes to the demographics of the ﬁlm crew pictured on the TV
programme. After the (white, male) Jason Mann won the competition for
best director, the rest of this series of Project Greenlight depicted Mann’s
creation of a ﬁlm (with white actors) about the American aristocracy, The
Leisure Class (HBO, 2015), including the power struggles on set and the
various dramas and challenges of the ﬁlm-production process. This included
a diverse crew, as Eﬃe Brown stated that she largely took the job on Project
Greenlight in order to help mainstream media diversity:
I wanted to hire a crew that looked like America so anyone would turn
on the TV and see black people, Latino people, Asian people, white
people, everybody working together and being like, It can happen! I’m
kind of a soapbox chick. … I also wanted to do it a bit because I’m in
that world. I feel like I’m the queen of indie movies and I needed to
do something where I could break out on a larger level.
(Eﬃe Brown, cited in Wieselman 2015)
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The contradictions between the self-consciously diverse crew that Eﬃe
Brown brought with her into the show and Damon’s pronouncements and
the all-white cast of Mann’s ﬁlm were therefore stark. The narrative frame
of Project Greenlight attempted to sporadically showcase this diversity whilst
simultaneously exploiting the divisions and tensions between this diverse
ﬁlm crew and producer and its non-diverse ﬁlm director, cast and TV
production team. In particular, this antagonism was focused through the
ﬁgure of Brown, who was often positioned as a singular problem. For
instance, despite Brown having an agreement with her (white) ﬁlm pro-
duction partner, Marc Joubert, that they ‘were not going to talk bad about
each other, [on TV] we were going to have each other’s backs’, Joubert did
throughout (Wieselman 2015). Indeed, Joubert’s commentary – and notably
Joubert had a simultaneous role as executive producer of the TV show as
well as the HBO ﬁlm – was the most emphatic televisual framing of Eﬃe
Brown as a ‘hotheaded’ problem.
Likewise, Matt Damon’s attempts, in his commentaries, to oﬀset the
reality of the unequal power dynamics – dynamics that are rightly uncom-
fortable for white liberals – were made in a partial manner before being
negated. Through Damonsplaining and the televisual frame, the merit of
meritocracy became mobilised to bolster white male privilege and to
attempt to actively push down that of a black female.
Trying to shut women up
Positioning merit as having nothing to do with gender, race or class has a
long history as a construction privileging wealthy white men. As Nirmal
Puwar puts it, ‘there is an undeclared white masculine body underlying
the universal construction of the enlightenment “individual”’(Puwar 2004:
141). The legacies of Enlightenment rationality positioned white mascu-
linity as the site of rational logic and merit, whereas the more volatile state
of femininity reproduced nature rather than creating merit-worthy
culture:
This was also the era in which the concept of culture enabled women to
be positioned as part of nature, with important consequences. Being
part of nature rather than culture meant that women were regarded as
unable to properly self-cultivate, self-actualize, and exercise freedom
and rationality.
(Rattansi 2016: 67)
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The Damonsplaining incident is mansplaining and whitesplaining, a white
man talking down to a black woman. Such micro-aggressions, such small
gestures of silencing, can and often are cumulative, signiﬁcant and powerful.
Patricia Hill Collins, for instance describes them as
painful, daily assaults designed to teach me that being an African-
American, working-class woman made me lesser than those who
were not. And as I felt smaller, I became quieter and eventually was
silenced.
(Hill Collins 2009)
Eﬃe Brown was brought onto Project Greenlight because of her expertise as a
ﬁlm director, as someone who had received many awards and plaudits from
the ﬁlm industry. And yet the logic of the Damonsplaining incident stages
this power as merely temporarily granted at the whim of more powerful
others. It is a structure where
those once racially disprivileged but now structurally rendered white by
virtue of their class standing nevertheless are oﬀered little or no respite
from the bite of failing inevitably to make it quite into the inner
sanctum of privilege and power in America. Always on the outside
looking in, even when invited in, selected or elected (Balibar 2003).
You are here at our whim, your presence terminable at our discretion,
so don’t go getting any big ideas now.
(Goldberg 2012: 203)
By suggesting that diversity needs to be considered at the level of produc-
tion, by raising the issue of white privilege and implicit racism, Eﬃe Brown
disrupts the myth of post-racial neoliberal meritocracy. In doing so she is
‘discussing a taboo subject that is closeted under the veneer of professional
neutrality’ (Puwar 2004: 155). This is an act which involves a risk to such
precariously ‘awarded’ status:
Those who choose to come out and speak against racism amongst their
ranks risk being seen as engaged in renegade acts. Divulging the secrets
of your own occupational tribe is a risky business indeed, especially
when your ‘space invader’ status already marks you out and grants you
a tenuous location.
(Puwar 2004: 155)
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Noticeably, Eﬃe Brown did not provide much media comment on the
incident afterwards. She did, however, re-tweet some support provided by
other people, including a gif of her saying ‘Ooof’ to Damon, alongside the
descriptor ‘when you realize even the most liberal white dudes in Hollywood
will mansplain representation to you’.11
Calling out the myth of post-racial meritocracy
I learned of the Damonsplaining incident from Britain through my Twitter
feed. Project Greenlight was not being broadcast in the UK, though it was
publicised to British newspaper readers in The Daily Mail, and could be
bought here on DVD. The Damonsplaining incident generated media
commentary in the UK, positioned as part of a shared transatlantic form of
culture and connected social mores.
Racialisation takes diﬀerent forms – what David Theo Goldberg calls ‘racial
regionalisations’ – but there are shared reference points and co-productions
across contemporary black, white and hybrid Atlantics. As UK writer Gary
Younge puts it in his book Stranger in a Strange Land: Encounters in the Dis-
united States, ‘I’ve always found America exciting but, for better and worse,
never exceptional. Its eﬀorts at global domination seemed like a qualitative
and material plot development in the narrative of European empire rather
than a break from it’ (Younge 2006: x). The contours of US racism clearly
take diﬀerent forms from those ‘regional racialisations’ which are active
where I live in the UK, but they share the legacies of the project of imperial
modernity, carried, in this case, across from Europe. American ﬁlm culture is
dominant in the UK: the products of the American cultural industries more
broadly have a longstanding, conspicuous place in the cultural landscape.
Alongside and throughout all the anxieties about Americanisation and US
cultural imperialism, the residual snobberies about US low culture, and the
vast quantities of non-US culture that are consumed, products from the US
cultural industries remain something that the vast majority of people in the
UK grow up with.
Therefore the reach of the post-racial neoliberal imaginary extends
beyond the US where the show is screened, connecting with the UK
through its mediated post-racial diaspora. In an age when news media providers
scour online platforms for hot stories and cheap content the transatlantic
currency of the incident was facilitated through online platforms like
Twitter and extended through the UK online and oﬄine press. Thus the
Damonsplaining incident was covered in much of the UK press such as
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newspapers The Daily Mail, The Guardian, The Independent and The
Telegraph, and the UK version of online news site The Huﬃngton Post.
Matt Damon’s performance in the Damonsplaining incident is, as I have
attempted to show in this chapter, best understood as a shining example of
post-racial neoliberal meritocracy, one which taps into and re-activates
longer-standing discourses about racialisation and merit while coding them
anew. But if the Damonsplaining incident is an example of neoliberal,
misogynistic post-racial meritocracy, it is also at the same time an example
of the ideology of neoliberal misogynistic post-racial meritocracy being seen
and disrupted, being called out for its racisms.
This calling out, this challenge, this rupture was possible for a number of
reasons. To begin with, there is the multifaceted intersectional cauldron of
privilege that was being activated. While Damon’s performance not only
exhibited racism but also misogyny despite his denial of both, this denial
resonated in a larger media context where its disingenuousness was for
many made clearly visible. The spectacular nature of this contradiction,
ampliﬁed through overweening celebrity privilege, made Damon’s expla-
nations particularly mobile as nuggets of untruth: a spectacular specimen of
post-racial, meritocratic contradiction.
This is in part because, as I discuss above, the disruptions aﬀorded by its
format enable its contradictions to be apparent and visible. In a media pro-
gramme about media production, once you start discussing the problems of
racism, the sheer whiteness of the producers on screen are hard to hide
from, whether or not the incident itself is being used to gain extra viewers
though controversy. There were a number of examples indicating that this
was so, and that Project Greenlight’s production team sought to capitalise on
the racialised controversy over Damonsplaining, both by framing Eﬃe
Brown as an overly aggressive problem and presenting these tensions as
antagonisms to be exploited. One episode, for instance, was entitled ‘Hot
Ghetto Mess’, then hastily retitled after HBO announced that its inﬂammatory
racialised title had been a ‘mistake’ (Hollywood Reporter 2015).
Crucially, the technological means through which Damonsplaining was
primarily called out – after the shot of Eﬃe Brown’s aﬀective physical
response, her raised eyebrow and ‘Ooof!’ – was through social-media outrage:
through the brief media storm of Twitter. The hashtag #Damonsplaining
allowed the overweening celebrity, the misogyny and the racism of this
event to be exposed and highlighted through satire. The use of hashtags has
quite frequently been analysed in social- and digital-media studies in terms of
its ability to network and connect otherwise disparate publics, particularly
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around actualising and nascent political movements and events such as
Occupy and the Arab Spring (Gerbaudo 2012; Papachrissi 2015). The use
of hashtags in the Damonsplaining case has a less formally coded political
aﬃliation but is nevertheless a very politicised tag which works through
comedy and more precisely through sarcasm. The sardonic use of hashtags is
a widespread, if interestingly under-discussed, practice. Twitter is notor-
iously a platform through which people speak to multiple audiences at the
same time, a process danah boyd calls ‘context collapse’ (boyd 2008). You
do not need to be ‘followed by’ or ‘following’ people on Twitter to view a
hashtag: if you click on it, it will take you to a list of tweets by people who
are tweeting on that particular topic. Hashtags function as ‘an integral part
of Twitter’s ability to link the conversations of strangers together’ (Murthy
2013: 3) through a platform which ‘thrives on impromptu form’ (Papachrissi
2015: 111).
Zizi Papachrissi terms these impromptu communities ‘aﬀective publics’,
and, whilst it is the case that all publics and all media publics, have some
aﬀective dimension, her work is surely right in highlighting how hashtags
can often ‘combine conversationality and subjectivity in a manner that
supports both individually felt aﬀect and collectivity’ (Papachrissi 2015: 27)
and can produce ‘disruptions/interruptions of dominant political narratives
by presencing underrepresented viewpoints’ (Papachrissi 2015: 130). It can
also, of course, provide conservative platforms for the likes of republican
presidential candidate and billionaire Donald Trump and facilitate the strategies
of micro-celebrity (Senft 2012) through the processes by which ordinary
people amplify their possessive individualism through self-framing on social
media. Yet this Twitterstorm did indeed work by at least brieﬂy disrupting a
dominant political narrative, using an informal sarcastic register to register
the transindividual slights experienced and/or understood as metonymic
component of vast social injustice. Its danger is that its response itself could
recode its exposure of the post-racial problem in post-racial form, by
making it about only a problem with the racism of one very prominent
Hollywood man. #Damonsplaining became a popular, ‘trending’ hashtag; a
viral event spread through a social media structure of speedy contagion and
replication. As Nahon and Hemsley put it in their work on viral media,
‘viral information is one indicator of what is important to a particular
society at a given moment’ (Nahon and Hemsley 2013: xii).
#Damonsplaining was not alone as a hashtag using comedy to fore-
ground racism; it might be situated in the broader context of what has
variously been called ‘Black Twitter’ or ‘blacktags’: the ‘ambient aﬃliations’
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of racialised aggregations which as Sanjay Sharma expertly points out fre-
quently mobilises ‘humour-laden provocation and social critique’, a trend
encouraged by Twitter, which, as a company, ‘has shrewdly positioned itself
as concerned with social justice’ (Sharma 2012; Brock 2012). As Sharma
highlights, there are a high proportion of black tweeters in relation to
Twitter’s wider demographic, but we have to understand these tweets not
simply as reﬂecting a preconceived group of actors but as a wider racial
aggregation and assemblage.
The comedy of Damonsplaining interrupted post-racial, misogynistic
neoliberal meritocratic discourse. It had a brief life as an incident, but its
existence and the extent to which it spread shows something of how this
post-racial meritocratic dream is in crisis. It is not believed. It is ruptured,
exposed, caught in the act of being a lie. If the post-racial meritocracy is
potent, so too, increasingly, is its opposite. The whiteness of neoliberal
post-racial meritocracy was, through the Damonsplaining controversy,
exposed: it was widely perceived, in that moment, to be unbearable.
The potential of this assemblage was substantially extended in one direction
in 2016 when #OscarsSoWhite went viral. The New York-based journalist
April Reign had coined this hashtag a year previously and it was resuscitated
when not a single person of colour was included in the Oscar list of acting
nominees (Kirst 2016).12 The trending of #OscarsSoWhite helped facilitate
oﬄine action and media coverage, as celebrities including Jada Pinkett
Smith, Spike Lee and Michael Moore announced they would boycott the
2016 Oscars ceremony. Shortly afterwards Cheryl Boone Issacs, the only
black person amongst 51 Academy governors, released a statement on
behalf of the Academy Awards. It stated that they would immediately add
three non-white governors and pledged to double the number of women
and non-white members of the Academy by 2020, so they would comprise
48% and 14% respectively of those casting the votes. Debate is currently still
raging over the extent and pace of these changes (Feinberg 2016). A less
widely reported fact is that, as part of these changes, a handful of non-white
members have also been added to the six committees working on the
Academy Awards: one of these people was Eﬃe Brown.13
Externalised and internalised neoliberal meritocracy
Damonsplaining is an example of a discourse of neoliberal meritocratic
power on display: what we might call ‘externalised meritocratic privilege’.
However, meritocratic narratives are not only external ‘injuries’, laid on
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women or non-white people (for example) by white men. They are also
discourses and narratives which are internalised and inhabited by less socially
privileged groups of people.
In the following chapter I consider how neoliberal meritocracy is parti-
cularly vigorously incited as an internalised state of being to constituencies
with less social power than that most often occupied and wielded by rich
white men. Indeed, notably it is often people who face signiﬁcant dis-
empowerment in terms of their resources and available choices who are
most intensely incited to construct a neoliberal meritocratic self. Whether
through corporate populism, black entrepreneurialism and/or marketised
feminism, the meritocratic deﬁcit has continued to aﬀect particular groups
more than others. In considering how particular constituencies have been
positioned as particularly amenable to a meritocratic discourse of ‘empow-
erment’, I want to focus on another case study where the incitement to
internalised meritocratic subjects is or has been taking place: the emergent
social ﬁgure of the ‘mumpreneur’.
Notes
1 Lipsitz 1998: xix.
2 Solnit states that she did not coin the term, but she was told it was inspired by
her essay. Her article ‘The Archipelago of Arrogance’ was originally published
online and she later wrote a book about it, Men Explain Things to Me (Solnit
2014).
3 My thanks to Roshi Naidoo for this reference.
4 Christopher Hayes writes on how New Orleans’ tragedy during Hurricane
Katrina was in part ‘a planning failure enabled by social distance’, with Newt
Gingrich for example complaining about the uneducated who did not get out,
when those people simply did not have any means to leave and escape the ﬂoods
(Hayes 2012: 198).
5 George Lipsitz wrote: ‘Too many of us continue to imagine that we would have
supported the civil rights struggle of thirty years ago, when our actions and
opinions today conform more closely to the record of that struggle’s opponents.
We have so demonised the white racists of 1960s Mississippi that we fail to see
the ways in which so many of their most heinous practices and policies have
triumphed in our own day’ (Lipsitz 1998: xv).
6 Although the groundwork for this formulation had been set the century before.
Literature as ‘the best that has been thought and said’, in Matthew Arnold’s
inﬂuential formulation, also happened to be work tending to maintain the
bourgeois public sphere, rather than supporting the lower orders with their
pesky demands for full representation (Arnold 2009).
7 For instance, in Season 1, the longlisting was carried out by white men and
the shortlisting by six white men and one white woman. In Season 1 only one
female potential director appeared in the initial top ten list; the rest were white
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men. In Season 2, the shortlisting of scripts from top 50 to top 10 was carried
out by ﬁve white male judges.
8 The Bechdel Test asks whether a ﬁctional work features at least two women
who talk about something other than a man. It has been used to draw attention
to inequality in ﬁlm (roughly, only half of US ﬁlms meet this criteria) and ﬁction.
It is named after the graphic artist Alison Bechdel who credits her friend Wallace
(as well as Virgina Woolf) with the idea, and thus it is sometimes known as the
Bechdel-Wallace Test. Sometimes further criteria, such as the characters being
named, are added.
9 https://seejane.org. Accessed 1 December 2016.
10 Alongside a backlash against discussion of quotas (see Julious 2015). A UK
example of activism around racialised quotas in acting is Act for Change (www.
act-for-change.com. Accessed 1 December 2016).
11 Another re-tweet included one from Ava DuVernay, the director of civil-rights
ﬁlm Selma, sharing a gif of a 1980s sitcom clip of three people doing a black
power salute.
12 Kirst’s recommendations include the DuVernay test: ‘It operates like the Bech-
del test, which checks a ﬁlm’s feminist credentials. But its benchmark is low,
requiring simply that “African Americans and other minorities have fully realised
lives rather than serve as scenery in white stories”’ (Kirst 2016).
13 This includes areas such as education and outreach, membership and ﬁnance.
Eﬃe Brown was appointed to the museum committee in 2016 (Academy of
Motion Picture Arts and Sciences 2016).
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6
DESPERATE SUCCESS
Managing the mumpreneur
Social mobility [is] a politically driven distraction that diverts our attention
from the real problems that need to be addressed: problems of increasing
social and economic inequalities that require redistribution not social
mobility.
Diane Reay1
What is required, above all, is to overcome ﬁnancialised capitalism’s rapa-
cious subjugation of reproduction to production – but this time without
sacriﬁcing either emancipation or social protection.
Nancy Fraser2
Doing it all
‘Mumpreneur’, ‘mompreneur’ or ‘mumtrepreneur’ depending on your
geographical location and preference is a relatively recent term.3 It has been
regularly used over the past decade to signify a mother who establishes her
own business from the kitchen table whilst her children crawl beneath it.
There have been many articles discussing the rise and expansion of this new
social type in the press (e.g. Morrison 2013; Smith 2011), sometimes fea-
turing startling statistics such as ‘65% of mothers want to launch their own
businesses from home’ (Russell 2014). Established prizes for outstanding
examples of mumpreneurialism now include the yearly ‘Mumtrepreneur
Awards’ in New Zealand4 and the ‘Mumpreneur Awards’5 and the Daily
Mail ‘Mumpreneur of the Year’ Awards6 in the UK. Online and oﬄine
services and networking events are directly marketed by and to them, such
as theM:UK and CEOMumswebsite magazines (Ekinsmyth 2014). A plethora
of guidebooks have emerged to show their readers how to become a
mumpreneur, such as Mum Ultrapreneur (Odev and Weeks 2010), Kitchen
Table Tycoon (Naik 2008), Just Do It: Rules to Go from the School Run to the
Boardroom; (Rigney 2014) andMumpreneur (Karmel 2015; Figure 6.1). Ranging
from cute, infantilising pink, through butch-femme corporate balancing of
shoulderpads, phone and buggy, to holistic earthtones, the bookcovers of
mumpreneurialism signal that the phenomenon is not conﬁned to one singular
socio-aesthetic genre. The enterprising maternal also surfaces in popular
women’s ﬁction: in ‘henlit’ novels, that branch of women’s popular ﬁction
aimed at the chicks of ‘chicklit’ who have now grown into ‘mother hens’
(Sanders 2004; Littler 2013), in ‘momoirs’ like The Mumpreneur Diaries (Jones
2009), and across an array of glossy women’s magazines, in articles showcasing
the tribulations of mumpreneurs and oﬀering up their stories as examples to
emulate (Eikhof, Carter and Summers 2013).
Whilst what mumpreneurs produce is varied, there is an overwhelming
emphasis in media proﬁles on their role in generating lifestyle products and
services that are consumed by women and parents, such as skin cream,
cupcakes, wedding services, children’s clothes and potties. Mumpreneurs
do, of course, have predecessors and earlier incarnations. Their representa-
tion in popular culture includes Allison Pearson’s 2002 novel about work-life
balance, I Don’t Know How She Does It, and the ﬁlm Baby Boom (1987) both
of whose heroines downsize from corporate jobs to home enterprises
making dolls houses and apple sauce, respectively (see Littler 2013). It is,
nonetheless, a term that has had a noticeable surge in use since the 2008
ﬁnancial crash. As Diane Negra and Yvonne Tasker astutely highlight, the
gendering of the post-2008 recession, at this time of ‘tough measures’, is
both signiﬁcant and overlooked (Negra and Tasker 2014), and indeed as a
variety of reports have shown, it is women who have been hit hardest
ﬁnancially (Pearson and Elson 2015). Negra and Tasker discuss the emer-
gence in women’s magazines of the ﬁgure of the ‘recessionista’, the savvy
female consumer who knows how to be thrifty yet stylish (Negra and
Tasker 2014: 4). The mumpreneur has a family resemblance to the recessio-
nista, and her contemporary popularity clearly owes something to the same
context the recessionista has emerged from. Yet there is also an obvious
core diﬀerence in that one key theme which surfaces again and again across
the array of mumpreneur articles, how-to guides and memoirs is the idea of
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mumpreneurialism as a solution to the problems of combining work and
childcare. As the back cover blurb from Anita Naik’s Kitchen Table Tycoon
asserts: ‘Many mothers are quitting their day jobs and starting up on their
own, eager to cut out the nursery fees and see more of their kids.’ The
mumpreneur is presented as a meritocratic means of solving an array of
problems, problems exacerbated by the recession: of the expense of
FIGURE 6.1 Cover of Annabel Karmel, Mumpreneur. Reproduced courtesy of the
Random House Group Ltd.
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childcare and of the gendered inequalities and inﬂexibilities of much paid
work. It promises even more freedom to climb the ladder of meritocracy as
long as you put up with the substantial diﬃculties. ‘Now you are the boss’,
says Supermummy: The Ultimate Guide to Business Success, ‘you can promote
yourself straight to the top of the ladder’ (McGee 2009: 35).
This chapter analyses the ﬁgure of the mumpreneur to focus a discussion
of the role of gender and entrepreneurialism in neoliberal meritocracy. The
chapter has three interlinked sections. To begin, it considers representations
of the mumpreneur in relation to the wider context of social reproduction,
particularly in terms of how the relationship between gender, work and
childcare remains dramatically inequitable. It discusses the attempted temporary
crystalisation of gendered drives for self-realisation through entrepreneurial
discourses of work and their pressured articulation to coping strategies
which bypass the potential for collective co-operation raised by second-
wave feminism. It argues that neoliberal meritocratic discourse has been
extended through the contemporary moment of capitalist crisis using a
trope I term ‘desperate success’. Secondly, the chapter considers what
mumpreneurialism reveals about the gendering of entrepreneurialism (as a
category theorised in academia as well as a lived gendered reality). To do
this it discusses recent work on neoliberalism which it relates to what is now
often marginalised work on gender and enterprise coming out of cultural
studies in the 1980s and 1990s. Thirdly, the chapter considers the speciﬁcity
of the contemporary ‘post-post-Fordist’ conjunction between gender and
enterprise by following the mumpreneur online and discussing its relation-
ship to self-branding. The chapter ends by considering what discourses and
alternatives might prove useful resources for ﬁnding routes out of the
mumpreneur’s pragmatic yet constrained worldview.
Child labour
The dynamics of social reproduction, or the question of how a society
reproduces itself and patterns of in/equality, was a problem repeatedly ana-
lysed by second-wave feminism, a movement which regularly treated the
issues of paid and unpaid labour as questions to be considered together, as
pieces of a social puzzle which would need some substantial reorganisation
in order to be in any way fair (James 2012; Oakley 1974). Particularly
central was the issue of childcare: the question of who should look after the
children and what the dynamics of this care and unpaid labour were to look
like in relation to paid work in the public sphere (McRobbie 2013). Yet
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almost half a century later, this central problem of childcare – the issue
that second-wave feminists were so active in highlighting as perhaps the
major obstacle to gender equality – remains, as Beatrix Campbell put it,
‘dramatically unresolved’ (Campbell 2008).
Nancy Fraser’s classic essay ‘After the Family Wage’ (Fraser 1994) supplies
some useful tools for disaggregating the charged dynamics around this issue.
This article considered the implications of ‘the crumbling of the old gender
order’, centred as it had been on the normative idea of a family wage during
the Fordist welfare state, in which the dominant model was men earning a
stable income whilst women undertook unpaid labour looking after children
and the home. Fraser’s aim was to consider what gender justice might look
like in a new post-industrial age of unstable employment, family diversity
and women in the public workplace in increasing numbers. She argued that
two main models exist which attempt to redress the problematic relation-
ship between gender, childcare and employment. The ﬁrst is the ‘universal
breadwinner’ model, in which working mothers strive to emulate male
employment patterns. The second is the ‘caregiver parity’ model, in which
women are remunerated for being full-time stay-at-home mothers. ‘After
the Family Wage’ surveys the strengths and weaknesses of each type by
breaking their components down into a range of categories and analysing the
extent of their ‘gender justice’: poverty, exploitation, income, leisure-time,
respect, marginalisation, and androcentrism or gender norms (Fraser 1994).
Fraser concluded that neither model is ultimately very satisfactory. So
instead she proposed the universal caregiver model – in which both men
and women are structurally enabled to share the load – as a fairer solution.
A contemporary example of this paradigm would involve both parents
being able to work part-time, spreading the load of work more thinly,
without being discriminated against in terms of career advancement and
being able to aﬀord housing. Its emphasis on sharing work throughout the
wider society resonates with Ulrich Beck’s idea of solving unemployment
and overwork by spreading work around more equitably and combining
social protection with diverse working patterns (Beck 2000) as well as with
recent initiatives in Sweden to introduce a six-hour working day (Matharu
2015).
However, as Fraser has argued more recently, progress towards the gen-
dered equitability of the universal caregiver model is not much in evidence
in the Global North (Fraser 2013, 2015, 2016). Instead, even wealthier
women are incited to copy the universal breadwinner model and oﬄoad
domestic tasks onto the less wealthy:
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I don’t see any progress at all really. And in fact this idea of universal
care-giver is really a kind of socialist feminism that requires re-thinking
the whole split between production and reproduction – which in my
view is absolutely deﬁnitive of capitalist societies. So it’d take a very
profound structural change to begin that. Instead we have the hege-
mony of a liberal feminist model, which doesn’t grapple with this issue
at all: and in eﬀect just tries to make privileged women lead lives that
are socially male, while abandoning other women.
(Fraser 2013: 21–22)
The now notorious example of such a liberal feminist model is Facebook
COO Sheryl Sandberg’s book, Lean In, in which she encourages women to
deal with this complex of issues by embracing corporate working culture
and succeeding in the workplace rather than leaving it and returning to the
home (Sandberg 2013). The critical opposition to such liberal feminist
corporate norms is pithily encapsulated in the title of UK writer Dawn
Foster’s book, Lean Out (Foster 2016). As Angela McRobbie argues, such
discourse overwhelmingly operates to extend the inequalities of corporate
culture rather than rein them in (McRobbie 2013). To translate this oppo-
sition into Fraser’s terms, liberal feminist discourse, like Sandberg’s, merely
extends the universal breadwinner model to an elite group of ﬁnancially
advantaged women – a constituency known in Norway as ‘golden skirts’ –
leaving domestic household labour as a feminised role for poorer women
(James 2015).
Interestingly, the discourse of the mumpreneur tries to reconﬁgure pro-
duction and reproduction diﬀerently from that promoted by universal
breadwinners like Sandberg. It attempts to meld work from both the private
and public spheres into a new conﬁguration. Work from the (masculinised)
public sphere is brought into the space of the home. Yet there are a range
of problems here, and they include the notion that self-employment is an
automatically empowering, meritocratic alternative, which in the majority
of instances is far from the case.
Desperate success
The mumpreneur is symptomatic of the contemporary world of work and
its increasing number of self-employed workers. In the UK at present, self-
employment rates are higher than at any time over the past forty years,
comprising 15% of the workforce; in the US three out of ten jobs are
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held by the self-employed and the workers they hire (Oﬃce for National
Statistics 2014; Pew Research Centre 2015). Both ﬁgures have risen since
the 2008 recession, along with growth in ‘forced’ or ‘sham’ self-employment
and an expansion of precarious labour through companies subcontracting
out, oﬀering previously permanent staﬀ positions on a temporary basis,
sometimes on zero-hour contracts, a practice rife in creative industries such
as publishing.7 Since 2011, the UK government has encouraged the growth
in ‘individual entrepreneurship’ though the New Enterprise Allowance
(NEA) available to unemployed people who become self-employed.8
Meanwhile the glamorisation of ‘the independents’ of the creative indus-
tries, and of the ‘industrialisation of bohemia’ (Leadbeater and Oakley 1999)
has continued alongside revelations of precarious working conditions (Ross
2003; Gill and Pratt 2008; McRobbie 2015).
Self-employment oﬀers the promise of breaking from the Fordist 9–5
working day. It oﬀers ﬂexible hours, portfolio working and the idea of
control and agency over working lives, over both the means of production
and of self-realisation. But notoriously the ascendancy of right-wing neo-
liberal governments in post-Fordist times and beyond has meant that these
more fragmented modes of work have frequently been accompanied by an
erosion and loss of the forms of security won during the high point of the
social democratic welfare state, including pensions, sick pay and holiday pay
(Adkins 1995; Beck 2000; Bauman 1998). Subcontracted employees are no
longer required to receive the same employee beneﬁts and protections as
permanent employees. Self-employment has therefore also come to be
associated with the rise of ‘the precariat’. As Guy Standing argues the pre-
cariat is not simply composed of the working classes but has expanded to
include middle-class workers (Standing 2011), the growth in temporary
lecturers in academia being one example (Chakrabortty 2016). This
uncertainty has even aﬀected the very legal status of work: the binary
divide in labour law between the image of the subordinate employee and
the dynamic entrepreneur has now become blurred and manipulated with
the growth of highly precarious employment, as the idea of entrepre-
neurialism has been manipulated in ways that lead to deeper cracks in the
very idea of standard employment relationships (Bogg 2015). To use those
two ugly but highly useful neologisms, self-employment – including
mumpreneurs – is a phenomenon now more often shaped by ‘ﬂexploitation’
rather than the ‘ﬂexicurity’ it ostensibly oﬀers (Ross 2010). Nevertheless,
through this blend of government policy and cultural and media discourse,
glossy media features, workplace subcontracting and incentivisation to
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those with limited possibilities, individuals are increasingly encouraged to
become entrepreneurs.
Alongside the cost of childcare, ﬂexibility is repeatedly invoked as a core
incentive for becoming a mumpreneur:
Many mums leave those successful careers behind to have children and
then struggle to return to the workplace – due to high childcare costs
and the incompatibility between their new life as a mum and the
inﬂexible long hours often expected as an employee.
(Karmel 2015: 2)
The issue of ﬂexible working hours, so often cited by mumpreneurs as a
reason for embracing self-employment, is produced by the inﬂexibilities of
much permanent and/or full-time employment. In the UK, for example,
employees have the right to request ﬂexible work but not to get it. There is
no legal onus on a company to provide a percentage of jobs on a ﬂexible or
part-time basis. Furthermore, many professions, particularly those in the
creative industries – such as ﬁlm and TV work – expect employees to work
lengthy shifts as a matter of course, leading to an exodus of women of
childbearing age in particular (Wing-Fai, Gill and Randle 2015).
High childcare costs have been a key issue for parents and carers outside
the Nordic countries (where the strong tradition of socialised childcare
makes it both well paid and relatively inexpensive). In the UK, the expansion
of free provision for two-year-olds has been increasingly subsidised by the
parents paying nursery fees rather than the government as nurseries have
had to put up fees to cover their post-recession high costs (Rutter 2015). As
Angela McRobbie writes, the long social-democratic tradition of public
nursery provision as a key feature of feminist discourse and as a wider social
good – a beneﬁt that improves the health and well-being of children from
poorer families whilst enabling women to work – has been attacked since
the Blair years, when ‘banal phrases like work-life balance’ were bandied
around, replacing an emphasis on state funding and thus ‘opening the
pathway for the present day demonization of welfare’ (McRobbie 2013:
127–128; see also Riley 1983; Littler and Winch 2016). In the US, since
the 1980s, a renewed cultural emphasis on intensive mothering has been
accompanied by an astonishing demonisation of collective day care provision,
surveyed in fascinating detail in The Mommy Myth where Susan J. Douglas
and Meredith Michaels pick apart sensationalist media reports lambasting the
‘dangers’ of putting children in day care (Douglas and Michaels 2004). The
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stay-at-home and downscaling mom has achieved a new idealised prominence
in the past two decades at exactly the same time as neoliberal policies have
sought to cut back on state day care provision. Such analysis is illustrated by
Diane Negra’s persuasive account of the gloriﬁcation of feminine domes-
ticity over the last few decades as a form of retreatism from the problems of
the public sphere (Negra 2009: 130).
Within this context, the mumpreneur, who is predominantly assumed to
be a ﬁgure doing her own childcare or reproductive labour, is frequently
packaged as an enticing meritocratic solution which oﬀers a promise of
resolving problems of restrictive work and expensive childcare whilst also
providing glamour and personal fulﬁlment. (‘Are you ready to carve out
that new and rewarding life as a mum in business?’ asks Annabel Karmel
[Karmel 2015: 9].) Nonetheless, it does similarly reinforce the traditionally
gendered role of the woman as the primary domestic carer. We do not hear
of ‘dadpreneurs’ mixing their family life with domestic-based entrepre-
neurial activity. The masculinity of the entrepreneur is the unnamed norm.
The twee address of the mumpreneur thus works to reinforce the role of
woman as what Rebecca Asher in her book Shattered calls the ‘foundation
parent’ – of how, even in most nominally equal arrangements, women are
usually the ﬁrst point of contact for schools, those addressed by food manu-
facturers, those doing more housework (Asher 2011). Mumpreneurialism
rarely disrupts the conventional nature of such androcentrism by encoura-
ging men to get more involved with childcare (as explored in Burrows
2013). Instead it reinforces the pattern that women should somehow
manage both spheres. It continues to position mothers as the primary
childcarers, who are home-based, but also seeks to render that state
economically productive. As Emma Dowling has discussed, there is a sys-
tematic imperative to extend markets into previously unremunerated zones
of social reproduction in the pursuit of neoliberal proﬁtability (Dowling
2016), and the mumpreneur ﬁts neatly into this model.
In this combined context, with women often bearing the burden of
childcare responsibilities alongside precarious economic security and what
Hochschild termed the ‘third shift’ of domestic administration in the home
(Hochschild 2001) – those who are incited to become mumpreneurs face a
meritocratic deﬁcit in terms of both recognition and redistribution. In real
life, mumpreneurs often report diﬃculties in balancing home/work life and
overworking at home (Ekinsmyth 2013: 533–538). In mumpreneur guide-
books the sheer diﬃculty of being encouraged to strive individually to oﬀset
these structural inequalities when the odds are stacked heavily against you is
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palpable. For instance in the guidebook Kitchen Table Tycoon there is a
whole chapter devoted to how women simply must accept that they are
going to be very stressed and very overworked:
If you’re going to work from home you need to be prepared to be
stressed most of the time, because running a successful business out of
your home and scheduling your work around your kids is diﬃcult, and
there’s no getting away from that.
(Naik 2008: 200)
The attempt is to encourage the reader to ‘conduct their conduct’ by
managing these massive forms of overwork, treating it as a necessary sacri-
ﬁce to the gains of individualised achievement and ﬂexibility-to-come. The
problem of managing childcare and work is to be absorbed by the indivi-
dual: and the individual mother even more than the individual family.
Working hard to activate your talent is positioned as the only route to
mumpreneurial success. For instance, Annabel Karmel – who has a sub-
stantial following amongst UK parents due to her popular recipes for chil-
dren and babies beginning to eat – recently published a guidebook simply
and authoritatively entitled Mumpreneur. This book repeatedly uses the
neoliberal meritocratic discourse of there being ‘no barrier’ to opportunity:
Whatever background you come from, however little money you start
oﬀ with, there is no getting away from the value of talent, hard work and
vision. If you have passion for something and plenty of entrepreneurial
spirit, you can do it.
(Karmel 2015: 15)
However, the vast majority of women Annabel Karmel interviews in her
book, when closely examined, tend to already have sizeable amounts of
private capital with very privileged backgrounds (and are often white).
Thomasina Miers, for instance, the founder of Wahaca, a chain of Mexican
restaurants in Europe, attended the very expensive private girls’ school St Pauls
(and is listed in Debretts, the guide to the UK aristocratic establishment). Liz
Earle, who co-founded a skincare company bearing her name, had a father
who was an admiral. Both are feted in Mumpreneur as members of a range of
celebrity members of ‘Annabel’s Kitchen Cabinet’, a motif through which
public sphere government is transposed into a cutely re-feminised private
sphere, of ‘domestic battle stations’ (Karmel 2015: 23, 179). Likewise, Carol
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Ekinsmyth’s empirical research with UK-based mumpreneurs notes that
87% of her respondents had relied on personal wealth or savings in order to
self-fund their start-ups (Ekinsmyth 2011: 109).
The types of work foregrounded as mumpreneurial often involves produ-
cing consumer goods conventionally targeted at women, whether body lotion
or baby clothes, thereby linking together discourses of feminised pleasure in
consumption and pleasure in production. Mumpreneurial production is
made possible through women’s knowledge and work as consumers (see
Pettinger 2015). Fulﬁlling, enjoyable work is to be found by generating
consumer lifestyle products: to be ‘closer’ to the imagined centre of that
milieu. In the henlit novel Goodbye Jimmy Choo, for example, two newly
countryside-based mumpreneurs set up a business selling a rural wonder
skin cream based on one of their distant French relatives’ recipes, calling
their company Paysage Enchanté and selling their product for a large proﬁt
in upscale metropolitan skincare emporiums (Sanders 2004). For these henlit
characters, just like the women portrayed in lifestyle magazines like Eve, the
synchronicity and congruence between the branded producer and the con-
sumer products they produce and/or sell is crucial. (In the novel this is
played out through comic scenes about excessive image management, as the
mumpreneurs dress up as ‘rustic peasants’ in a way far removed from their
everyday lifestyle). The vast majority of businesses run by mumpreneurs
featured in magazines tend to be home-oriented, caring-related or directed
at a female consumer (Lewis 2010; Eikhof, Carter and Summers 2013). For
Patricia Lewis, such reportage both reduces business potential and is a
regressive discourse as it endorses or assumes women adopting full domestic
responsibility within the household (Lewis 2010). Indeed, in 1963, for Betty
Friedan, small-scale home-based entrepreneurial projects like crafting was
part of the ‘feminine mystique’, ‘small businesses which open and close with
sad regularity’ and which, as Stephanie Taylor points out, have a continuity
with much ‘mumpreneurial’ activity today (Taylor 2015: 184). The
domestic-oriented nature of these enterprises are not without contestation:
Mumpreneur UK, for example, has recently argued that the term should
not be pigeonholed as restricted to baby and child-related businesses (Farren
2014). Yet the highly pronounced nature of the association remains, indeed
is built into the phrase itself.
Success in mumpreneurialism is mainly striven for in a tenor of liberatory
desperation. In the 2000s the glossy women’s magazine Eve sold the mum-
preneur as an aspirational and liberated position in its regular monthly feature,
‘Women doing their Own Thing’ (Eikhof, Carter and Summers 2013).
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Being a mumpreneur was framed as a potential pursuit that was for any
woman a realistic and accessible option, one requiring little training apart
from ‘personality and passion’ (Eikhof, Carter and Summers 2013). For
Eikhof, Carter and Summers, such framing endorses a bypassing of business
skills which is problematic both in terms of gendered routes into mumpre-
neurialism and in general.9 (Indeed, the magazine Eve itself folded shortly
after this run of mumpreneurial articles). In her book The New Entrepreneurs:
How Race, Class and Gender Shape American Enterprise, an ethnographic project
based on interviews with a range of US-based cafe owners, Zulema Valdez
notes the extent to which all her interviewees continually emphasised their
success, even in businesses that closed shortly after the interviews (Valdez
2015). A similar tenor of desperate insistence on entrepreneurial success is
detectable in the Facebook self-employment descriptor (oﬀered by a drop-
down box) to describe work status: ‘Self-employed and loving it!’ Such an
aﬀect is shared by mumpreneurial discourse, in which the possibility of
solving the combined problem of childcare and inﬂexible work will be
resolved through her individualised acumen. There is frequently an insistence
that it has to, it will, it must all work out perfectly, for there are precious
few other solutions to the childcare/work problem presented by the current
context. The tenor of mumpreneurialism is often one that could be
characterised as an insistent form of desperate success. That this form of
neoliberal meritocratic struggle takes place against a more than diﬃcult
backdrop is indicated by how, in Karmel’s guidebook, a lengthy section is
called ‘How to Persist against All Odds’ (Karmel 2015: 250).
Such desperation in the narratives of mumpreneurialism indicate, despite
themselves, the weight of responsibility and lack of options in an increasingly
shrivelled social context. In 2015 The Daily Mail launched its ‘Mumpreneur
of the Year’ search by proﬁling four women. Alongside mumpreneurs who
had created wedding furnishing accessories, cleaning ﬂuid and zippered
babygros, was ‘Mona Shah, 45, founder of Harry Specters chocolate’
(Sturgis 2015). The article outlines how Harry Specters chocolate company
was largely set up by Mona and her husband to provide employment and
work experience for people with autism, after they worried about the
employment prospects for their autistic son. In the UK, only 16% of people
diagnosed as being on the autistic spectrum and of working age are
employed; only 32% do any kind of paid work (NAS 2016). Harry Specters
chocolate company employs six people part-time who are on the autistic
spectrum, and ‘provides work experience opportunities for 40 young people
with autism’ (Sturgis 2015).
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This business is laudable in providing opportunities for some young
people with autism (a lifelong learning condition) who want to engage with
potentially interesting work (NAS 2016). At the same time its status is clearly
a small-scale survival strategy. There is no regulatory onus on employers to
have any kind of quota system, to take a proportion of their staﬀ who are
diﬀerently abled: such policies were abandoned in the UK in the 1995
(Innesti, Radevich-Katsaroumpa and Sargeant 2016). Support and day-care
services up and down the UK for the diﬀerently abled and disabled have
faced severe cuts as local councils with reduced budgets have been forced to
slash expenditure (Hedley 2010). In this highly precarious context of
reduced provision, people are forced to adopt individualised solutions.
As we have seen, the role of individualised entrepreneurs in actuality is
predominantly a role occupied by the white upper-middle classes, which is
presented to the middle, lower-middle and, at times, working classes for
emulation. Desperate success is augmented by class. Susan Luckman notes
how mothers partaking in what she terms ‘home-based micro enterprise’ are
positioned as middle-class, white heterosexual women who are ‘simulta-
neously of the home and of the global marketplace’ (the case she writes
about, ‘crafting’, often ﬁgures ‘an unrealistic image of seemingly blissful
hipster domestic perfection’ [Luckman 2015]). Yet despite this upper-
middle-class focus, its logic resonates throughout the class spectrum. Julie
Ann Wilson and Emily Chivers Yochim have incisively analysed how
mothers in the US post-industrial rust-belt engage with consumer thrift and
ﬂexible enterprise (Wilson and Yochim 2015, 2017). Here the enterprise
spans the intensive clipping out of coupons for money-oﬀ products and
participating in a franchise scheme to promote products at the school gates
and on social media. These activities are not the same as inventing and
establishing a new business and connect to much longer histories of house-
wives working with commercial franchises like Tupperware and Avon, and
yet their work of managing activity in the home (what Arlie Hochschild
calls a ‘third shift’) in order to engage in what Yochim and Wilson term
‘mamapreneurialism’ or ‘mothering through precarity’ have obvious reso-
nances with the examples I have been discussing here (Hocshchild and Man-
chung 2012; Wilson and Yochim 2015).
Entrepreneurialism is deeply and extensively problematic: it channels all
life activity into a mode of competition, extending inequality and validating
the environmentally destructive model of economic growth. But it also
needs further picking apart. Whilst in some ways it is easy for academics to
carp from the side-lines about people colluding in their own oppression, we
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also need to think hard about mechanisms, modes and strategies of disen-
tanglement as well as entanglement, processes of construction alongside
excavatory analysis. It is also therefore useful to dwell a little on what is
meant by ‘entrepreneurialism’ and to move a step beyond some of the more
asphyxiating accounts of neoliberal governmentality. This is not to say we
should not understand the extent or depth of its savagely atomising,
viciously impoverishing eﬀects: to understand its depths, how low it can go,
to stare it in the face. But treating it as an unrolling logic of inevitability
gives it more power. It is salutary to remind ourselves that these are unrolling
logics which have become powerful but which are not inevitable. The need
to simultaneously understand its depths and identify some of its moments of
instability: to consider its appeal and how its appeals might be redirected.
In this case I suggest one means of doing this is to consider what entre-
preneurialism has become ‘articulated to’ (in the Laclau and Mouﬀe sense of
‘connecting to and with’) and how this articulation is gendered (Laclau and
Mouﬀe 1985; Hall 1987; Slack 1996). The following sections therefore consider
the gendering of the entrepreneur within the gendered rationalities
of neoliberalism, in order to try to extend and to help open up alternative
directions for this ﬁgure we call the mumpreneur and all those connected to her.
Entrepreneurial man
Clearly we can understand the mumpreneur in terms of the percolation of
neoliberalism into the domestic sphere. This after all is one of neoliberalism’s
key features: extending the ethic of competition into the nooks and crannies
of everyday life or what Foucault describes as the extension of marketised
dynamics throughout the social body (Foucault 2010; see Brown 2015). It
is, however, particularly important to consider what is meant by ‘entrepre-
neurialism’ as entrepreneurialism has historically functioned as a potent and
double-edged drive, one both facilitating creative energies and their
capitalist capture. It is useful to consider these trajectories alongside the
gendering of entrepreneurs and the gendering of neoliberal theory. One
suggestive source here is Dardot and Laval’s Foucauldian account of neoli-
beralism’s intellectual and political genealogies, The New Way of the World
(2013). Much like Wendy Brown’s Undoing the Demos, it takes inspiration
from and is a lengthy exegesis of Foucault’s Birth of Biopolitics lectures.
Delivered in France in 1978–1979 but only translated into English in 2010,
these are the lectures (despite the somewhat misleading title of the book) in
which Foucault analyses the origins of neoliberalism.
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The New Way of the World foregrounds the centrality of the entrepre-
neur, enterprise and competition to everyday life and the role of entre-
preneurialism as a guiding principle of neoliberalism. As Foucault, who
they are elaborating upon, argued, this is what makes neoliberalism
diﬀerent from classical liberal thought: competition is not natural, it needs
to be worked at. Dardot and Laval trace how these ideas percolated from
Austrian economists and sociologists Ludwig von Mises and Frederich
Hayek through to their synthesisation in the UK and US by both them
and their students, including Israel Kirzner, and the subsequent adoption
of their ideas by management gurus including Peter Drucker. These
writers
aim to show how a certain dimension of humanity – entrepreneurship – is
constructed in competition, which is the potentially universal principle of
conduct most essential to the capitalist order.
(Dardot and Laval 2013: 102)
Dardot and Laval highlight this genealogy of neoliberal entrepreneurialism
in a chapter titled ‘Entrepreneurial Man’, which analyses the formulations
and centrality of the ﬁgure of the entrepreneur for neoliberal theory and
neoliberalism. (For von Mises, for instance, ‘in any real and living economy
every actor is always an entrepreneur’ [Dardot and Laval 2013: loc. 2570]).
It is, however, unclear as to whether Dardot and Laval’s chapter title is also
a reﬂexive commentary on how man stands for all the genders. Given that
it does not explicitly foreground or discuss this issue or the question of
gender at all, it seems to indicate not. But such lack of clarity also leaves the
issue of the gendering of the political rationality of neoliberalism a somewhat
glaring undiscussed absence.
Dardot and Laval’s gendered formulation of entrepreneurial man is also
interesting for other reasons. The authors pick apart key characteristics of
entrepreneurialism, such as how it entails being a vigilant, alert, self-constructing
subject:
[For Kirzner,] the entrepreneurial element in the behaviour of market
participants consists … in their alertness to previously unnoticed changes
in circumstances which may make it possible to get far more in
exchange for whatever they have to oﬀer than was hitherto possible. …
For von Mises, as for Kirzner, entrepreneurship is not only an ‘econo-
mizing’ behaviour – that is, geared to proﬁt maximisation. It also
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contains an extra-economising dimension of the activity of discovery,
of detecting ‘good opportunities’.
(Dardot and Laval 2013: 111)
Dardot and Laval foreground the years of theorisation, argument and per-
colation which were involved in creating the entrepreneurial rationality of
neoliberalism. They lay bare the idea that, through competition, you might
be able to get more, which is the basis of the marketised mantra of meritocracy
and paves the way for our contemporary moralising neoliberal discourse
that it is your own fault if you do not. And they foreground how
the characteristics of discovery, being alert and being resourceful become
channelled into a logic of competition.
We can I think note that these characteristics are also important to
co-operation (Sennett 2013). They are attributes that people want to have
to extend their capabilities, to realise their potential, or what Marx called
their ‘species-being’: to ﬂourish (Marx and Engels 1976; Wright 2010;
Hesmondhalgh 2016). These characteristics are connected to corporate
entrepreneurialism through this chain of equivalence, formulated in entre-
preneurial man’s economic laboratory. But they do not have to be taken
this way.
Magical femininity
Where can we ﬁnd ‘entrepreneurial woman’ in theoretical literature? Problems
caused by sexism and neoliberalism are not just a problem in everyday life
but also in academia and political theory, where texts that are often pre-
sented as being particularly signiﬁcant, weighty analyses of neoliberalism also
often happen to be ones with no or little reference to gender. In this con-
text it is both important and useful to refer to suggestive earlier work on
entrepreneurial culture, to connect these to key works on post-feminism
and to more recent work on gender and entrepreneurialism from a range of
disciplines including organisation and gender studies. This can help a con-
sideration of just how new the meritocratic mumpreneur is: both to historicise
her as a social type and to help track the changing nature of the formation
of gender and entrepreneurialism of which she is a signiﬁcant part.
In 1986, Swasti Mitter noted that women working at home were on the
rise. Mitter focused on Bangladeshi women in London sewing and doing
piecework at home as post-Fordism took hold and the garment industry
shut many of its factories, laying oﬀ men and white women and
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subcontracting the labour to cheaper exploited zones overseas and the
fourth-world zones in Europe (Mitter 1986).10 The rise in what became
termed ‘ﬂexible managing’ and the creation of pools of domestic-based
insecure and disposable labour was the early stages of a longer process in
which, as Lisa Adkins more recently put it, ‘the subcontracting associated
with post-welfare states is a strategy via which women’s work is actively
being transformed into precarious work’ (Adkins and Dever 2015). On the
one hand, these tendencies can be understood as both being part of the long
post-Fordist moment: the patterns developing in the 1980s are recognisably
of the same epoch. On the other hand, there are now diﬀerent intensities and
modulations which I want to discuss here in relation to earlier examinations of
the cultural relationship between gender and enterprise.
To do this we can turn to cultural studies. Whilst it is often the male-
authored or edited collections on Thatcherism that receive the most promi-
nence in discussions of cultural studies work on the political conjuncture or
conjunctural analysis (e.g. Hall et al. 1978; Hall 1988), important feminist
work has notoriously challenged and extended it. For instance, the 1991
edited collection Oﬀ-Centre: Feminism and Cultural Studies contained a size-
able amount of work explicitly concerned with the gendering of enterprise.
It is useful to consider these pieces, now often occluded, in some depth
here, both because some of the tools they oﬀer are useful and because of the
continuities and breaks with this earlier stage in post-Fordist culture.
For example, Janet Newman’s incisive chapter ‘Enterprising Women’ in
Oﬀ-Centre followed the emergent ﬁgure of the entrepreneurial woman
across the pages of advice manuals from the 1980s. This ﬁgure, writes
Newman, is part of the ideological onslaught of Thatcherism, constituted
through endorsing the qualities of free market enterprise and standing
against collective provision. The chapter tracks the appeal of these manuals
to someone who does not want to follow tradition but could succeed and
ﬁnd their own niche ‘in the marketplace of the world of work … if
you have enough self reliance, ﬁnancial nous, competitive spirit and the
determination to overcome the barriers you might ﬁnd on the way’
(Newman 1991: 241). ‘Enterprising Women’ foregrounds how these ideas
become trenchant by oﬀering such sheer galvanising potential, noting that
they speak to a missing dimension often ignored in feminist analysis of
work – ‘women’s experience of the structures and cultures of the workplace
and business world’ (Newman 1991: 242). Predating the slew of
Foucauldian-inspired work on the management of the self within neoli-
beralism by well over a decade, Newman argued that the ideology on oﬀer
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is one in which clever managing and purchasing will bypass structural social
inequalities, and
[t]he whole of life is thus constructed within the discursive practices of
managerialism; and the potential contradictions between diﬀerent
elements of women’s lives and identities can be resolved – if only
women work hard enough and manage well enough they can have it
all (or nearly).
(Newman 1991: 250)
Estella Tincknell’s chapter in the collection considers the same issue of how
entrepreneurialism and femininity were being fused. ‘Enterprise Fictions’
examines the popularity in the 1980s of entrepreneurial heroines who make
it from ‘rags to riches’, focusing on the heroine of Barbara Taylor Bradford’s
bestselling novel turned hugely popular TV series, A Woman of Substance,
who starts out as a servant and ends up as the wealthy owner of a depart-
ment store. Tincknell reads this narrative as an aspirational fantasy actively
working to popularise the ideology of the individual bourgeois woman who
can ‘make a space for herself within capitalism’, one which ‘recognises class
conﬂict but not class struggle’ and bypasses the mutual help of the second-
wave feminist movement, evading ‘any sort of discussion of the obstacles in
the way of aspiring female entrepreneurs’. What such ﬁctions oﬀer instead is
‘the assurance that magical femininity will be the key to individual success
in a world which demands that only one woman at a time can sit at the
boardroom table’ (Tincknell 1991: 272). The analysis of the novel is there-
fore read in terms of a Thatcherite vision for women which does not
trouble the sexism of existing social structures but makes success a matter of
what Tincknell usefully terms ‘magical femininity’. This is a matter of
dressing well, using the right attitude and feminine authority, and in the
process reinvigorating ‘the mythology of the unique individual and its promise
of self-fulﬁlment’ (Tincknell 1991: 262).11
Both chapters examine the uses and attitudes toward consumer goods (in
the form of media artefacts and business books as well as their representation
of the landscapes of consumption) to explore how the highly individualised,
right-wing ﬁgure of the enterprising, consuming female was gaining cultural
and political currency at this time at the expense of a more collective feminist
vision of the social order. They indicate the importance of the discourse of
the consuming woman who manages her way out of her class position and
social diﬃculties to the neoliberal ideological project from the 1970s.
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Despite some hugely imaginative and important work (e.g. Rowbotham,
Segal and Wainwright 2012), it also indicates the wider failure of the political
left to oﬀer a popular mainstream version of social democratic feminism in
relation to this vision of liberation through individual hedonistic consumerism
and a managerial, entrepreneurial self.
How such formations spoke to younger women pursuing careers in the
cultural industries has been extensively analysed by Angela McRobbie in a
series of multifaceted pieces since the 1990s, writing which also drew on her
earlier inﬂuential work on gender, consumption and individualisation (e.g.
McRobbie 1978, 1991). McRobbie foregrounds how creative workplaces
often present themselves as more like clubs than companies, are organised
through ‘network sociality’ and incite self-exploitation through their
appeals to passion for work. She traces how the insistence of the labour
market on ﬂexible, entrepreneurial subjects has meshed with a wider gender
settlement, producing an array of gendered types ranging from the phallic
‘top girls’ disavowing feminism and adopting aspects of ‘masculine’ beha-
viour, through to the more recent strand of corporate liberal feminism that
ostensibly takes ‘feminism into account’, oﬀered by the likes of Sheryl
Sandberg and her acolytes (such as the chicklit author, UK Conservative
MP and US media commentator Louise Mensch) (McRobbie 1999, 2000,
2008, 2009, 2015).
In part what characterises all these writings is their close attention to the
congruence between work and consumption for the success of entrepre-
neurial discourse. Magical femininity is an aﬀective property built through a
constellation of desires: it is repeatedly presented as easily obtainable if the
individual simply puts her energies in the right direction. This is also the
promise oﬀered to the mumpreneur, in terms of how entrepreneurial
working from home becomes oﬀered as a magical solution to the problems
of post-Fordist work (Luckman 2015) and as a feminised aﬀect which
downplays skill and accentuates passion. For instance, in the Daily Mail
proﬁle mentioned earlier, Mona Shah is presented as the woman behind
the chocolate-production. However, articles in the business press see the
company positioned somewhat diﬀerently, as a more equal partnership
between Shah and her husband, combining her experience in making
chocolates and the knowledge he gained doing an MBA (Moules 2015).
Ostensibly oﬀering an empowering feminist image by virtue of Shah’s singular
eﬀorts, the Daily Mail’s type of mumpreneur media proﬁling therefore
underplays the material and business skills needed to launch enterprises
(Eikhof, Carter and Summers 2013), whilst the magical femininity of the
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mumpreneur continues to be framed as simply produced by the activation
of her aﬀective passion. Indeed, such a sizeable lacuna between aﬀective
empowerment (as the singular virtue) and the acquisition of the necessary
skills to carry it through is a slippage deeply characteristic of liberal, neo-
conservative feminism more broadly. In addition, a key diﬀerence between
these 1980s and 2010s moments is the extent to which the individual
women are now incited to be self-branding microcelebrities.
The mumpreneur and the branded self
‘Self-branding’ has become a generalisable cultural imperative that extends
way beyond those setting up businesses. As Alison Hearn argues, today most
teenagers are encouraged, particularly through social-media activity, to
establish an ‘improved self’. Online self-representation becomes a promo-
tional vehicle designed to sell you as an active agent (Hearn 2008: 205):
‘The branded self is a commodity-sign: it is an entity that works and, at the
same time, points to itself working, striving to embody the values of its environment’
(Hearn 2008: 201; my italics). Striving, rather than skiving, has also, as we
have seen in previous chapters, become a contemporary keyword, one often
imbued with a moral charge and a glow of righteousness. Alison Winch
notes that striving is also a charge created between women, through what
she terms the ‘gynopticon’, or ‘girlfriend gaze’, under which ‘what is
rewarded and acclaimed is striving for perfection. Indeed those who are
eﬀortlessly perfect are bitchily viliﬁed in the mainstream media as they do
not evidence the success and necessity of the neoliberal work ethic’ (Winch
2015: 234). This formulation also draws from Ros Gill’s extensive work on
the sensibility of post-feminism ‘in which notions of autonomy, choice and
self-improvement sit side-by-side with surveillance, discipline and the
viliﬁcation of those who make the “wrong” choices’ (Gill 2007: 163). The
intensity through which women are incited into this subject position (in
contradistinction to a masculinity which is constructed as not needing to be
constructed) leads Gill to pose the question:
To a much greater extent than men women are required to work on
and transform the self, to regulate every aspect of their conduct, and to
present all their actions as freely chosen. Could it be that neoliberalism
is always already gendered, and that women are constructed as its ideal
subjects?
(Gill 2007: 164)
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Sarah Banet-Weiser persuasively makes the case for such neoliberal selfhood
marking a shift from post-Fordism and vividly illustrates this transition by
tracing the historical strategies the cleansing product brand Dove has used to
sell its products to women. In 1957, Dove privileged white femininity and
addressed a ‘uniﬁed’ Fordist subject through advertisements featuring a
white model posing in the bath. After the emergence of post-Fordist niche
marketing, in the 1980s, Dove developed ads in which diﬀerent ‘ordinary’
women addressed the camera as ‘themselves’. Today this empowerment
agenda has mutated into Dove’s ‘Self-Esteem Project’, which involves con-
sumers engaging by, for instance, voting, uploading videos to YouTube,
and participating in ‘activist’ outreach work by encouraging teens to use
online Dove workbooks to create their own ‘healthy self-esteem’ (Banet-
Weiser 2012). Through such activity, which is heavily dependent on ‘pro-
sumption’ and immaterial labour, corporations strive to extend the reach
and depth of their brand and become social actors. Women are positioned
as the ideal neoliberal subjects to be enlisted into such activity.
Such a diagnosis of the contemporary promotional use of social media as
marking a break from post-Fordism ﬁnds a further reverberation in recent
statements by the industrial economist and inﬂuential early theorist of post-
Fordism Robin Murray (Murray 1989).12 Murray makes the case that there
has been a major shift to ‘post-post-Fordism’ (Murray 2015) marked by the
emergence of the platform economy and the dominance of digital platforms
alongside – and in many cases over – content. In an attention economy, he
argues, capital needs to control platforms, and thus capitalism’s main work
becomes focused on attempting to capture them; but not everything can be
captured and codiﬁed, and ‘in one sense the means of production have been
internalised within labour and cannot be entirely appropriated from labour’
(Murray 2015: 195). This reading therefore foregrounds the political
potentiality of the worker/prosumer alongside the wider extension of cor-
porate power facilitated by a digital platform economy.
The shift to the platform economy of post-post-Fordism is apparent in
how forms of mumpreneurial self-branding have mushroomed in the blogo-
sphere, with some estimating the existence of 4 million ‘mommy bloggers’ in
the US. As Jessica Taylor cogently argues, mommy blogging, often speciﬁcally
a pursuit of white middle-class women, simultaneously involves capitalism
attempting to harness maternal sociality as it moves online, women trying to
extend their sociality and generate income; and ‘reproductive labour becom
[ing] a site for potential investment not just in children or in members of
the household but in a creative self’ (Taylor 2015: 115). The US ‘queen of
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the mommy bloggers’ Heather Armstrong (who has 1.53 million followers
and the proﬁle description ‘I exploit my children for millions and millions of
dollars on my mommyblog’ on Twitter) announced in 2015 that she was
stopping her blog, Dooce, because of the pressure from advertisers to brand
her family:
At the beginning, it was, ‘We’re just gonna put the logo at the end of
the post. Write something around this.’ … And then it was, ‘Well,
actually, we need you to show pictures of the product’. And then it
was, ‘We need you to show the product.’ And then it was, ‘We need
your kids involved in the post.’
(Dean 2015)
Armstrong posted images to Instagram with the hashtag #NotAnAd to
indicate her rebellion against corporate control. (Later, she partly resumed
her blog, branched out into podcasts, and now marks advertisements on
Twitter more clearly, with the hashtag #Ad). Such actions were reminiscent
of the actions of Essena O’Neill, the Australian teenager with 612,000
Instagram followers, who, in 2015, spectacularly dethroned her own social
media construction. O’Neill replaced her previous photo captions with
revelatory phrases documenting the banality and eﬀort involved in staging
apparently spontaneous and carefree glamour, such as ‘Not real life. Only
reason we went to the beach this morning was to shoot these bikinis’
(Speed 2015). The examples of both O’Neill and Armstrong do undoubtedly
indicate how public acts of breaking with ‘Brand Me’ can paradoxically
garner more publicity. They follow, to some extent, the journalistic structure
Richard Dyer discusses in relation to celebrity as the staged exposure of a
‘real’ persona (Dyer 1980). At the same time they also reveal the pressures
to create a congruent brand which is inhabited by the self and the faultlines,
the splinterings, breaks and moments of profound resistance, whether micro
or macro, to such corporate-sanctioned versions of selfhood.13
Similar ﬁssures are also apparent in the chicklit mumpreneur novel
Goodbye Jimmy Choo. Here, the mumpreneur heroines launch skincare pro-
duct Paysage Enchanté and on the advice of their PR friend extend the
brand to themselves and their home in Provençal/Amish fashion, adopting a
rustic look, altering their interior to remove gadgets, dressing their children
in breeches and themselves in white blouses and ﬂouncy skirts and altering
their conduct by giving up smoking and drinking. The novel’s denouement
happens when a photographer captures images of one of the mumpreneurs
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in her garden smoking, drinking alcohol and dancing with her daughter
wearing a post-feminist pink t-shirt with ‘FCUK’ on it whilst her son plays a
GameBoy.14 Mumpreneurial activity is depicted as necessarily being heavily
imbricated with self-branding and self-presentation: she has to not only sell
the product but represent it, embody it, live its brand in her daily life. In
the novel, this is depicted as a false presentation, the exposure of which
means the end of the business. It is also necessary: at the end, the main
characters retain the pots of money that they have made – it was all ‘worth
it’. However, despite this, the contradictions and psychological expense of
manufacturing such entrepreneurial, meritocratic selves seep through and
become foregrounded.
Disaggregation and alternatives
The mumpreneur promises a meritocratic solution to the overwork culture,
the inﬂexibility of institutionalised labour, inadequately funded and socialised
childcare, and the costs of recession within neoliberalism, all wrapped up in
a package of glamour and self-realisation. The problems of overwork and
potential failure that come with being a mumpreneur are often mediated as
enjoyable chaos, part of a frenetic journey towards diﬃcult but very prob-
able triumph. Yet the mumpreneur primarily operates through a register of
desperate success. The guidebooks urge the potential mumpreneur toward
complete aﬀective and psychological commitment: ‘The best (and only)
way to sustain yourself over all the obstacles is to feel passionate and fanatical
about what you are doing’, writes Annabel Karmel (Karmel 2015: 6).
Wannabe mumpreneurs are regularly prepared for the losses, loneliness and
exhaustion that lie ahead. ‘I don’t think anything of going to bed at 2 or 3
am and then getting up again and doing the school run, trying to grab a nap
in the day, sleeping in cars’, says Myleene Klass (Karmel 2015: 6). Mum-
preneurs are incited to oﬀset such desperation, and to propel themselves up
the ladder of success, through passion. ‘Are you on the passion ladder?’ asks
the mumpreneur website, CEO Mums ([Huelin] 2014; Figure 6.2).
The solution and terms of reference oﬀered by the mumpreneur are
neoliberal: they are organised around marketing an entrepreneurial branded
self and generating proﬁt. They perpetuate the patriarchal model of woman
as primary carer who is primarily in the domestic sphere whilst making her
‘productive’ in a capitalist sense.
How could we imagine these varying neoliberal corporate imperatives
being reconﬁgured diﬀerently, more progressively, around motherhood and
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work? There are always many ways into an issue. To conclude here I will
consider some potential points of leverage.
The mumpreneur’s relationship to capitalist discourse often stands on
something of a faultline. It can consist of interesting creative activity that is
attempted to be captured, scaled up and funnelled into a capitalist mould.
These small enterprises often take an anti-monopoly, anti-corporate stance.
Such points of self-identiﬁcation are often strong and clear, if also ﬂeeting,
in the guidebooks and momoirs. At the end of the momoir, The Mumpreneur
Diaires, for instance, Mosey Jones proudly reﬂects: ‘six months down the
line and I still haven’t taken back the corporate shilling’ (Jones 2009: 307).
One route beyond neoliberal meritocracy in this case, then, is by orienting
such activity further away from corporate discourse, against becoming
exploitative organisations based on a corporate model. Here opening up the
possibilities for and desirability of mumpreneurial activity forming
co-operatives instead becomes an interesting area of potential. A lot of the
current vibrant discussion of co-operatives (Murray 2010; Sandoval 2016a,
2016b) is focused around the young, but it has great potential to connect
more extensively to this constituency. In addition it is important to
emphasise the distinctions between the smaller organisation and the mono-
polistic, predatory exploitations and corporate tax-avoidance of the large
corporation (Gilbert 2015).15
Another crucial faultline is between childcare and work, and here there is
ample potential to move closer to Fraser’s ‘universal caregiver’ model and
share the load of both. As mentioned before, there are very diﬀerent
childcare patterns according to country.16 Maternity pay should be paid and
extended so that parents aren’t pressured back into work; paid paternity/
partner leave needs to be expected to be taken; the right to ask to work
ﬂexibly or part-time needs to become the right to work ﬂexibly or part-time;
and tighter legislation needs to exist to stop employers demoting staﬀ when
they become parents. The cultural conversation around diﬀerently gendered
multi-tasking needs to be enlarged and institutionally embedded. Rebecca
Asher’s book Shattered includes a raft of practical policy suggestions on this
front, including ensuring partners attend meetings during pregnancy with
midwives so their role as a caring parent is embedded early on in the pro-
cess. Gideon Burrows’ book Men can do It! proposes a range of solutions for
tackling the reasons why men do not do enough childcare, including
changing masculinities and arguing that ‘men should not only get the good
stuﬀ out of childcare; they also need to take the hit for equality to really be
achieved’ (Gideon Burrows in Littler and Winch 2016; Burrows 2013).
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This debate also connects to the rich history of socialised co-operative
childcare (McRobbie 2015; Riley 1983), the importance of which, for so
many children and parents, is hard to over-estimate.
None of these issues are isolated but are part of a wider social tapestry.
For instance, parents overwork not only because of a lack of employer
ﬂexibility – although this is obviously a crucial factor – but also because of
the associated issues of the cost of living. (In metropolitan centres this is
often, crucially, the cost of housing). This is why ‘social reproduction’ is
such a useful term, because it enables these issues, which are joined up in
everyday life, to also be joined up in theory. Social reproduction, at its best,
involves forms of co-production which are open, egalitarian and creative. As
such it connects to wider debates on ‘post-work’, which suggest reconsidering
the primacy we give to paid employment relationships and reconceptualising
what human productivity and creativity means, as well as prioritising social
care rather than the exploitations of ﬁnancialised capitalism (Fraser 2016;
Weeks 2011; Srnicek and Williams 2015). The crisis of care, as Nancy
Fraser puts it, involves reinventing the distinction between reproduction
and production without sacriﬁcing liberation or social protection (Fraser
2016).
These suggestions are ways into reconﬁguring the zones, the discourses
and components which together form the assemblage of and around the
mumpreneur. The means of making these changes is, of course, highly
debatable and contextually speciﬁc, and the way these issues are connected
together into chains of equivalence – and how and by whom – depends
on context, will and available resources. But these better solutions at
micro and macro levels both have generalisable elements and contextual
speciﬁcities. In terms of the speciﬁcity of this chapter’s example, the key
task here is to reorient the mumpreneur and the relationship between
gender and the corporation: not to ‘lean in’ to neoliberal meritocratic
discourse so that we are pushed into its contours, but to lean on it so hard
it is ﬂattened, so its implicit resources can be reorganised around our
collective needs.
Notes
1 Reay forthcoming.
2 N. Fraser 2016: 117.
3 ‘Mumpreneur’ is most commonly used in the UK, ‘Mompreneur’ in the US and
‘mumtrepreneur’ in New Zealand.
4 www.mumtrepreneurawards.co.nz. Accessed 1 December 2016.
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5 www.mumpreneuruk.com/awards/mumpreneur-awards. Accessed 1 December
2016.
6 www.dailymail.co.uk/femail/article-3040629/Wholl-Mumpreneur-year-major-
new-trend-women-juggling-motherhood-setting-businesses-like-four-looking-
inspiring-stories.html. Accessed 1 December 2016.
7 ‘Everyday Self-Employment’, day event, City, University of London, 30 October
2015. Particular thanks to Rachel Cohen for pointing me towards the appropriate
statistics.
8 The scheme was a revival of an earlier scheme developed in the 1980s under the
Thatcher government.
9 Eikhof, Carter and Summers noted that whilst mumpreneur activity was very
much portrayed as an aspirational fantasy, its protagonists tended to ‘transition
into sectors with typically high levels of occupational segregation across all forms
of employment, lower prestige and earnings’ (Eikhof, Carter and Summers
2013: 558). Promoting such domestically centred, under-capitalised forms of
entrepreneurship, they argued, was activity that ‘could be expected to entrench
and increase existing gender inequalities in entrepreneurship’ (Eikhof, Carter and
Summers 2013: 558–559).
10 The piece work seamstress has a longer history, and was a powerful symbol of
economic exploitation in the nineteenth century, as represented in Thomas
Hood’s famous poem ‘The Song of the Shirt’.
11 This also resonates with Phil Cohen’s work on ‘magical solutions’ which Susan
Luckman refers to in her article on entrepreneurial home-working as oﬀering a
‘magical solution’ to the problems of the post-Fordist sexual contract (Luckman
2015).
12 Murray’s inﬂuential 1989 article ‘Benetton Britain’ sketched the nature of post-
Fordist production/consumption patterns. It outlines the movement, from the
1970s, toward a multiplicity of intersecting practices by manufacturers – of
which Benetton was paradigmatic, just as Ford was for Gramsci in ‘Americanism
and Fordism’ – such as the use of consumer-led focus groups, computerised
orders and shifts towards the production of small batches of consumer goods that
could be made quickly using ultra-cheap, contracted-out, exploited labour far
away from corporate HQ and retail sites (‘just-in-time production’ or ‘ﬂexible
specialisation’) (Murray 1989).
13 Afterwards, Armstrong said she missed producing her blog, as it provided her
with a relief and it was something she was proud of (‘I made this. I’m proud of
it’ [Dean 2015]). She re-activated the blog on a part-time basis.
14 On post-feminist aesthetics, including pink FCUK t-shirts, see Gill 2007.
15 In the UK, for example, in 2016, the opposition leader Jeremy Corbyn stood on a
platform for ‘small businesses, co-operatives and social enterprises’ (Corbyn n.d.).
16 The US, for example, has no paid parental/partner leave, whereas the UK has
two weeks which can be shared with a mother’s maternity leave.
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CONCLUSION
Beyond neoliberal meritocracy
Many people question the notion that individual interests reign supreme;
that anyone can get on with hard work and eﬀort; and that this society is as
good as it gets. Those who won wars, who got an education against the
odds, who fought for better rights at work, and who worked hard to give
their children the best possible start only to see them joining dole queues
emphasise that life has not always been thus, and that it can change again.
Selina Todd1
Failing to convince
As we have seen throughout this book, discourses of meritocracy are
relatively mobile and capable of being articulated in diﬀerent directions. We
are currently living in an interesting moment because there are more narratives
in circulation indicating in various ways that there are problems with con-
temporary neoliberal meritocratic discourse. Simply put, this is primarily
because since the ﬁnancial crash of 2008, and the political use of the recession
to extend the rights and wealth of the 1% rather than rein them in, the
social ladder between rich and poor has become conspicuously longer, and
the distance to traverse it increasingly diﬃcult, or impossible, for the
majority who do not have considerable structural privilege. Consequently,
as we saw at the beginning of this book, there are now more articles
and books in circulation questioning the very concept of meritocracy
(Bloodworth 2016; Frank 2016; Hayes 2012; McNamee and Miller 2009).
There are also more dramatic narratives implicitly questioning the idea that
working hard is enough to activate talent and propel it to the top.
Take, for example, how the so-called new ‘golden age of television’ has
thrown up some ﬂamboyant examples of narratives that show that working
hard and having talent just is not enough. In the popular cult TV series
Breaking Bad, being brilliant and diligent at chemistry is clearly depicted as
simply not enough to enable career success or even survival in a cruel
atomised neoliberal world of over-privileged elites and a lack of social safety
nets. Breaking Bad’s anti-hero Walter White, a brilliant chemistry teacher
who cannot aﬀord to pay for his cancer treatment, slides into becoming a
crystal-meth dealer. In Breaking Bad’s spin-oﬀ drama, Better Call Saul, there
are powerful depictions of lawyers and shopkeepers who are stymied by a
lack of money and the vested interests of the rich. Eﬀort and talent simply
not being suﬃcient in a social structure undergoing evisceration was also the
critical context of the highly acclaimed Baltimore-based US drama series
The Wire. Each of its ﬁve seasons focused on the manifestation of this pro-
blem within a diﬀerent zone: education, drugs, transport, media and law.
The language of career opportunities is now often presented as more
fraught with diﬃculty and drudgery than in the 1990s. The precarious
creative labour depicted by Lena Dunham’s Girls, in which the protagonists
struggle with unfulﬁlling menial positions, is noticeably diﬀerent from that
in the 1990s show Sex in the City, in which labouring in the cultural
industries is overwhelmingly glamourous and fulﬁlling (Fisher 2014). In
ﬁlm, one of the main reasons the dystopian drama of The Hunger Games has
been wildly popular is because it expertly foregrounds the sadistically
uneven power dynamics of reality TV’s competitive individualism.
In short, then, there are more narratives in popular circulation which are
exposing the meritocratic myth as being in crisis, and there are some which
challenge it. But this destabilisation of a ‘secure’ neoliberal narrative of
meritocracy has not simply involved progressive movement towards a more
egalitarian future. On the contrary, it has been seized upon by new variants
of neoliberal and neo-national discourse. The most graphic example here is
the billionaire Donald Trump purporting to speak for oppressed masses let
down by a meritocratic dream that failed to materialise.2 Trump oﬀers a
corporate justice narrative of meritocracy. He loudly voices his recognition
of increased diﬃculties faced by the working and middle classes, for which
he promises anti-elitist nationalism (‘Make America Great Again’), a promise
directed in particular to white men and activated in the election campaign
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and beyond, through violently racist and sexist ‘banter’. Trump proposes
that anyone can make it, and in his discourse, merit becomes the ability to
parlay ‘talent’, anti-elitism and ostensible ‘entrepreneurial acumen’ with
working hard to make it to the top (Elmer and Todd 2016; Ouellette 2016;
Hearn 2016). His own vast privilege is simultaneously sidestepped and
mutated into a discourse of being ‘worth it’. Trump oﬀers a corporate justice
narrative which will work to siphon oﬀ more wealth for plutocrats, and
increase inequality, whilst oﬀering a meritocratic dream to his voters. Those
who do not make it and who disagree with his prescription of rampant
capitalism are, in his meritocratic discourse, ‘weak’; over them hangs his
violent threat of being punished. Political destabilisation is a state which can
be seized upon by a range of diﬀerent political interests, and at present the
new right has been very good at using it to extend its own advantage.
The journeys of meritocracy
This book has endeavoured to contribute to and extend the multifaceted, if
often somewhat disconnected, conversation around meritocracy, to draw
existing strands of divergent debate together and to contribute new forms of
analysis and argument. It has attempted to do so by outlining meritocracy’s
historical genealogies in contemporary social theory and political rhetoric
and its manifestations in popular culture. It has sought to oﬀer theoretical
resources to understand its shifting cultural formations and to analyse telling
examples of how it is activated as a popular parable. Arguing that the
ideological discourse of neoliberal meritocracy has been used over the past
few decades as the key legitimating narrative for contemporary capitalism, this
book has shown how it has been reproduced, popularised and extended.
Whilst meritocracy has a variety of genealogies, the book has argued that
we can understand its more recent formation by tracing its journey as a
term since it came into being in mid-twentieth-century Britain. As we saw
in the ﬁrst chapter, about the travels of the word in social theory, the word
‘meritocracy’ was initially used by Alan Fox as part of a socialist critique of
‘merit’-based inequality. Michael Young’s subsequent more famous elabora-
tion was a social-democratic critique that was primarily oriented towards
education and the dangers of building a hierarchical society around
talent-based ‘merit’. The social-democratic critique was less committed to
anti-capitalism than its earlier phase, and this ambivalence enabled the incipient
discourse of neoliberal meritocracy to take hold. Neoliberal meritocracy,
which has presented meritocracy as a wholly positive discourse, became
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popularised from the late 1970s in social theory in work by academics
including Michael Young’s friend, Daniel Bell, the US cheerleader of the
idea of the ‘knowledge economy’.
I have argued that we need to understand neoliberal meritocracy in terms
of its speciﬁc relationship to the movements and struggles for liberation
around gender, race and class. As chapter 2 demonstrated, the capitalist rhetoric
of neoliberal meritocracy which was developed from the 1970s directly
addressed those with less social power, with what I term ‘a meritocratic
deﬁcit’, and has incited them into the neoliberal meritocratic dream of
individualistic competitive striving with a particularly emphatic insistence.
In doing so it selectively appropriated the aspects of liberation struggles that
were compatible with capitalism in order to sell products, individualised
modes of self-conduct and precarious labour as liberating and meritocratic.
Neoliberal practice and discourse, mobilising its existing institutional power,
has also attempted to cash in on these forms of structural injustice. What I
term ‘neoliberal justice narratives’ recognise structural injustice but then
oﬀer to sell neoliberal meritocratic solutions for them. This is a discourse
which puts the already disempowered under extra pressure, a double move
which promises opportunity whilst producing new forms of social division.
This book has foregrounded how the meaning of neoliberal meritocracy
was created through multiple contexts – social, cultural and political.
Taking politics as it key object, the third chapter outlined how the UK’s
political sphere in the neoliberal period since the late 1970s has popularised
the idea of meritocracy. It focused its discussion around the meritocratic
messages diﬀerent prime ministerial personas have variously projected, from
Thatcher to Major, Blair to Brown, Cameron to May. Whilst the meritocratic
mantra of equality of opportunity has been consistent throughout this
period, it has been diﬀerently modulated: from the authoritarian anti-
establishment version oﬀered by Thatcherism, through socially liberal
Blairism, through the castigation of a ‘morally degraded’ underclass by the
ex-Etonian David Cameron, and on to the neoliberal justice narratives of
potential redemption promised by Theresa May. This chapter’s analysis
showed how discourses of political meritocracy evolve and mutate within
a given national context whilst being connected to other national and
transnational narratives about meritocracy.
All these varied expressions of neoliberal meritocracy have primarily
worked to expand the gap between rich and poor, even while some of their
political strategies encouraged diﬀerent groups of people to attempt to
become rich. A wide economic chasm between rich and poor is a structural
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hallmark of neoliberalism. Chapter 4 examined how neoliberalism’s wealth
gap has been justiﬁed with recourse to narratives of neoliberal meritocracy
starring the rich, whether in terms of speciﬁc plutocrats or as abstract entities
and through a range of motifs from normcore plutocrats to kind parents to
luxury-ﬂaunters. In doing so it marked the shift in emphasis in the second
half of the book from tracing genealogies to examining ‘parables of progress’
in popular culture. It foregrounded the rise of an image of the ‘ordinary
rich’ as a key persuasive motif of our neoliberal times and related it to the
selective poaching from liberation struggles that I discussed in chapter 2. In
other words, the idea of the normcore plutocrat who struggles against the
system is not only a hugely popular contemporary motif, but is structurally
constitutive of a wide range of mediated ﬁelds including politics. It has
become profoundly useful to a neoliberal economic system which wishes to
extend the logics of proﬁt-seeking, marketisation and competition whilst
retaining an image of social ﬂuidity and mobility.
Chapters 5 and 6 extended the book’s analysis of cultural parables of
progress and their challenges in more depth. Chapter 5 examined the
racialisation of meritocracy. The Damonsplaining incident was analysed as
an example of how the discourse of post-racial meritocracy was mobilised
and rejected. Matt Damon simultaneously insisted that diversity did not
matter and that he was the one who knew how to deal with it, a tautological
framing which when performed through the attempted silencing of a highly
experienced black producer provoked substantial media ridicule and out-
rage. As the chapter argued, the very vignettes and performative parables of
meritocracy that reality-TV talent-search competitions have publicised so well
are themselves a constitutive part of the problem of inequality; problems
Damon, as producer and presenter, embodied. Here, the idea of a post-
racial meritocracy was crumbling, was appearing ridiculous, was unbearable.
The emergence of the mumpreneur, as the last chapter outlined, is often
presented as a solution for the recognised problems of inequality at work and
inequalities over childcare at home faced by parents but disproportionately by
mothers. As such the mumpreneur oﬀers a highly gendered version of what
I term a ‘neoliberal justice narrative’. This chapter positioned mumpre-
neurialism in its historical context to clarify how it is being oﬀered as an
ostensibly meritocratic solution to these wider social failures to deal with the
relationship between productive and reproductive labour, whilst extending
the business of proﬁt-seeking further into the home. In particular, it fore-
grounded the ﬂip side of narratives of mumpreneurial triumph by highlighting
a trope I termed ‘desperate success’, the insistence that people are winning
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even as the costs – online and oﬄine, in and out of the home – of its
multiple exertions are palpable.
As we saw in chapter 1, people are more likely to tolerate severe
inequality, if it is suggested that, regardless of this fact, there is enough social
mobility for everyone to succeed. But full social mobility simply cannot
co-exist with extreme inequality. If there is not anything like a level playing
ﬁeld, to deploy another beloved trope of meritocracy discussed in chapter 1,
the structural advantages given to the children of the rich and the extreme
disadvantages constraining the lives of the poor simply negate the opportu-
nities for social mobility ad inﬁnitum. Meritocracy as a social system is
therefore a structural impossibility, and, as a cultural discourse, it is a
damaging ﬁction.
What is the alternative?
Clearly, the language of ‘equality of opportunity’ has been used to restrict
the possibilities of this outcome for the majority. As this book’s title indicates,
we need to name neoliberal meritocracy as a problem. We need to talk
more loudly about how it functions as a ﬁgleaf for inequality. We need to
foreground the variety of collaborations, solidarities and change needed to
create a more equitable society and to discuss, strengthen and implement
alternatives. We need to take the power away from the 1% and give it to
the 99%. Ultimately this means ﬁnding techniques and strategies to undermine
and dismantle neoliberal ideology and economics – phenomena which, as
Doreen Massey pointed out, are intimately interrelated through the voca-
bularies we use – and to produce greater velocity towards economic
equality, anti-capitalism, anti-racism, anti-sexism and environmentalism
(Massey 2013).
In conventional political terms, then, I am arguing for ‘equality of out-
come’ above and instead of ‘equality of opportunity’, as chapter 1 discussed.
However, I also argue that it is crucial to understand the signiﬁcance and
salience of the languages of opportunity which are being mobilised. For
what this neoliberal language of opportunity speaks to, in its most positive
sense, is a desire for human lives and potential not to be constrained and to
ﬁnd occupations and/or outlets in forms of activity that match the abilities
they have developed so far and enable them to ﬂourish in a way which is
not delimited by the precise context they were born into. It is a formulation
which notices that what we are born into may be constraining; it is a for-
mulation which recognises that the world is large and multifaceted and
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speaks to adventurous desire to extend our capacities to act, our capabilities.
These facets of the desire for meritocracy and its often used political/academic
synonym ‘equality of opportunity’ should not be minimised but recognised.
They are recognised by plutocrats and the right. To put this in even simpler
terms: we need to argue for economic equality and for social, environmental
and cultural diversity.
But what does the alternative mean in practice? It is varied and multi-
faceted, to be sure, but there are a lot of resources we can draw on here.
Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett’s book The Spirit Level, for instance,
has used an array of disciplinary evidence to prove that the more equal
income levels in a society are, the happier and healthier it is: the narrower
the income gap, the more advantageous it is for all. They argue that greater
equality and an end to the obsession with economic growth is the way –
indeed the only possible way – to rein in consumerism, tackle global
warming and improve the quality of life (Wilkinson and Pickett 2010). Like
the 2015 ﬁlm based on it, The Divide, The Spirit Level does an excellent job
of foregrounding the critical importance of working towards economic
equality for the good of all. Like an array of other theorists (Hall, Massey
and Rustin 2013; Simms 2009; Wright 2010), they argue that to reduce
inequality we have to expose the damage caused by, and jettison our
attachments to, the idea of economic growth:
We have seen that the rich countries have got to the end of the really
important contributions which economic growth can make to the
quality of life and also that our future lies in improving the quality of
the social environment in our societies.
(Wilkinson and Pickett 2010: 272)
At the end of the book Wilkinson and Pickett discuss a range of diﬀerent
strategies to move toward economic equality, such as using taxes and beneﬁts
or narrowing the diﬀerence in gross market incomes. They argue we need
to use both (Wilkinson and Pickett 2010: 245).
Alongside economic inequality we need to reduce discrimination. As
Stephen McNamee and Robert Miller put it, ‘merit is in reality only one
factor among many that inﬂuence who ends up with what. Nonmerit factors
are also at work’. Discrimination is ‘a major source of nonmerit inequality’
(McNamee and Miller 2009: 215, 229). Education is of pivotal importance
in addressing broader cultures of discrimination (Guinier 2015), as is the
importance of legal regulation to deal with structural inequalities, including
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in the form of anti-discrimination laws. McNamee and Miller also promote
aﬃrmative action policies, through, for example, the use of quotas for
women and non-white people in institutional contexts as a basic regulatory
code rather than relying on the whims of the already powerful who tend to
hail from a very limited demographic base. As Gary Younge put it: ‘I am
not in favour of quotas in general. They are a blunt instrument. But I am
even less in favour of getting nothing done and I prefer blunt instruments to
no tools at all’ (Younge 2014).
Alongside strategies to redistribute wealth, and to tackle discrimination,
we also need a greater amount of socialised provision (Gilbert 2013). The
grossly inﬂated phenomenon of corporate power needs cutting down, and
the potential of democratic employee share-ownership (Wilkinson and
Pickett 2010: 255) and co-operatives (Sandoval 2016a, 2016b) expanding.
Crucially there are forms of collective provision that we all need because
of our interdependency: we need government spending on healthcare,
education and transportation, as well as libraries and community centres. But
I do not advocate extending noblesse oblige, or the altruistic philanthropy of
the rich, to fund such forms of socialised provision (and here I depart from
McNamee and Miller’s otherwise excellent analysis). For as I have outlined
above and explored at greater length in chapter 4, the rich have found
plenty of ways through philanthrocapitalism to use donations to vastly
extend their power and perpetuate new inequalities. Instead we need con-
certed actions to break down such concentrations of wealth. Where this
theme is taken up at persuasive length is in Andrew Sayer’s readable
and thorough scholarly work Why We Can’t Aﬀord the Rich, discussed in
chapter 4. Sayer presents an array of strategies to curb the wealth extraction
produced by plutocratic rentiers, from radical reform of the institutions of
ﬁnance capitalism, to a maximum wage, to tackling inheritance (Sayer
2016).
The potential of digital technology in sharing wealth is also critical. How
we can maximise the beneﬁts of new technologies, rather than prioritising
proﬁt for technology companies through planned obsolescence and create
more eﬃcient forms of solar power to share resources are all key issues
(Wilkinson and Pickett 2010: 266). The potential of technology in demo-
cratising politics, in extending democratic decision-making and participatory
politics, has been explored in a variety of works (Bria 2015; Fisher and
Gilbert 2014). In Inventing the Future, for instance, Nick Srnicek and Alex
Williams set out a way to think boldly about post-capitalist social and
technological policy and potential: of combining a ‘universal basic income’
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with a genuinely smart and social use of technology to minimise tedious
labour and maximise sociality (Srnicek and Williams 2015).
There are then a wide array of strategies which could most deﬁnitely be
used, in our lifetimes, to move away from the inequalities of capitalist
meritocracy. But practical strategies are but one part of the picture. As this
book has shown, the ideology of meritocracy has been the key justiﬁcation
for neoliberalism, and it has operated on multiple levels: through political
narrative and strategy, through social theory, and through widely dis-
seminated parables of popular culture. Undoing the power of neoliberal
meritocracy therefore also has to work on multiple levels. Such alternatives
need coherent and powerful forms of political representation and persuasion.
They have to deal with a media landscape which is becoming increasingly
right-wing. To win support, to gain broader, hegemonic power they need
to be popularised within everyday discourse, through engaging media
forms, and through organisational practices.
Changing the cultural pull of meritocratic hope
Might we not retain the word ‘meritocracy’ to indicate the necessity for
people to be able to move into spheres of work into which they were not
necessarily born? We have social democratic meritocracy and neoliberal
meritocracy: might we not have a diverse, non-authoritarian socialist
meritocracy too? It is not completely inconceivable that there could be a
strategic use of the term in this vein. But ‘meritocracy’ has, ever since it was
ﬁrst used and in all its diﬀerent historical–political incarnations, meant a
society where people are given far greater economic rewards according to
their perceived merit. This creates a system of economic inequality, which
means their children grow up in privileged circumstances. ‘Meritocracy’ is
thus, as it has always been used so far, a tautology.
It is important to disaggregate the diﬀerent components of discursive
formations of meritocracy, as I have attempted to do throughout this book.
What is worth keeping is a question which is a little diﬀerent, for as we
have seen there are diﬀerent components or aspects of an ideology of
meritocracy depending on which particular era, ﬁeld and/or discursive forma-
tion it is part of. There is plenty that is good, admirable and useful about many
of the separate components of the contemporary ideology of meritocracy.
For instance: ‘working hard’. Obviously this is articulated in the neoliberal
ideology of meritocracy to capitalism, to the idea of overwork in the service
of neoliberal capital, to working too hard for the further proﬁt of the
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already wealthy. Yet working hard in the sense of focusing, putting in eﬀort
and persevering through diﬃcult moments and tough times is, of course, not
a bad quality unto itself. Indeed, it is an important and a crucial quality that
needs to be cultivated and drawn upon in order to expand our potential
(Wright 2010; Hesmondhalgh 2016). At the same time it is equally impor-
tant to insist that it always needs to be accompanied by enough time for rest
and recuperation. It is what ‘working hard’ becomes connected to, or what
cultural studies calls ‘articulated to’, in the ‘chain of equivalence’ that is
neoliberal meritocracy, which is the problem (Slack 1996; Hall 2016).
Similarly, aspiring to be involved in pursuits and work that is diﬀerent
from that pursued by people in the zone, the habitus, the locale you have
grown up in or have become habituated to is obviously also not a bad
thing. Aspiring to do and be something diﬀerent is, of course, not problematic
per se. Just as with focused hard work, pursuing such diﬀerence is usually a
crucial and important part of living. Again, its potential for extending our
capacities to act, for human ﬂourishing and self/collective realisation is
immense, and its ubiquity indicates why neoliberal meritocracy has power.
It is important to recognise that these are key aﬀective zones from which
neoliberal meritocracy becomes fuelled. They are sources of power and
emotional resonance, and their appropriation is a core reason why neoliberal
meritocracy works. Orienting these powerful aﬀects and attributes in
diﬀerent directions, through less individualistic and more co-operative
pathways, is crucial.
Equally, it is not useful or credible to deny the importance of merit. It is,
however, important to argue about what forms of merit are useful for what
purpose, and to nurture them in their diversity. It is not useful, as Michael
Young’s satire pointed out all those years ago, to create an elite cadre of
those deemed to have merit at the expense of others and of themselves
(Young 2004). As Alan Fox said, why would you want to heap great wealth
and prizes on the already prodigiously talented? Surely we should ﬁnd
better ways to share our skills (Fox 1956). Following in this vein, in this
tradition of left sociology, I argue that the word ‘meritocracy’ has become
too toxic for it to be recuperated. Instead, we should argue for economic
equality combined with social, cultural and environmental diversity.
Alternatives to the ladder
A variety of people opt out of the meritocratic race for one reason or
another. Whilst, as we have seen in chapter 4, some elites, particularly those
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who have a public proﬁle, often strenuously use discourses of meritocracy
to justify their position, for other sections of the super-elite, meritocracy is
simply an irrelevant discourse with which they have no need to be concerned.
This is particularly the case with high earners in the ﬁnancial industries for
whom having a public proﬁle is not a necessity (Freeland 2012; Mizruchi
2013). Similarly, although from a very diﬀerent political angle, the merito-
cratic discourse that ‘eﬀort mobilising talent’ will propel you to the top can
be rejected by those sections of the working and middle classes who do not
see any persuasive evidence for believing in the discourse of neoliberal
meritocracy or believing that it is fair. Why bother with the rat race when
the race is rigged? From downsizing lifestyles to dropping out, this is a
palpably recognisable popular discourse.
A third constituency consists of those who are actively and self-
consciously rejecting the individualistic, competitive foundations of the
meritocratic myth by participating in politics or in co-operative, mutual or
‘commons-oriented’ activities instead. For instance, the UK co-operative
Altgen was set up by a group of recently graduated students who realised
that despite getting ﬁrsts in their degrees and doing internships, they could
still not obtain the paid work in the industries they wanted to work in.3
They founded Altgen (short for ‘alternative generation’) as a co-operative
group which rejected the individualism of the career ladder, and which is
oriented towards helping each other, working together and in association
with other co-operative groups.4
As we saw in chapter 1, the ladder is the prime symbol of meritocracy: as
Raymond Williams pointed out nearly seventy years ago, it ‘weakens
community and the task of common betterment’, as its promise of individual
rewards ‘sweetens the poison of hierarchy’ (Williams 1958: 331). One of
Altgen’s graphics depicts a ladder turned on its side, above the caption ‘You
don’t need to climb the ladder’ (Figure C.1). This is not just inviting other
people to drop out and do nothing. It is inviting them, or us, to engage in
constructing alternatives that involve working together and to share
resources.
A key issue is what possibilities do and might exist for those who do not
believe in neoliberal meritocracy and those who are actively trying to con-
struct alternatives to it to connect together, in order to create and to
popularise democratic alternatives to the individualised social ladder.
Within my lifetime, through neoliberalism, ‘meritocracy’ has become an
alibi for plutocracy, or government by a wealthy elite. It has become a key
ideological term in the reproduction of neoliberal culture, oﬀering the false
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promise that the social ladder is consistent and there for us, if only we have
enough nous and gumption to climb. It has achieved this feat by seizing
the idea, practice and discourse of greater social equality which emerged in
the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century and by marketising it. Neoliberal
meritocracy, as a potent blend of an essentialised notion of ‘talent’, com-
petitive individualism and belief in social mobility, is mobilised to both
disguise and gain consent for the economic inequalities wrought through
neoliberalism. However, such discourse is neither inevitable nor consistent.
It requires actively reinforcing and reproducing and can be augmented and
shaped in a number of diﬀerent places and spaces. The alternative to
FIGURE C.1 Altgen graphic. Design by Constance Laisné for Altgen. Reproduced
courtesy of Constance Laisné and Altgen via a Creative Commons
License.
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plutocracy-as-meritocracy is a more plural understanding of merit – which
considers merit on a collective and not a purely individual basis – alongside
mutual and co-operative forms of social reproduction which create greater
parity in wealth, opportunity, care and provision.
Notes
1 Todd 2015: 9–10.
2 The US business magazine Forbes estimated his net worth at $3.7 billion in
September 2016 (Forbes 2017).
3 Personal communication, 2016. See http://altgen.coop. Accessed 1 December
2016.
4 Of course small, co-operative groups on their own are not the singular solution
to all society’s problems; the attempted extension of neoliberalism into new domains
has attempted to include co-ops, through, for example, Cameron’s ‘Big Society’
rhetoric in the UK or the encouragement of loose forms of domestic co-operation
in Italy (Dowling and Harvie 2014; Muehlebach 2012) and it is hard to work in a
small co-op and crack the problem of low-paid labour, for instance. But progressive
strands of worker co-operativism are often aware of such issues, all co-operative
activity cannot be reduced to it, and such activity can oﬀer both a crucial
alternative and important preﬁgurative politics (Sandoval 2016a, 2016b).
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